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ABSTRACT  
In[bodying] the Other: Performing the Digital Other as a Component of Self through 
Real-Time Video Performance 
Through practice-led research this thesis will explore the phenomenology of 
interactions between the digital ‘other’, and the lived experience of the subject 
through real-time video performance practice. It challenges the assumption that the 
digital video image is merely or simply other to the subject and aims to re-position 
the ‘other’ as an integral part of self where we perform the other. It does this by 
drawing on Jacques Lacan’s Mirror Stage and claims that through digital 
performance we can suspend divisions between the self and the digital other.  By 
being immersed within the real-time video image the thesis argues we re-enter the 
Mirror Stage and become captivated within the digital counterpart. Through a 
disruption in the proprioception of the body there is a crossover of the actual self and 
digital other which are suspended in each other. Through the use of Head Mounted 
Display Systems in the work In[bodi]mental it is claimed that the actual body can 
In[body] the other subject as part of self. The thesis argues that the digital other is a 
component of self mediated through new digital technologies to be understood as an 
augmented self. Therefore it is through an In[bodied] Mirror Stage we momentarily 
access the loss of the Lacanian real encountered through the uncanny experience.  
This investigation has been conducted in the form of four digital performance 
projects defined as Inter-Reactive Explorations I-REs (i-iv).The I-REs were subjected 
to critical analysis and reflection using a variety of disciplines including:  
psychoanalysis, philosophy, the study of perception, phenomenology, and 
ethnography. The methodological framework for this research has been coined 
‘auto-ethnophenomenology’; a mixed-method approach utilizing auto-ethnography 
and the phenomenological lived experiences of informants. This model has enabled 
both the ‘I’ of the researcher and the other to be equally represented from both first 
person and third person perspectives. The symbiotic relationship between the theory 
and the practice is exemplified through the phenomenology of interactions between 
the digital ‘other’, and the lived experience of the subjects supported by the writings 
of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Drew Leder and Rane 
Willerslev.    
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Key Terms 
Augmented Self: an augmentation of the actual body mediated through the 
technology. 
Autoethnography: is a method of research that involves self study and reflection 
where the researcher takes on board being both the observer and the observed.  
Auto-ethnophenomenology: has been defined as a way of reflecting on 
perceptions of lived experience from both positions of the observer and the 
observed. It is a method which incorporates self-reflexive study and the lived 
experience of others.   
Betwixt: is a term used by Rane Willerslev which connotes a state of being between 
substance and non-substance. 
Digital other: a digital representation of oneself. It is also understood as an entity 
outside the materiality of self which is separate, different and alien – understood as a 
virtual representation. It is through this research the digital ‘other’ can be defined as 
part of the materiality of oneself transposed through the digital video image where 
matter and media are aligned.  
Impossible/lost real: a Lacanian concept which relates to the human condition. It 
belongs to Lacan’s three orders; the real, imaginary and symbolic. The real is 
something we lose during his Mirror Stage when we become an individual subject 
constituted by language. This is understood as the lost real. It is impossible to 
access as it is unsymbolizable. 
Individuation: this is a term used by Carl Jung. It describes the Individuation 
process as a balance between the conscious and the unconscious (as the psyche) 
that establishes the person as an individual.  
In[bodied] Mirror Stage: An inversion of Lacan’s where the subject does not lose 
the real but gains access to it through virtuality. 
In[body] or In[bodi]ment:. The term is defined as being inside another body and/or  
to the feeling of being inside another subject .   
Infinity Symbol: ∞  is used to create a framework where the theory and the practice 
intersect. 
Imaginary: the Imaginary in this thesis relates specifically to the Mirror Stage where 
the child imagines what it is through the specular image of itself in the mirror. The 
imago is the ‘I’ which is based on an imaginary image of itself i.e. the image is not 
real. 
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Lacan’s three orders: Lacan’s three orders of the real, the imaginary and the 
symbolic are all fields of human existence that shape what we are. His three orders 
within the Mirror Stage begin with Lacan’s the real. This is a concept that relates 
back to pre-language and resides within the human organism. This is the pre-
language, pre-subject phase of human existence. For Lacan we never access the 
real, it is beyond language. It cannot be represented and it is unsymbolizable. Once 
something becomes a word or an image, for example the real is lost. The real is 
always in place and it makes its presence known through its absence in the subject. 
Once the child enters the Mirror Stage she/he enters into the imaginary where the 
infant only knows what it is through images, reflections and doubles. This is a closed 
circuit which is eventually broken through language. Once the child enters into 
language-the world of the symbolic, it becomes a split subject. The imaginary order 
is replaced by the world of the symbolic where the infant constitutes itself through 
signifiers. The access to language creates identities and subjects which can only 
come about through difference. This is where we only know what a thing or a subject 
is by excluding another. The reality that the subject lives in for Lacan is a social 
symbolic reality.   
Live chiasm ∞:   the lived experience of a cross-over of the actual body and the 
digital counterpart using real-time video.  
Lived Body: this is used to represent – your own body experienced by yourself, as 
yourself. 
Lived experience: a subject’s first hand account of their experience. 
Lost real: I am defining the lost real, as the leftover of some primordial phase of 
human development encountered through the uncanny experience. 
Mirror Stage: is a Lacanian process associated with the development of the 
individual from around the age of eighteen months when the infant first sees itself in 
a mirror.  
Phenomenology: a subject’s lived conscious experience and the philosophical 
phenomenon of perception.  It is a way of reflecting on the invisibility of lived 
experience. 
Proprioception: the way the body senses its position within space 
Psychasthenia: a state of being when one cannot distinguish between what is self 
and what is other and there is no distinction between them and the world.   
Real-time video: a term used to describe live video feed. 
Uncanny: is defined in this thesis as a remnant of the real which we encounter 
through the In[body] experience.  
Virtual: is understood as a description of the digital video image – the non-actual.  
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Forward  
I have been an art practitioner since the late 1980’s coming from a fine art 
background. I began my career as a time-based media artist using film and video 
which soon developed into video art installations and performances. My concerns   
dealt with the relationship between the body and the artifact, self and other and the 
impact the artwork and the viewer had on each other. My practice was influenced by 
the body/performance art from the 1960s onwards and the video art of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  I embraced this media as a way to challenge the perception of the 
autonomous art object, including the body, as a means to understand the relational 
relationships between these two elements.  
One way to understand these dualities was to place myself within the practice using 
performance as a vehicle to do this. However using my body within my practice was 
always problematic due to the body being represented as an object outside of my 
subjectivity and /or an object of desire through the beholder. In an attempt to resolve 
this dichotomy I took myself out of the live performances and began creating 
performances for the video camera. Through the collaboration of video and 
performance, the screen of the video became a filter which I felt brought me closer to 
the art work as a maker but at the same time it distanced the viewer through its lack 
of liveness. Without a live audience I could concentrate on my body as a site for the 
artwork filtering the real experience for viewers through the lens. Or I could embark 
on live performance which took me away from my body being conscious of an 
audience. I continued to contend with these concerns using a variety of media in my 
MA in Fine Art. 
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However it was not until my introduction to real-time digital video and the processes 
of performance that I managed to return to performativity as a means of re-
challenging the relationship between binary self/other elements which manifested as 
the corporeal self and the real-time digital other. The collaboration between 
performance and the technology is what began to shape this research project. 
Despite the polarized oppositions between subject and object the research also 
began to raise a number of questions regarding the location of the self and the 
material body within these interactions. It is these questions which formulated the 
framework for this practice-led research.  
Due to the longevity of my practice, it was challenging to know where to begin with 
this research in the context of how my experience as an artist has shaped the 
historical discourse I have encountered over the years and vice versa. As a starting 
point I began this doctoral study at the same time that I was introduced to emerging 
technologies in my second MA in digital Performance. Before this second Masters 
degree I was very much a technophobe. It has been through a culmination of the 
digital technology, the live physical body and the real-time video programme Isadora 
which has brought the fruition of this research into being.   
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Introduction    
This thesis explores the relationship between the physical body and the digital body 
within real-time video performance and the way the ‘actual’ live physical body and its 
digital referent overlap in the form of a digital video representation. The relationship 
between the physical body and its digital counterpart, understood as the digital 
‘other’, is what has motivated this research. It focuses on the interrelationship 
between the physical body of the performer and the digital video image as other; and 
the impact this has on the human subject and its perception of self. What is   
particularly significant is the way the digital video image is understood as ‘other’. The 
research does not focus on the particularities of otherness, such as defined by 
certain differences, but it focuses on the fact of otherness, as something which is 
other to the self. It does this by exploring the phenomenology of interactions between 
the digital ‘other’, and the lived experience of the subject. Similarly, when speaking of 
the self this thesis refers to the whole person as a material and immaterial being.  
The following research question arose as a result of this enquiry to understand the 
impact this relationship has on the formation of self within digital performance 
practice:   
How might the lived experience of digital performance enable the subject to 
step into the digital ‘other’ to understand more about the self through the 
phenomenology of the digital other?  
Coming from a fine art background it is important to define what one means by digital 
performance. When I refer to performance practice I am merely discussing the live 
interactions between subjects and objects. Within the context of video performance it 
is not defined by the traditional proscenium stage, audience and performer. It is 
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defined more by the live interactivity that integrates the work, the artist and the 
viewer in what is both a material and immaterial connectedness. It focuses on the 
interactions in the moment. The digital video technology is understood as the 
mediator between the actual self and the video image as other. So throughout this 
thesis digital performance is understood as a real-time video interaction in the 
moment. 
My art practice is located within the happenings of the 1960s and 1970s, and video 
art of the 1980s and 1990s. It is these histories which suggested the scope of this 
research within the field of video performance. Historically my practice has been  
influenced by these traditions including such works as: Nam June Paik’s TV Cello 
(1971),1 Rebecca Horn’s performance Finger Gloves (1972)2  Marina Abramovic and 
Ulay performances Breathing In/Breathing Out (1977)3 the video art of Gary Hill, Tall 
Ships (1992) 4  and Bill Viola’s The Crossing (1996). 5 Also Joan Jonas, film 
performance Disturbances (1974 6 )  Tony Oursler’s video installations 7 , Paul 
Sermon’s Telematic Dreaming (1997)8 Gillian Wearing 2 INTO 1 (1997)9 and Rafael 
Lozano-Hemmer UnderScan (2012)10
However, though this thesis is coming from a different approach which draws on 
performance and analogue video, the research explores the transition from analogue 
to digital advancing my practice as a video performance artist. It is important to note 
that the shift from analogue to digital does not encompass cyberspace and virtual 
worlds within contemporary art practice. This is because the construction of self 
within virtual worlds is less of a concern than understanding the way the self is 
constructed and understood when we interact with the real-time self projected video 
.These artists and others will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter one (pp. 42-49) to articulate the way they have influenced 
my practice through their use of the body and technology. 
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image.  Previously my concerns between the self/other relationships had been 
through pre-recorded analogue video. It was not until I encountered the real-time 
digital element of these interactions that the affordances of digital technology 
enhanced my practice to investigate the impact the actual and digital relationships 
had on the self projected image as other and ones perception of self.  The meeting 
place between the digital and the actual image has advanced my practice creating 
new encounters and relational experiences. Though the technology has facilitated 
this research the art practice has led the research in raising new questions with 
regard to binary self/other oppositions.              
It is also pertinent to make a clear distinction between Otherness and the other. The 
other which I refer to is derived from the Lacanian little ‘a’ meaning ‘other’ as subject 
in his Mirror Stage and not the big Other which Lacan relates to the world 
understood as the symbolic. What encompasses Otherness is less of a concern 
when referring to the particularities of political, social, religious, ethical and gendered 
forms of exclusion and discrimination. The little other ‘a’ autre is specific to the self-
projected image understood as other to the self as separate and different. It is the 
fact the ‘other’ is outside of the self when we interact with the image that the power 
relations between them is explored. Rather than presuming that the digital image is a 
mere representation and therefore inferior to the body the thesis looks towards a 
negotiated balance – a meeting place between these binary elements through real-
time digital performance practice. Subsequently, though I understand that self-image 
and body image cannot be excluded from these interactions they are not primary 
considerations.             
By drawing on psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s ideas of the Mirror Stage this thesis 
proposes that during a series of real-time video performances, the performer re-
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enters the Mirror Stage as a subject where the power of speech, as such, is withheld 
and we are suspended in the world of the Imaginary. This is what Lacan regards as 
an imaginary image of the self reflected in the mirror. This work will demonstrate how 
the actual self becomes captured within the digital counterpart through a disruption in 
the proprioception of the body immersed within the other. As a result this thesis is 
postulating that it is through digital performance that we can suspend divisions 
between the self and their digital other. Thus arguing that while the self is reflected 
within the digital ‘other’, it can overcome any divisions between them, where self is 
not lost in the other.  
The concept of the other as discussed from a variety of perspectives will be 
described to explain how it has become a socially constructed phenomenon to 
understand the notion that the digital counterpart is other to the self. The thesis looks 
for evidence of an overlap between the digital body and its physical referent to 
challenge traditional binary oppositions of the self/other dichotomy. This includes the 
assertion that when the self and digital other meet they can maintain their sameness 
and difference. It is argued that the lived body can experience being self and other 
simultaneously within the context of digital performance to understand more about 
the nature of selfhood. When referring to the ‘lived body’ it is a term used to connote 
your own body, as experienced by yourself, as yourself. The thesis claims that when 
the physical body interacts with its digital counterpart the digital other is a part of the 
self. These positions overturn and challenge the accepted binary self/other 
definitions, where the other is understood to be a separate entity to the human 
subject.  
As well as in relation to the other, the self is articulated from the viewpoint of 
sociologists Charles Horton Cooley and George Henry Mead. Both of these writers 
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believed the self was constructed through social interactions with others. Cooley’s 
Looking Glass Self (1902) is based on how we are shaped through the way others 
may perceive us. Whereas, for Mead, his notion of the self has been focused on 
cognitive processes where we can think outside ourselves as object and less on how 
we feel about the way others see us (1934).  
During the onset of this research the word ‘double’ was used instead of the ‘other’. 
However, as the exploration progressed it became apparent that the term ‘double’ 
had more associations with “having two different roles or interpretations, esp. 
implying confusion or deceit (double meaning; leads a double life)”.The Concise 
Oxford  Dictionary  (Thompson 1995, p.405).11 The term ‘the double’ focused more 
on sameness, or a pair which was less challenging than the impact ‘the other’ had on 
the perception of an entity outside the self as alien, fearful, or separate. The word 
‘other’ also had a much stronger association with the user as both subject and object 
within telematic digital performance. It was the tensions between the video image as 
other (not-me) and the relationship with the self (me), experienced as both self and 
non-self, that began to shape this research. The replacement of the word ‘double’ to 
‘other’ more closely resembled the dynamic between the duality of the subject/object 
paradox of being one and the same within psychoanalysis and in particular the 
writings of Lacan on his ‘Mirror Stage’. This is particularly relevant to the 
interrelationship between the user of the artwork and the artwork itself as both 
instances are co-dependent on the self/other dynamic. Together with the interaction 
between the physical body and the digital other this thesis will focus on the impact 
this may have on one’s perception of self. Also it will inform and shape further 
knowledge and understanding of the lived experience of digital performance.  
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Paul Sermon’s work Telematic Dreaming (1997)12 and the performative experiences 
of Susan Kozel in her paper Spacemaking (1994)13 informed my MA practice. These 
artists were working within the field of telematics (were one could remotely interact 
with another subject) which had an impact on my practice. It was these artists in 
conjunction with theorist and performer Steve Dixon who influenced the research. It 
was Dixon’s coining of the term ‘digital double’ (2007)14
In particular it was Sermon’s earlier work that motivated this research where he 
enabled subjects to interact with each other using real-time video conferencing 
techniques.  In Telematic Dreaming (1992) two beds are remotely linked via ISDN 
video conferencing and audiences can remotely interact with each other on a virtual 
bed. This was first shown at Kajaani Art Gallery and Helsinki Telegalleria Finland. 
Similarly, in Sermon’s A Body of Water (1999) 
 within the context of digital 
performance that spurred this research on. Though Dixon’s ‘digital double’ is 
explored as an alter ego and/or a spiritual emanation it was the phenomena of the 
‘digital double’, the performative ‘felt’ experiences of Kozel and the work of Sermon, 
that underpinned the MA practice and began shaping this doctoral research. 
15a site specific installation which 
linked the Herten Colliery showers room with the Wilhelm Lehmbruck Museum 
Duishburg in Germany. He used real-time video images projected onto a wall of 
water which transported audiences remotely from one location to another. As well as  
Unheimlich (2005)16 a remote interactive real-time video play which virtually linked 
up actors in Salford, Manchester UK with audiences in Rhode Island USA. All these 
works enabled subjects to remotely interact with each other in real-time. His later 
work which moved into second Life is concerned with blurring the boundaries 
between online and offline identities. This research, however, is located between the 
crossing over of the corporeal body and the real-time digital other and the impact this 
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interaction has on the perception of self. Moreover it has been the writings of Kozel 
in Spacemaking (1994) and Closer (2007) which led to a greater understanding of 
phenomenological experiences. It has been Kozel’s account of the morphing of 
shared experiences between subjects within performance practice and the impact 
these intersubjectivities have on each other which has contributed to an 
understanding of phenomenological experiences amongst subjects. She borrows the 
term ‘heterophenomenology’ from American philosopher and writer Daniel Dennett 
where she discusses the shared phenomenological experiences of two different 
subjects as a shared experience. Though Kozel’s interpretation of 
heterophenomenology has informed this research the term is not used to encompass 
the methodology as a whole due to the ‘autoethnographic’ element to the research.  
Whilst working alongside these influences it has been the writings of Lacan which 
has also developed a shift in a critical understanding of the ‘digital double’ to ‘other’. 
It was the introduction to new digital technologies that made a marked impact on my 
work as a video performance artist. This together with the phenomenological 
questions that arose during my practice then determined the direction of this doctoral 
research.  
The thesis is structured into three main chapters. Chapter one presents a contextual 
overview of the other within theoretical discourses to position ‘self projection as 
other’ within a given context. Chapter two is dedicated to a qualitative practice led-
study and Chapter three presents the findings from that study in a contribution to 
new knowledge.  
Throughout the thesis we come to develop an understanding of what the other 
means and the implications it has on the construction of the subject. Furthermore 
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what is pertinent to this research is the impact Lacan’s Mirror Stage17
This thesis will also present some ideas on how the digital other as a separate entity 
may be shaped by our fixed viewpoint of ourselves and our interactions with digital 
counterparts. For instance when we consider the concept of the digital other we 
imagine an image which is separated and other to the self. These notions suggest 
that our relationship with the image is alienated and we have no inter-connectivity 
between them. By looking at the way human to human interactions are connected 
with each other we can explore the way emotions and behaviour between subjects 
has a profound impact on ones perception of self. In this way we can look towards 
emerging technologies which may be able to bridge these gaps and create a 
seamless connection between the self and the digital counterpart.   
 has had on the 
construction of the human subject from a psychoanalytic position. It is through 
Lacanian discourse we can come to understand the way the social symbolic world of 
language has established the subject as an individual. By drawing on the Mirror 
Stage we see how Lacan’s work on his split subject has made sense of the 
relationship between the individual and its perception of reality within digital 
performance.  
Apart from introducing Lacan’s Mirror Stage in chapter one the content moves on to 
Lacan’s notion of the impossible ‘real’. This is articulated as a stage in human 
development that cannot be accessed, represented or articulated through the 
symbolic social world of signifiers. The Lacanian writers Sean Homer, and cultural 
theorist Catherine Belsey refer to the real as a gap in the signifying chain. It’s “an 
absence that makes its presence felt” (Belsey 2005, p.41)18. The real is located 
beyond the symbolic, it is always outside language. It is “that which resists 
symbolization absolutely” (Lacan cited in Evans 1996, p.159). 19 The thesis attempts 
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to present the paradox of the real by articulating through digital performance 
experiences which cannot be expressed through language in a way to understand 
more of the self. Though the Lacanian real is impossible to articulate this thesis 
draws a parallel between the lived experience of subjects and the real. Due to the 
nature of being as hidden, the gap between language and experience may be 
explored through formulating new encounters between bodies and technology.      
Chapter one also discusses the relevance of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s work on the chiasm (1968), the philosopher Drew Leder’s work on The 
Absent Body, (1990) and anthropologist Rane Willerslev work on Soul Hunters, 
(2007) . These writers all give plausible interpretations on the self/other dichotomy 
where they maintain that the lived body can manifest itself in both roles 
simultaneously. For example, Leder’s work (1990) focuses on the body experiencing 
itself as both a subject and an object when the body is in pain. It is the body part 
which is objectified and alien whilst the subject feels it. Meanwhile Willerslev (2007) 
articulates the importance of body objectification and its contribution to the formation 
of self. This is most understood when he refers to the Siberian Yukaghirs style of 
hunting and how one can perform the hunted as other through mimicry. The latter all 
contribute to the way in which the physical body and its digital referent are a part of 
each other without losing a sense of self in the other.  
Later on in chapter two we come to see the significance of Sigmund Freud’s work on 
the uncanny and its relations with the real where it is postulated that the uncanny 
may be caught up in remnants of the lost real. This is supported through the art 
practice were this research identifies the fundamental correlations between the 
uncanny, Lacan’s real and the digital other, which are explored in relation to the self.  
To explore these possibilities chapter two presents a qualitative practice-led study.  
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The first part outlines the methodologies used in the practice and the second section 
introduces the art practice in the shape of four performative Inter-Reactive 
Explorations (I-REs) as a way forward to answer the overall research question. The 
thesis challenges the view that the digital video image understood as ‘other’ is a 
separate part of self. Instead the research is exploring the prospect that the digital 
other is a part of self transposed through the technology within digital performance. 
The research uses a mixed-method approach using phenomenological and auto-
ethnographic frameworks. Utilising elements of these methods resulted in the 
coinage of the term ‘auto-ethnophenomenology’. Drawing on ‘autoethnography’ has 
enabled the study to consciously take on board the significance of the ‘I’ of the 
researcher who looks ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ during this research. This way, the 
relational aspect between the ‘I’ of the researcher and the other are considered as 
important contributions to knowledge. This autobiographical element of the 
methodology is particularly significant to the first Interactive Reactive Exploration I-
RE(i) at the beginning of chapter two where, ‘I’ as the researcher interact with my 
digital other through performance to write and narrate a phenomenology from a 
personalized first person perspective. In her book The Ethnographic ‘I’ (2004) 
Carolyn Ellis’s coinage of the term autoethnography,20
In speaking of subjective experience I-REs ii-iv is significant to this research from the 
phenomenological perspectives of informants. Therefore the study of a subject’s 
conscious lived experience is paramount to the research. More importantly by 
drawing on phenomenological perspectives in digital performance one can come to 
understand and empathize with the lived experiences of others. The performative 
element to these I-REs is aimed at enabling informants to have a shared knowledge 
 locates the function of the ‘I’ 
within ethnographic research as an important factor in subjective experience.  
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through digital technology in the moment. The culminations of these methods are 
therefore defined as ‘Auto-ethnophenomenology’ – representing the ‘I’ of the 
subjects experiences, where the relational aspect between I’ and the other are 
equally represented. Above all it aims to complement the sharing of experiences and 
empathy between subjects and the researcher and shift between perspectives from 
‘I’ to ‘other’ as both the observer and the observed. Auto-ethnophenomenology   
attempts to capture lived experiences in the moment through the art practice. The 
methodology is an endeavour to capture that which cannot be expressed through 
language and it focuses on the present as a way to stay in the moment to maintain 
the agency of the subject.  
The second part of chapter two introduces the following four key questions outlined 
below which will be interrogated through the digital performance practice. These are 
defined as Inter-Reactive Explorations I-REs I, II, III and IV. These four key 
questions have been constructed in order to answer the overall research question. 
Using the following performative methods to interact with the digital other were ways 
to encounter stepping into the digital image to understand more about the self. In 
doing so these performances are aiming to experience the digital other as a part of 
self.  
Key Questions 
I-RE (i) Using video projection technologies can we unite with the digital video 
image as other and become one? 
This question explored whether we have the potential to experience stepping outside 
our physical body and step into a digital counterpart when engaged in digital 
performance 
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I-RE (ii) Does the digital other have an emotional impact on the self? Can we 
challenge the impact emotional responses may have on the alienation 
between self and digital other? 
This I-RE expanded the technology to real-time video as a way to step into the self 
image. These were public performances that audiences encountered and 
participated in to understand the potential that human emotion has on the notion of 
the image as digital other.  
I-RE (iii) Do we alternate between the physical self and the digital non-self to 
get to know more of the self and is this oscillation an uncanny experience?  
This question developed the technology further where participants encountered their 
real-time image and a pre-recorded image simultaneously, in an attempt to immerse 
the participant into the image of the other. This was a way to explore the paradox of 
perceptually shifting from the actual into the digital through the video technology and 
the impact this may have on an uncanny lived experience.  
I-RE (iv) Can new technological affordances now allow us to embody the self 
of another?  
This I-RE developed using new technologies, such as, head mounted display 
systems with real-time video technologies in an attempt to embody the image of the 
other in real-time. The question was concerned with suspending the division 
between self and other through immersion as a means to merge selves.  
The way in which each I-RE had been orchestrated was informed by the next one 
using similar key elements. Each I-RE grew out of the preceding one in a response 
to answering the overall research question. The lived experiences of informants and 
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the researcher were observed and collated in the form of responsive field notes as 
self-reflective video, audio and written experiences. Consequently the term ‘Inter-
Reactive’ is used to connote the way in which the informants react to the 
performance exploration and the impact this may have had on them. In other words it 
was important to capture informants’ instinctual reactions to the I-REs as a way to 
understand the impact the image would have on their perception of self during the 
moment and after the event. In this way their initial reactions could be compared to 
their first and second experiences.     
Significant to chapter three is how the theory and the practice interrelate with each 
other and the impact this interaction has on the contribution to new knowledge. The 
chapter reflects on aspects of the theoretical discourse discussed in chapter one and 
the findings discovered in chapter two from the digital performance practice. The first 
section focuses on the outcomes of I-REs I-III and discusses their relevance to the 
research. In addition it will include a summary of those findings and point out the 
important elements of those conclusions which have informed I-RE IV entitled 
In[bodi]mental. However it is important to understand that the first three I-REs were 
also significant to this research in the journey undertaken in coming to understand 
the impact digital performance has on the perception of the self. A shift in the 
technology from basic video projection to real-time video projection using head 
mounted display systems (HMDs) had the greatest impact on contributing to new 
knowledge to the field of video performance within digital media art practice. 
Chapter three proceeds with an exploration of how the art practice has extended the 
theoretical positions articulated in the thesis.  It analyses the findings from 
In[bodi]mental I-RE IV and claims that the video technology Isadora21 was integral to 
how we perceive the self and its constitution. This is explained through the 
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augmentation of the corporeal self and the head mounted display systems which 
have extended the phenomenological experience thereby, leading to a number of 
conclusions where the self can experience more of the self, in the digital counterpart, 
understood as other. These claims are to be substantiated through 
phenomenological methodologies which reflect on the lived experiences extending 
the theoretical discourse. These include a re-presentation of Lacan’s theory on the 
Mirror Stage22
To support these ideas the chapter draws on the impact Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
the chiasm
; articulated as an In[bodied] Mirror Stage. 
23 has had on the research which is evidenced in In[bodi]mental as a ‘live 
chiasm’; experienced at the intersection between the corporeal self and digital other. 
Indeed it is this entwinement of the corporeality of two selves ∞ augmented through 
the technology which is to be defined as In[bodied] selves. The use of the infinity 
symbol is discussed later in the chapter to illustrate the chiasm and the way that 
theory and the practice intersect. The chapter then returns to Freud’s The Uncanny 
(1919)24
The last part of this chapter challenges the assumption that the digital image is other 
to the self with reference to neuroscientists and their work on mirror neurons. It 
compares mirror neurons to the way we simulate the other, through digital 
performance, which might contribute to our ability to empathize with another and 
simulate experience.  
, discussed in chapter one. Thereafter articulating the relationships between 
the uncanny experience, and the lost real.  It also presents views on the way in 
which the real can be performed as a form of experience within digital performance, 
particularly exampled in In[bodi]mental.  
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As we proceed into the following chapter some of the issues presented in this 
introduction will move towards an in depth overview of the theoretical duality of the 
self/other positions, within contemporary discourse. Chapter one begins with a post-
modern approach serving as a starting point to investigate the relationships between 
the actual body and the digital counterpart within real-time video performance 
practice.      
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Chapter One 
Between the Actual and the Digital: the self projected digital video 
image as other – a theoretical discourse   
In order to challenge existing notions of the binary oppositions between self and 
other this research has come about through the writings of Lacan on his Mirror 
Stage, (1977)25
1:1 Mirror Stage 
  hereafter referred to as MS. This chapter begins with the MS as a 
way forward to articulate the paradoxical relationships between these self/other 
positions. Later, we will see the relevance of the MS by comparing its key elements 
to more contemporary theoretical discourse and digital performance practice.  
The MS is a process which sees the emergence of the individual subject constituted 
by language. The paradox of the MS is emphasized during an infant’s first encounter 
with its image in a mirror were the infant sees itself as a whole being and 
simultaneously feels fragmented and separated from its mother and its surroundings. 
The infant becomes a split subject where the formation of the infant’s identity is 
based on an imaginary ‘I’. The child develops an understanding of itself as a subject 
through the cognitive awareness of itself as an agent. This occurs around the age 
eight to eighteen months during the pre-language stage of its development.  This 
pre-subject phase of human development is articulated by Lacan as an organism 
which can only constitute itself as a subject through language (1977, p.4)26.  When 
the infant sees its own specula image in the mirror it experiences a sense of 
separation from itself. Before this encounter the child is understood to be in a state of 
union with its mother and the world. This fragmentation is induced by the child’s 
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underdeveloped motor neurons where it paradoxically sees the specula image as 
part of itself but the infant feels apart from it.  
Moving on from the MS the following text is informative in describing what we mean 
by the ‘self’ and its relationship with the other within theoretical discourse. Also it 
seeks ways to find connections of an overlap between self and other and the impact 
these states of being may have on subject’s experiences.    
1:2 The Alignment of Matter (Self) & Media (Other)  
In order to make sense of what the self is we need to exclude what it is not, through 
difference. This is how we relate to the other, as being a construct of what the self is 
not. We know that the term ‘self’ is often used in many ways to refer to a person 
being in the world, such as ‘oneself’, ‘yourself’, etc.  In order to have a self one must 
have an ‘I’ to distinguish the ‘being’ from the world and others. It was important to 
this research to explore the term ‘self’ as the self is differentiated from the other. How 
and what that difference may be based on will be discussed later. For now it is 
necessary to focus on what we mean by the ‘self’. The dictionary definition of the 
word self is defined as “a person or thing’s own individuality or essence (showed his 
true self) … a person or thing as the object of introspection or reflexive action (the 
consciousness of self).  (Thompson 1995, p.1253) 27 Though it is a simple term it 
has a very complex relationship with the ‘being’ of a person and their connection with 
the world. There are many terms in which the self is often used interchangeably but 
which have fairly distinctive meanings such as: describing a subject’s state of mind 
within ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘self-esteem’ to ‘self-relating’ ‘selfhood’ ‘self-concept’ 
‘self-recognition’ and many more. 
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The self can also be referred to as the agency of the subject. For example when 
looking in a mirror the ‘I’ is the subject and the ‘me/you’ is the object. The ‘I’ therefore 
relates more to the agency and subjectivity of the subject. The subject becomes both 
the ‘thinker’ and the ‘looker’. This relationship is further extended between human-to-
human interactions where the ‘me’ is reflected in the ‘other’ person. These ideas are 
explored by the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley’s theory of the ‘looking glass self’ 
in his book Human Nature and the Social Order (1902). 28
The looking glass self is a socio-psychological concept where a person's self grows 
out of society's interpersonal interactions and the perceptions of others. People 
shape themselves based on what other people perceive and confirm those opinions 
on themselves. Cooley’s theory of the self is understood as a process where the self 
is reflected in the reactions of other people, who serve as the ‘looking-glass’ for 
oneself. For Cooley, in order to make sense of what we are like, we need to see how 
others see us. This sense of self we feel we have in our relationship with others can 
be understood as the core of the self and the driving force behind the looking glass 
self. Sociologist George Herbert Mead also believed that knowledge of self and 
others develops simultaneously, where both are dependent on social interaction. 
According to Mead, the human being is an organism that has a self which converts 
the agent into a special kind of actor or actress that transforms one’s relations to the 
world, and that gives the subjects’ actions a unique character. However, the idea of a 
self for Mead can only develop if the individual can experience getting outside 
himself in such a way as to become an object to himself. This self-awareness and/or 
reflexivity is based on the cognitive view of the self (1934, p.173)
 
29 which Mead 
thought was more important than Cooley’s self-feeling. 
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Not only does the self relate to the interiority and exteriority of the subject it also has 
a relationship with identity. The subject is identified by others and also identity places 
‘oneself’ in relation to others, based on many factors including, gender, race, 
demographics’, and so on. As subjects we identify with others in relation to 
ourselves. Identity is often seen as a reciprocal relationship where ‘one’ relates to 
another or within a grouping of some sort. Postmodernism has brought about the 
display of fractured identities as multiple selves which can be established 
simultaneously particularly within virtual worlds. It has been through new 
technologies we can move in and out of many identities at the same time.   
Furthermore taking into account the type of personality one may have also plays a 
crucial role in constituting how others see you or how you may see yourself. 
Linguistically we refer to subjects as ‘self’ such as self-destructive, selfless, self-
obsessive or narcissistic. When we refer to an individual or even make a statement 
about our own individuality we are acquiring ownership of ourselves as ‘beings’ in 
the world. Thus making it clear that as subjects we are singular objects that stand 
out from the rest, making a marked difference from others as individuals.  
If we take into account the many aspects of self in relation to the body: the subject, 
the person and the persona – these all suggest the flesh of the subject or the body 
as a vessel. Conversely the self can also be viewed as an immaterial entity such as 
the psyche, the soul, the spirit. It has a private and public association with the 
subject in terms of thought and speech where what one thinks feels, shares and 
hides, may be described as a secret self or public self. Notions of extended selves 
have been discussed in many discourses such as New Media, Virtual Reality and the 
object relations theories of psychologist D.W. Winnicott 30  and the extension of 
consciousness in more contemporary thinking in such works as artist and writer Roy 
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Ascott’s Reframing Consciousness (2001) and theorist Malcolm McLuhan’s 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). How self is attached to and 
becomes part of objects has been a main focus of interest for the psychologists in 
the early 20th Century. This leads to more terms for the self such as the digital-self, 
the technological-self, the virtual-self and the actual-self. The digital self has been 
understood to be a construction created by others especially within the online world 
of teenagers.  In his paper The Digital Self: Through the Looking Glass of 
Telecopresent Others (2005) Shanyang Zhao, a sociologist at the University of 
Philadelphia, asked ‘how do people conceive their self when others become 
disembodied and anonymous in the online world’? In his study he found out how 
others constitute a ‘distinctive looking glass’ that produces a ‘digital self’ that differs 
from the self offline. (2005, p.387)   
In the case of defining the self we can come to understand the many facets that 
contribute to the formation of the self within contemporary culture. Perhaps 
searching for a singular unified self will be overturned by a deeper understanding of 
our ability to have multiple selves which shapes the individual – that is many 
components which give us more insights into the construction of self. In 
postmodernism we can already see the complexity of the notion of self and selves as 
is often seen in the example of the virtual self in phenomena, such as avatars. 
Having articulated some ideas on the construction of the self it is important to focus 
on the different notions of the other and to explore the ways in which the other has 
been interpreted as a separate body to the human subject. In doing so we can arrive 
at a better understanding on the way in which the digital other has come to be 
considered as separate to the self. If the ‘other’ is to be defined by the Oxford 
dictionary as … “separate in identity or distinct in kind … apart from… different from 
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…distinct from” (Thompson 1995, pp. 965-966) 31
Although the other is a key concept in human culture this research is more 
concerned with the notions that have arisen out of contemporary philosophical ideas 
particularly within the context of new technologies and digital performance. One of 
the main concerns regarding technology has been the fear of the dissolution of the 
self within the technology itself, understood as other. For instance Jean Baudrillard 
claims that it is the over proximity of things that makes one totally instantaneous with 
them; therefore the function of alienation acts as a protector which gives us the 
benefit of the doubt that the other exists
 It can be much understood as 
being singled out as exclusion, as apart from, separate, divided, alien, unfamiliar, 
and fearful and even an estranged entity.   
32
These concerns are consistent with Otto Rank’s theory of The Double (1972) where 
he claims that the double is also an insurance against extinction
 (Baudrillard 1998). The other for 
Baudrillard can be understood as a good alien that prevents the dissolution of the 
self. The implication that we can immerse ourselves in ‘things’ and lose a sense of 
our self has been met with apprehension where we depend on alienation to survive.  
33
In an introduction to Jungs’s Psychology (1953) Jung refers to a theory on the 
shadow (my italics) which can also be understood as other. The shadow is what 
Jung refers to as the other side of us which can be found in the personal 
unconscious. The shadow is the inferior being in ourselves which is described as the 
one who wants to do all the things we do not allow ourselves to do – it is everything 
. Similarly when we 
think of the other as being different from the self we understand this functionality to 
act as a barrier which separates the human subject to enable its survival. Without 
difference the subject cannot emerge as an individual.  
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we are not ; The equivalent of Mr Hyde to our Dr Jekyll . (Jung 1953 p. 49)34
From Jung’s perspective the notion of the shadow may become much more sinister 
when we interact with our own video image emerging as other.  The relationships 
between self and other become much more blurred when we refer to Virtual Reality 
and the hyperreal. These are states of consciousness which we encounter in virtual 
worlds were it is difficult to distinguish reality from a simulation of reality. Within VR 
there are varying degrees of immersion between self and other where the power of 
absorption can break down these boundaries and create a feeling of a boundless 
body. Though VR may be able to create these feelings of immersion it does not hold 
that if we immerse ourselves within technology we lose the self. These are notions 
that have been based on the fear and scepticism of technology. Rather than looking 
at the relationship between self and other as binary opposition’s emerging 
technology is challenging our relationship between the corporeal and the digital. Of 
course this is specific to real-time video when we interact with our digital counterpart 
without losing the self.  However it is at this juncture that when speaking of 
immersion throughout this thesis it is most understood in the realm of stepping into 
and out of a space – as a space of being within.  
 For 
Jung the shadow personifies itself so when we unreasonably dislike someone we 
may actually dislike a part of ourselves we find in the other person.    
When we refer to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1958) we 
become objectified through the gaze of the other. For Sartre this is when we become 
a self-conscious object by the presence of another, being conscious of ourselves. 35 
Sartre argues that the body is a thing from the perspective of another, and yet 
another’s body is also a thing from his/her own perspective. Sartre articulates this 
when he encourages us to imagine him spying through a keyhole and being caught 
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by another from behind him. His shame is based on the gaze of the other. Sartre 
sees himself through the eyes of the other as an object of shame where he becomes 
the object of the gaze (Sartre 1958, p.353).36
The question of the lived body being both a subject and an object, self and other in 
experience is a dual relationship with conflict at its core. In his book Soul Hunters 
(2007)
 Sartre’s position is based on a dualism 
between self and other, subject/object. For Sartre the body cannot be both subject 
and object simultaneously. Being the subject of experience prevents him being the 
object of that same experience. Taking these considerations into account the next 
part of this chapter presents an alternative to the duality of the self/other dichotomy 
which leads the research in the direction of the interrelationships of these polarized 
positions.  
37  Willerslev shares this problem with the body when he asserts; “If it is 
‘subject’ it is ‘my body’, responsive only to my will. If it is ‘object’, it is ‘other’, 
disobedient of my will”. He claims that an adequate account of the self and its body 
would have to accommodate both of these aspects within a unitary and coherent 
view of the lived experience. (2007, pp. 63-4)38 Willerslev’s view along with those of 
Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and Leder all contribute to the notion that the lived body can 
be construed as both self and other in experience. This is true of course when we 
experience pain. The subject feels it while the body part is other. In critiquing Sartre’s 
position on the subject/object division Willerslev maintains that the body can 
experience itself from both viewpoints. He refers to Sartre’s story of shame and 
claims that the experience of shame requires a ‘double perspective’ in which I am 
both the object of the shame that I adopt and towards myself through another 
perspective on me, and the subject, who witnesses this shaming objectification 
(2007, p.65). 39  
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This ‘double perspective’ is also expressed by Willerslev when he describes the way 
in which the Siberian Yukaghirs go hunting for their elk. As an imitator the Yukaghirs 
can enter into relations with significant and powerful others and be transformed but 
without losing their sense of self in the process (2007, p.26).40 This is exemplified 
when they suspend their identity by dressing and behaving like the elk. Willerslev 
suggests that the hunter re-enters Lacan’s imaginary order where he remains in a 
loop to overcome the boundary between the hunter and their prey. The hunter goes 
through the motion of the MS by imagining and imitating the elk whilst abstaining 
from using language as such.  It is only through the use of language that this circular 
cycle of the imaginary41 is broken where the imaginary order is replaced by the 
symbolic order. By gaining access to language identities come about as a result of 
difference and this is where the infant emerges as a speaking subject. (2007, p.68)42
For the Yukaghirs when they go hunting it is a form of mimesis where their imitation 
does not take on board the identity of the elk. This liminal domain is where the hunter 
is neither the actual elk, nor is his transition the elk, so he is not, not, elk (2007, 
p.1).
    
43
Similarly there are accounts of the Mbendjele hunter gatherers in the equatorial 
forest of the Northern Congo Basin who also use mimicry in a similar way to lure 
their prey. In As Well as Words: Congo Pygmy hunting Mimicry, and Play (2009) 
Anthropologist Jerome Lewis states “I have seen men successfully call three species 
of duiker, numerous monkeys species, and crocodiles” (Lewis 2009, p.239).
  He is neither one nor the other – he is between perspectives; he is in a 
‘betwixt’ state. The Yukaghirs deliberately seek to suspend their separation from 
their prey by refraining from talking in human language.  
44 He 
goes on to say that mimicry enables these hunters and gatherers to perceive 
themselves as agents interacting with other natural agents such as non-humans, 
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plants, other humans in nature rather than subjects in a society somehow outside of 
nature. Anthropologists’ Nurit Bird-David and Tim Ingold cited by Lewis state that 
“This has been usefully described as perceiving the environment as a ‘single social 
field’ (cf Bird-David 1990, 1992; Ingold 1994, 1996)’ (Lewis 2009, p. 247). 45 As 
sophisticated mimics the Mbendjele communicate with a range of agents in the 
forest using plant signs, fake animal calls, and villagers’ languages and customs.  
Ingold also claims that between these “spheres of involvement   there is no absolute 
separation, but they are contextually delimited segments of a single field” (Ingold  
cited in Lewis 2009, p. 247)46 So Hunter concludes that for the Mbendjele the forest 
is their ‘single field’ and their relationship with it is totally expressed in the following 
proverb. “An Ambendjele loves the forest as she loves her own body” (Lewis, 2009, 
p. 247).47
In some contexts both the Yukaghirs and the Mbenejele’s, rise above the symbolic 
order of language, whose principle is to divide and differentiate all identities. Mimicry 
through sound and movement and using mirror reversals, look-alikes and 
doppelgangers, they emphasize the essential similitude between the self and the 
world (Willerslev 2007, p.70)
     
48
The very young child has no sense of differentiation from the world of others, but 
must learn this by mimetically incorporating an other into the self, which then comes 
to be experienced as both ‘me’ and ‘not-me’. In this way the child assumes a duality 
 .In essence the Yukaghirs way of hunting can be 
compared to Lacan’s process of the MS where they become captured within the 
imaginary and bridge the gap between self and the world. Though the function of the 
MS is a way of allowing the infant to develop as a subject in order to develop a 
sense of self it may be plausible through digital performance where through mimesis 
we can perform the other.  
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or doubling of perspectives, which allows it to see itself as another would see it from 
an external vantage-that is, it comes to observe itself reflexively (Willerslev 2007,p 
26).49
Taking the view that through mimesis we can perform the other, the body occupies 
both states of the self/other experience. This is how Willerslev argues that our bodies 
invite objectification where they are experienced as part of us and as other. By 
identifying and incorporating the image of another, which in turn becomes the image 
of itself, the subject begins to represent itself to itself as a separate being. The 
paradox here is that the subject must experience self-objectification or self alienation 
to gain a sense of itself as self (2007, p.67).
  
50
Likewise in his book The Absent Body (1990) Leder describes the way in which the 
body as subject and object are intertwined. He does this by beginning with the 
question ‘why the body as a ground of experience tends to recede from direct 
experience’? Leder contends that the corporeality of the body becomes absent and 
‘disappears’ from our experience when we are engaged in a ‘purposeful action’ 
which reforms our experience (Leder, 1990, p.1).
  
51 For Leder, if we forget the body 
during immersion the ‘body conceals itself precisely in the act of revealing what is 
Other’. (1990, p.22) 52  In other words when we are immersed in a comfortable/ 
familiar activity we forget the body. Only when we reveal what is other to us do we 
return to it. According to Leder when the body is healthy ones corporeality 
disappears into the background. Similarly through the onset of illness, or change the 
body turns back on itself and becomes more aware of its corporeality where it is no 
longer alien. In this instance the illness is experienced as a sharp presence 
threatening the self (1990, p.91).53  
38 
 
The duality of corporeality through its absence and presence is expressed by Leder 
as a way of experiencing both modes of the self/other experience. He observes the 
knowledge of the body immersed in an activity where it forgets itself. In doing so he 
explains the way in which it returns to itself through pain and illness. Rather than 
focusing on body objectification and alienation from the gaze of the other he goes 
beyond first person perspectives, whereby self-reflection can be triggered by 
another. In other words Leder does not see his own subjectivity in the position of an 
object and vice versa but rather as co-subjects. This is where one comes to see the 
world not only through their own eyes but as the other sees it, where ones 
perspective on the world is extended through his/her eyes.  
This line of thinking corresponds with the work of Merleau-Ponty in his book The 
Visible and the Invisible (1968). In his section on the chiasm he pays particular 
attention to the interrelationships between self and the world, subject and object 
where there are no limits between them. In his analysis Merleau-Ponty explains the 
chiasm within a phenomenological context. This is significant when he uses the term 
as a metaphor of skin to express the intricate and interlaced relationship between the 
lived body and the world. Its Greek interpretation chiasma coming from the Greek 
letter X is a crossing over of parts. The chiasmus is referred to as a criss-cross 
structure which Merleau-Ponty identifies as a:  
…double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the 
visible’ where he describes an intertwining where ‘the two maps are complete and yet 
they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and yet are not 
superposable (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p.134).54   
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Though the chiasm is a ‘reciprocal insertion and intertwining’ of the seeing body in 
the visible body, the skin remains a boundary for Merleau-Ponty. The crossover 
between the visible and the tangible do not merge, instead they are a part of each 
other but they do not become ‘one’ thereby becoming something else. His chiasm 
enables us to encounter the position where sameness and difference are not lost in 
each other but a part of each other. “Since the same body sees and touches, visible 
and tangible belong to the same world”. (1968, p.134)55
According to Merleau-Ponty we are both subject and object simultaneously where 
our ‘flesh’ merges with the flesh, that is the world (1968, p.138).
  
56  His metaphor of 
the skin exemplifies the way in which the flesh of the world and the body are 
interlinked and enmeshed in each other. This crossover is also reversible which 
explains how one is both a subject and an object through the act of seeing: I can see 
and I am also seen. In other words I see the world and I also see me through the 
other. He incorporates the idea that I see the world and the world sees me, objects 
look back at me and this is the ‘seeing seen’ (1964).57
Reversibility is a ‘dynamic’, most simply understood geometrically as the shape of the 
infinity symbol or the Mobius strip where the exchange is in a constant sliding state 
along a twisting figure-of-eight (Kozel, 2007, p.36-7) .
  Although Merleau-Ponty uses 
the term reversibility to articulate an ‘extraordinary overlapping’ or chiasm Susan 
Kozel has described reversibility as a Mobius strip.  
58
The Mobius strip
  
59 is a figure which subverts our normal way of representing space. 
It appears to have two sides but it only has one. When the strip is traversed the two 
sides become one continuum where it is impossible to locate the cross over between 
the inside and outside. By locating the chiasm within the centre of the symbol of the 
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mobius strip we see the intersection of the binary oppositions between self and other 
reflected in one another which may appear as one continuous framework. No matter 
how we view the image of the mobius strip, both sides look different, but in reality it 
is one single surface. The crossover of the lived body and the world, the actual body 
and the digital image may be caught up in a ‘live’ chiasmic process through stepping 
into the digital other. This could result in experiencing a seamless crossover between 
the digital other and the actual body through stretching the materiality of the body 
transposed through emerging technologies.  When I refer to the mobius strip, I am 
relating it specifically to the reversibility of the chiasm to demonstrate the 
irreversibility between the actual body and the digital other and less on infinity. The 
figure of eight therefore represents a self, which has a front and a back, a past and a 
future, within the digital performative experience.   
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at all 
things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the ‘other side’ of its 
power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and 
sensitive for itself. It is not a self through transparence like thought which only thinks 
its object by assimilating it…by transforming it into thought. It is a self through 
confusion… a self, therefore, that is caught up in things, that has a front and a back, 
a past and a future… (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.162-3).60
The image of the mobius strip is understood as a metaphor to illustrate the way in 
which, the digital other feeds back into, and changes the perception of the physical 
body in the form of the following symbol ∞ 
    
61 .The intersection between the body as 
matter and the digital other (as media) where the traversal of the matter and media 
are reflected in each other. The phenomenology of the digital other is not necessarily 
a new consciousness but a heightened awareness of self which is continuous 
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through our altered perception of our bodies.  In this way we may be able to 
experience the chiasm through the digital technology in the context of digital video 
performance. So far there is nothing to suggest that the chiasm may result in the re-
positioning of the digital ‘other’ as part of self. However, later in chapter three, these 
ideas are discussed in greater detail when comparing the findings from the art 
practice in chapter two. 
Though the digital refers to the binary numeric forms of digital video, when speaking 
of the digital other, it is regarded as a digital representation outside of the materiality 
of oneself – understood as a virtual representation. However it is through digital 
performance that this research intends to re-define the digital ‘other’ as the 
materiality of oneself transposed through the digital video image where matter and 
media are aligned. Through the art practice, this research addresses our 
understanding of the relationship between the actual corporeal body and the real-
time digital other as an ‘in-between’ condition of being both self and digital other 
simultaneously. This gap in knowledge explores the impact real-time digital 
performance has on our perception of self through stretching the materiality of the 
body beyond its physical limitations where we experience the image as part of own 
corporeality via the technology.  Using digital processing techniques manipulated 
through the computer may be understood as ways to experience Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasm as a digital circuit – a meeting place between the actual self and digital other 
which changes the actual physical experience. It may be through a deliberate 
disruption of the proprioception of the body within performance, we might be able to 
perceptually step out of the body and into the digital counterpart and return back to 
the corporeality of the body. So what was other may now become part of self.  
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1:3 Artworks and Context 
Throughout art history we have seen methods artists have employed to absorb the 
viewer within the artwork. During the Italian Renaissance architect Filipo 
Brunelleschi’s (1377-1446) discovery of perspective was based on the principles of 
illusion to pull the viewer into the painting. From modernism to postmodernism we 
have seen the way artists have extended the body beyond its natural parameters in 
the performance happenings of the 1960s through to the video artists of the 1970s 
and 1980s. The relationship between the self image, as other to the self, and our 
desire to embody our other through visual reproduction is not a recent phenomenon. 
It is through these histories we can see the way artists have been concerned with 
bridging the gap between subject and object, art and artist, artwork and viewer.  
The film performance of Joan Jonas in (1974) entitled Disturbances62 captures a 
connection between the material body and the world. Jonas filmed peoples 
reflections in a river keeping the lens of the camera focused on their reflection filling 
the frame with the ripple of their image.  The interaction between subjects and 
objects is most notable in Korean American artist Nam June Paik’s TV Cello (1971)63 
which was performed by his collaborator and cellist Charlotte Moorman (1933-1991). 
Using three TV monitors and strings Paik creates a cello played by Moorman where 
the TV screens showed closed circuit footage of the gallery and the performance as 
it happened. The human contact between the subject and the media illustrates Paik’s 
concerns of altering sound and vision between subjects and objects and the impact 
these interventions have on each other.  The performances of Marina Abramovic 
with her partner Ulay Laysiepen in Breathing In/Breathing Out (1977)64  also known 
as Death Self (1977)65 are powerful interventions which attempt to bridge the gap 
between subjects. In these performances they both clamped their mouths over each 
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others and drew breath from each other until they filled their lungs with carbon 
dioxide, attempting to absorb the life/death of the other. This work literally bridges 
the gap between subjects with severe consequences, resulting in a loss of 
consciousness during the performance.  In another performance both artists stand 
naked, flanking the doorway to an art gallery, where participants have to squeeze 
through them to reach the next gallery space. To narrow the gap between subjects 
and space has been a concern for German performance artist Rebecca Horn, and 
her work Finger Gloves (1972). 66
The video artists of the 1980s and 1990s have been using this media to express 
similar concerns between subjects and objects, self and other. The video installation 
Tall Ships (1992) by American artist Gary Hill
 Horn literally uses contraptions to extend the 
materiality of the body – each finger is elongated with balsa wood and cloth reaching 
to the floor. This performance collapses space between her and objects around her – 
objects that were distant are now in her reach.   
67, for example, explores the notion of 
absence and presence through a 12 channel video installation where participants 
experience the appearance and disappearance of ghostly projected images. 
Similarly, American video artist Bill Viola’s The Crossing (1996)68 is a large video 
projection placed in the centre of the gallery with a motion picture on both sides of 
the screen. Each side has a man walking in slow motion towards the viewer and 
suddenly stops. On one side of the screen water begins to pour over the man until 
he has disappeared. On the other side when the man stops we see the man being 
engulfed in flames until he also disappears. The concerns with mortality are evident 
in this work where we see the transition of the material body shift from the material to 
the immaterial. The Crossing deals with the binary oppositions between elements of 
fire and water, life and death, the opaque and the transparent. There are moments in 
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this work where the body is between these states where there is a seamless 
transition from one to the other. The gradual crossover of the human condition from 
one transition to the other is deliberately disrupted in the work of Tony Oursler69
British video artist Gillian Wearing and her piece 2 INTO 1 (1997) is a move closer 
towards uniting self and other. This work is significant in the way it depicts the 
emotional conflicts between a mother and her two sons. She invites both the sons 
and the mother to discuss both sides of their conflict openly and frankly. What 
Wearing does in this piece is she switches the roles so that the mother appears to 
speak in the son’s voice and vice versa. As we watch the video we see two sons, 
each sitting on a chair next to one another looking at us. As they speak the mother’s 
voice comes out of their mouths. Later the video switches to the mother who speaks 
in her son’s voice. Seeing this work has been described as ‘harrowing’ and 
‘unsettling’ by Dan Cameron who was a senior curator at the New Museum of 
Contemporary Art in New York. We appear to experience the inter-corporeality of 
these subjects through the overlaying of voice and image. The voices are a part of 
each other, they are genetically, emotionally and metaphorically connected and 
overlap as both mother child and/or child/mother. It is here we see the familiar taken 
out of context and not ‘self’ and not ‘other’ but both. One explanation for the impact it 
had on the viewer may be uncanny as we witness the conflicting dislocation between 
subjects as a form of embodiment. The unsettling quality of this art work has 
immersed the viewer in the conflict overcoming any boundaries between the subjects 
in the video and the artwork. In his article on Wearing’s work Cameron states:  
 
where we see disembodied heads projected onto doll like structures. The stark 
uncanny element to his work brings us closer to our own mortality through a 
disturbance in our own psyche.       
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Wearing also wants us to be aware that within a family, the separation between self 
and other is a more subtle distinction, since in pure genetic terms we are the result of 
the mixing of our two parents… Wearing’s art opens up the possibility of greater 
benefits (but also heightened uncertainty) to be derived from the possibility that one 
is a composite of many people at once, including the stranger in the street (Cameron 
2004, p.101).70
Here Cameron raises the point that Wearing’s work scrutinizes the subject’s 
perception of self within society raising some doubt and scepticism of what 
constitutes ‘self’. Wearing’s work, has used the video medium to find ways to 
demonstrate the overlap between subjects.   
  
Using real-time video in the work Telematic Dreaming (1992) by British artist Paul 
Sermon is a prime example of this overlap of two subjects. In this work we see the 
interaction of two performers connected in remote locations via real-time video 
technology. Both performers can see the other as a real-time video projection where 
they can remotely interact with each other. Performer and theorist Susan Kozel was 
the main constant performer in this work, inviting people to lay on a virtual bed with 
her. In her paper Spacemaking (1994) written as a response to this work she 
articulates the felt experiences of the other performer during these interactions. 
Kozel gives a first person account of the impact the experience had on her and the 
strength that vision has on our touch sensibility. This particular work by Sermon and 
Kozel’s experience are most poignant to this research. In his later works such as 
Mirror OnThe Screen (2012) 71 he collaborated with digital media artist Charlotte 
Gould. Here Sermon is still concerned with telepresence where he moves into the 
world of second life. Here the virtual avatar comes face to face with its physical 
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counterpart. This work attempts to blur the boundaries between online and offline 
identities.  
The collaboration between the German computer engineer Frieder Weiss, an expert 
in real-time computing and interactive systems, and dancer Emily Fernandez, they 
created Schlamp (2003)72. This interactive video installation uses Eyecon, a motion 
sensing tracking system. What looks like a real-time video projection, is a woman in 
a red dress lying on the ground. The projected image of the woman on the floor 
speaks attracting attention. The interactive system detects the collision of a live 
person with the projected image. Looking down at the woman in the projection some 
audiences avoided walking on her while others jumped on her image. The varying 
degrees of abuse and respect the projected video image encountered was also 
experienced by Kozel in Telematic Dreaming. Similarly in UnderScan (2012) 73 
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s interactive video installation also had a similar impact on 
audiences in London’s Trafalgar Square. In the work, passers-by are detected by a 
computerized tracking system, which activates video-portraits projected within their 
shadow. These projections appear and disappear on the ground of Trafalgar Square 
activated by real-time shadows of participants. Also working with digital doubles, 
performance artist Mary Oliver, in Mother Tongue (2001-2002) 74
These former works articulate the way artists have a desire to connect subjects 
through video and performance practice. The space between subjects is explored by 
media artist Thecla Schiphorst. Her work incorporates using body wearable’s to 
 is a video 
performance where she performs as all members of her family simultaneously 
controlled by the computer. These hilarious dialogues enable Oliver to stand in the 
shoes of her family members and become a part of their subjectivity without losing a 
sense of her own selfhood.    
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connect subjects where the technologies attempt to overlap the actual and the 
digital, self and other. In Bodymaps: artifacts of Touch (1996) the work focuses on 
the relationship between the digital body and the actual body through touch. In this   
computer interactive sound and video installation participants walk into a dimly lit 
space and come across a table like structure draped with a white velvet tablecloth. 
Participants see a still video image projected from above onto the table top. By 
caressing the velvet cloth you can interact with the video image of a woman.  
The piece uses a specially designed sensor surface that is embedded beneath white 
velvet. Touch and proximity sensors detect a participant’s presence and contact with 
the surface. The piece is silent until caressed. It responds to proximity and caress 
with movement and sound. The effect is sensual, disturbing, highly charged and 
openly affective. The intent of the work is to create a relationship between participant 
and technology that invokes a space of experience, reflection and vulnerability, a 
delicate balance that attempts to incite an awareness of one's relationship with 
oneself through the act of touch (Schiphorst:2007).75
The technology in Bodymaps is a tool to enable us to re-examine and reflect on our 
relationship with the digital image at the touch of the interface that reflects back at us 
as – the ‘Looking glass self. One explanation for the impact this work has on 
participants could be explained through an embodiment with the image; which may 
be disturbing and uncanny.   
  
The uncanny is something Japanese roboticist Mashiro Mori relates to in his thesis 
on the Uncanny Valley. He claims the closer a robot resembles a human being, the 
more affection or feeling of familiarity it can engender. However the imitation of 
human exteriors, may lead to unexpected effects and unpleasant surprises (Mori 
cited in Reichardt 1978).76  
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These ideas also resonate with the work of Japanese artist Hachiya Kazuhiko in the 
work Inter Dis-Communication (1993) exhibited as part of the Prix Selection 
exhibition at Eyebeam Atelier. 77
If we look at how artists have been using the tools of technology we can come to 
understand the way we interact with it and how it has become a part of the ‘Looking 
glass self’. In other words, according to Cooley’s looking Glass Self, it is the way we 
interact with other subjects through the technology that shapes our perception of self 
– through the other.  The tools of emerging technologies are enabling us to narrow 
the gap between the self/other threshold where we may be able to share our inter-
subjectivities and experience more of the self in the other.  
 The work involved  two people wearing head-
mounted displays, the ‘machine’ projects one wearer’s sight and sound perception of 
the environment into the other one’s display, thus confusing the borders between the 
identities of ‘you’ and ‘me’. The Inter Dis-Communication Machine allows its wearers 
to ‘enter’ each other’s body and perception without being able to influence it. The 
work composed of a video camera, transmitters, head mounted displays, batteries, 
and feathers as a communication system aimed at transmitting and receiving 
sensual experiences.    
 The desire to reproduce ourselves creatively has never been more prevalent than in 
Hiroshi Ishiguro’s Geminoid HI-1. Ishiguro a professor at the University of Osaka has 
reproduced a replica of himself through robotics. Ishiguro presented his Geminoid 
HI-1 as part of the Human nature exhibition78 at ARS Electronica Linz 2009. Ishiguro 
made a cloned robot of himself that combined both the cognitive and functional 
remote controlled programming of movements to focus on ‘human presence’. 
Participants sat around a table and were invited to ask the robot questions and 
engage in dialogue with the Geminoid. Hiroshi himself was controlling the Geminoid 
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in a remote space watching the participants on video. Hiroshi spoke through the 
Geminoid as a vessel, similar to Wearings 2 INTO 1. Those who were taking part in 
the dialogue expressed how ‘weird’ and ‘uncanny’ this experience felt. Most of the 
participants went up to the Geminoid and touched its face to confirm its reality.   
Though these artists have been concerned with bridging the gap between art and 
artist, artwork and viewer, through video art, media art and performance practice. 
The unique focus of this research is the live interactive element of the material body 
with its real-time digital other and the impact this interaction has on shaping our 
perception of self. Though Sermon’s later work on telepresence is concerned with 
blurring the boundaries between online and offline identities  this research is looking 
for a meeting place between the corporeal self and digital other as way to embody 
the digital other as a component of self. This may be achieved through stretching the 
materiality of the body through the phenomenological experience in real-time digital 
video performance.    
In order to explore this gap in knowledge through digital performance practice a 
return to Lacan’s MS is a way to seek ways of understanding the relationship 
between the actual self and the digital other. If the practice can evidence a meeting 
place between self and other where we can experience these binary oppositions 
simultaneously then the digital other may indeed be more a part of us than we 
realise.    
1:4 A Return to The Mirror Stage  
Performing with one’s digital counterpart can explain the way the image of the self is 
reflected within the other creating an overlap between the physical body and the 
imaginary ‘I’ of the subject. By returning to the MS it not only gives us an insight into 
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the construction of the subject it enables a questioning of the reality of the digital 
other, as a real or imaginary experience, and its relationship to the self.    
Lacan’s MS was influenced by the French sociologist Roger Caillois’ work on 
mimicry. In Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia,(1984) 79Caillois suggested that 
insects assuming the appearance of their environment are in fact assimilating 
themselves into that environment. They are captivated by the very space that 
surrounds them and seek to lose themselves within that space; to break down the 
distinction between organism and environment.  Lacan took this idea into his MS 
where he observes how the fascination with, and capturing of, qualities of the image 
shape ourselves according to that image and the constructed nature of the self. For 
Caillois there is no distinction between these insects and the environment; they have 
become space. As a result he regards human personality disorders as a disturbance 
between personality and space. This is where they enter into the psychology of 
psychasthenia and there is no distinction between self and other (Caillois 1984, 
p.28).80
 … the function of the mirror-stage as a particular case of the function of the imago, 
which is to establish a relation between the organism and its reality” (Lacan 1977, 
p.4).
 For Lacan, however, though the infant is captivated by its own image, the 
subject is not lost to the specular image, the other. Lacan regards:  
81
The child becomes enmeshed in a confused state of recognition/misrecognition. This 
is an imagined structure of identification/the ego where the infant does not lose itself 
in the image of itself. The child is captured between the image and its actual self. 
Paradoxically it is the specular image of wholeness which threatens the infant with 
fragmentation. The only way to resolve this problem is for the infant/subject to 
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identify with the image and it is this identification (or misrecognition) with its virtual 
counterpart that forms the ego. By alluding to the notion that the specular image is 
her/his own eradicates the fear of fragmentation, and at the same time the subject 
has entered the imaginary domain. This is understood as the child’s first step 
towards individuation82 and marks the child’s entry into Lacan’s ‘imaginary order’ that 
is the order of images, reflections and doubles (Willerslev 2007, p.66).83
… a mode of being in which no absolute distinction between subject and object is 
apparent; the self identifies with the world, feeling at once within and apart from it, so 
that the two glide ceaselessly in and out of each other in a sealed circuit  (2007, 
p.25).
  What is 
important here is an understanding of Lacan’s imaginary as: 
84
This reference to Lacan is exampled by Willerslev when the Yukaghirs go hunting for 
elk and they re-enter the imaginary order when they mimic and perform the elk. This 
form of mimesis enables them to suspend any division between themselves and their 
prey. While considering the Yukaghirs’ way of hunting digital performance may 
provide a potential framework for subjects to immerse themselves within the digital 
other using mimicry as a way to suspend divisions between self and digital other. 
  
When we return to the MS as a process Willerslev explains how as adults we still try 
to have mastery over our bodies. The infant in Lacan’s MS has an imaginary sense 
of mastery over its own body by anticipating a degree of muscular co-ordination 
which he has not yet actually achieved. As adults once the imaginary MS has 
passed we still don’t have mastery over it. When our bodies are healthy we cannot 
control the body flinching, feeling love or anger etc. In this sense Willerslev asserts 
that our bodies invite objectification where they are not just seen as part of us but 
also as other:  
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 …the self cannot be understood as a bounded and unitary entity because it is 
developed and constituted only in and through a rivalry with otherness – a rivalry that 
in fact is never reconciled but continues to trouble us through our lives…Our body 
therefore is not wholly and utterly our own, and we will never totally dominate or 
subjugate it to our own ends, just as we will never be able entirely to shake off the 
dominant role that others play in its constitution (Willerslev 2007, p.72).85
By drawing on the MS what can we learn about the self when we interact with the 
digital other? This is a fundamental question forming the basis of the thesis. Our 
perception of what self is has primarily been based on our interactions with others. 
So therefore it seems a logical progression to question our relationship with our live 
digital counterpart.  Is the video image an illusion or a reality of the self? Is it other?  
Is it real or imagined? In using real-time digital technologies can we come to 
understand the impact these interactions have on our reality and our place within it? 
Can we transport ourselves perceptually through the technology to observe 
ourselves from many perspectives? These questions may be answered through the 
art practice to determine what these interactions may reveal about our own 
embodiment with others and the world.  Can we experience more of the self, enabled 
through the digital technology that we have not encountered before? In order to 
understand the impact that the digital other may have on the subject the thesis re-
visits what is understood by Lacan’s real as a way to make more sense of the 
subject and its perception of reality. Furthermore by assimilating ourselves within the 
video image, we don’t lose the self and find ourselves in a state of psychasthenia; 
instead, we may know more about what constitutes the self and our relationship with 
the digital counterpart.  
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1:5 Re-visiting the real  
In Lacan’s MS we lose the ‘real’ where we are looking for a sense of self in the other. 
Perhaps by being immersed within the digital other through interactive video 
performance we may be able to experience the real. It has been through the 
experience of Virtual Reality that the Lacanian perception of the body as external 
object and attached subject at the same time is magnified in the cyberspace 
experience of Karen Frank. She calls this a partial ‘split physiology’ where we 
experience the ‘other’ space with bits of our bodies without losing the whole body. 
She emphasizes the way VR reinforces the established social boundaries of ‘me and 
not-me’. She describes it as a space that protects us to experience more of the ‘not-
me’ that enables the real self to understand more of the other 86
For Lacan our world is like a stage or a stadium where the language of signifiers can 
only re[present] the world as we know it, where we have no access to the real. The 
power of language to veil the real is expressed by Belsey when she declares that:  
(Frank 1995). We 
can see from Frank’s account the way VR disrupts the proprioception of the body 
when it perceptually shifts from one place to another without losing its place of 
standing. Therefore it may be that this displacement is experienced as a re-
appearing part of our corporality. Furthermore it may be via the technology we 
access something of the lost ‘real’ through the other.  
Language, in consequence, is not to be trusted’. The signifier seems to evoke the 
existence of something on the other side of it, but refuses to tell us what this 
is…there is no access to this place ‘behind’ the words…The signifier…appears as a 
veil, but one that veils the unknown, perhaps nothing, a possible absence, the 
potential absence, even of the subject itself (Belsey 2005, p. 41-42).87     
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The Real according to Lacan refers to authenticity – an absolute truth as opposed to 
a reality based on sense perception and materiality. Contemporary theorist Slavov 
Zizek, influenced by Lacan, relates to the real within fiction and supposes that fiction 
replaces the Real. Zizek’s version of the Real (with a capital) within contemporary 
culture refers to a reality we experience as really real (my italics) when ‘we should 
not mistake reality for fiction’ (Zizek 2002, p.19).88 The world we live in according to 
Zizek is fake and the Real we think we experience is replaced by fiction. In other 
words it is through fiction we can unveil the Real which is hidden. Therefore Zizek’s  
Real can be accessed through fiction/fantasy and for Lacan the real is inaccessible 
where we can only access the world through signifiers. Though accessing the 
Lacanian real would be a traumatic encounter for Zizek, the trauma of Lacan’s 
Real89
The question raised now is when one performs with their digital counterpart is the 
image a fantasy replacing the Real? Or can it serve as a way to experience the real 
accessed through the other? These are important considerations when taking into 
account the impact the lived experience of this interaction has on the physical body 
and one’s perception of self.  For Lacan we know the real exits because the 
symptom of its absence is trauma – a missed encounter with the real. We 
experience its absence through our symptomatic need to repeat. Using repetition as 
 can be sustained if we fictionalize it so we can avoid the trauma of the Real.  
Zizek articulates the trauma of the Real as a manifestation, an unreal apparition 
where fantasy replaces the Real. To understand the relevance of the real to this 
research we must look towards our direct experience of immersion within the digital 
counterpart. For instance if we experience the immersion as really real where we 
have understood the fiction of the image as a reality, it follows that the fictional image 
folds back into and changes our reality.  
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a metaphor Lacan sees this as a missed encounter with the real. Moreover for Zizek 
trauma is said to be veiled by fantasy to protect us from the Real. The only way to 
understand the connection between the Lacanian real, Zizek’s Real and digital 
performance is through direct experience. Whether we can access the Real through 
the fantasy of the digital image understood as really real or through some primordial 
Lacanian experience we may be able to discover something more of the self in the 
digital other. In other words there may be an unconscious connection with the loss of 
the real in the self, which we are able to access in the other. Rather than dividing the 
subject from the world and itself we may be able to look towards experience 
transposed through the technologies to overcome any boundary between the actual 
self and digital counterpart. Above all the performative quality of self as ‘me’ and the 
other as ‘not-me’ may well be caught up in both the familiar and unfamiliar 
interactions with one’s digital counterpart. It may also be likely that these ideas 
resonate with Freud’s work on The Uncanny (1914) which brings into question how 
the uncanny experience may have a link with Lacan’s lost real.  
Freud declares that the uncanny is “that species of the frightening that goes back to 
what was once well known and had long been familiar” (Freud cited in Phillips: 
2003:124)90
It appears that we have all, in the course of our individual development, been through 
a phase corresponding to the animistic phase in the development of primitive 
peoples, that this phase did not pass without leaving behind in us residual traces that 
can still make themselves felt, and that everything we now find ‘uncanny’ meets the 
 . In his essay he refers to an animistic phase in our early development 
that has been left behind in us. It is these traces of early development that Freud 
associates with the uncanny. He states:  
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criterion that it is linked with these remnants of animistic mental activity and prompts 
them to express themselves (Freud cited in Phillips 2003, p.147).91
By drawing on the uncanny these traces may be understood as a residue of the real. 
Consequently it may be speculated that Lacan’s lost real re-emerges as an uncanny 
experience. Indeed there could be a connection between the uncanny and a 
primordial part of self. For that reason could not Freud’s uncanny be a remnant of 
the real?  Do we experience a missed encounter with the real by reproducing 
ourselves as image and by mimetically incorporating the digital other as part of self? 
Are they symptoms of the real? Moreover is the desire to reproduce ourselves as 
image and/or repeat the actions of others such an instinctive process, where we 
have a need to discover a sense of self in the other? These notions are a part of our 
everyday occurrences where we catch ourselves mimicking others as a way to 
empathize and become a part of the other. Or indeed, when we copy idiosyncratic 
movements are we caught up in the other? These are methods we use to feel 
connected and/or closer to others. These ideas have some correlation with the work 
of the neuroscientists on their work on mirror neurons. In his book Mirroring People: 
The science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others (2008)
   
92 Marco Iacoboni 
explains how our minds share actions, emotions and experiences of others. We do 
this by imitating each other on a neurological level where our brains respond to 
others as if they were doing those actions themselves. According to Iacoboni these 
mirror neurons are important for action understanding were they allow an 
understanding from within. Likewise the Italian neurophysiologist Giacomo Rizzolatti, 
professor at the University of Parma in Italy holds a similar viewpoint. In the Annual 
Review of Neuroscience both Laila Craighero and Rizzolatti presented their research 
findings on The Mirror - Neuron System (2004, p. 169-192). They claim that the 
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mirror neuron mechanism appears to play a fundamental role in both action 
understanding and imitation. Unlike most species, we are able to learn by imitation 
and this faculty is at the basis of human culture. (Rizzolati & Craighero 2004, 
p.169)93 The most controversial neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramarchandran in his book 
The Tell-Tale Brain (2011)94 argues that mirror neurons underlie empathy and have 
accelerated the evolution of the brain. The very existence of mirror neurons in the 
human brain is disputed by some. Christian Jarrett, editor of the British Psychological 
Society’s Research Digest blog and staff writer on their magazine The Psychologist 
presents a more tenuous view of the mirror neuron phenomena. In his blog article 
Mirror neurons: The Most Hyped Concept in Neuroscience? (2012) Jarrett states that 
“ The biggest and most obvious problem for anyone advocating the idea that mirror 
neurons play a central role in our ability to understand other people’s actions, is that 
we are quite clearly capable of understanding actions that we are unable to perform” 
(Jarrett 2012).95
Though mirror neurons are a contested field within neuroscience and current 
research is still trying to find out what they are.  I am speculating that If we can 
simulate each other’s actions and emotions through our mirror neurons then it may 
be through the mimicry we can feel immersed were we feel we can embody the 
other. Pushing these ideas even further it might be the mirror neurons are caught up 
in repetitive movement and immersion which might contribute to an uncanny 
experience which could be a move towards experiencing the lost real. If Freud’s 
notion of the Uncanny is based on our inner compulsion to repeat causing us to 
unintentionally return to the same place, could this unintentional return to something 
once familiar be a return to the real? Maybe this is where we access a primordial 
stage of our human development long forgotten accessed through the digital other.      
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It could be suggested therefore that the desire to reproduce ourselves as a real-time 
video image is based on an intrinsic attempt to grasp something of the real through 
the other. I am defining the lost real as the leftover of some primordial phase of 
human development encountered through the uncanny experience. When we 
perform with a digital counterpart the uncanny experience may enable the subject to 
re-discover a lost part of self in the other. This might be understood as a return 
‘home’ encountered through the video technology. Freud articulates the uncanny is 
coming from the German das Unheimliche, translated as ‘the unhomely’ and its 
opposite das Heimliche, ‘the homely’ (Freud 1919 cited in Phillips 2003, p.134).96 
The ambivalence between these terms makes it difficult to define the uncanny 
experience. It is so much embroiled between the binary oppositions such as the 
familiar/unfamiliar, known/unknown and animate/inanimate, that as a form of 
experience we find it impossible to describe. We can relate to the feeling of home 
and not-home if we imagine ourselves returning home and discovering we have 
been burgled. Though it is our familiar home it also feels strange and oddly 
unfamiliar. Conversely when we encounter these strange feelings within other 
contexts we find it so difficult to articulate. Applying these ideas to the relationship 
between actual body and the digital counterpart may bring us closer to understand 
more about the self. The interaction between the actual body and the digital other 
may induce the feeling of the uncanny when our boundaries between the real and 
the virtual are blurred. This blurring of boundaries is encountered through the image 
of the mobius strip at the intersection where the inside and outside are continuous. 
According to Freud: “…an uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy 
and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we have until now 
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considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and significance of what it 
symbolizes, and so forth” (Freud cited in Phillips 2003, p.150)97
Though Freud is specifically relating to magical practices we can relate to the idea of 
the inanimate object coming alive within certain genres of cinema, for example, in 
horror and/or fantasy were the dead come alive in the vampire/zombie movies. The 
notion of the dead coming alive is a typical example of the uncanny. However if the 
fine line between fantasy and reality is blurred for audiences then what impact does 
this have on us when we are faced with the blurred boundary between the actual 
body and the digital body in digital performance? It is this uncertainty between the 
real and the imaginary were I draw a comparison with Lacan’s real in which the 
imaginary is the veil of the real. I am suggesting that the uncanny experience, which 
we find difficult to articulate in words, might actually be a way forward to access the 
real – behind the veil of signification. For Lacan all symbolization veils the real.   
When Frank (1995) described her cyber experience as a ‘me-not-me’
.          
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1:6 Embracing the other  
 
phenomenon, the boundary between the actual and the virtual may well be 
understood as an encounter with the lost real. From Frank’s account of her cyber 
experience the confusion between the actual and the virtual has enabled her to 
experience more of her body in cyberspace through a disruption in the 
proprioception of the body. In using real-time video technologies we may be able to 
reach a part of the self that has remained hidden and unfamiliar rekindled through 
the digital circuitry of the physical body and the digital other.    
The main focus of this research is to ascertain whether through digital performance 
the digital other is a part of self or not. In doing so what can we learn from this 
interaction? Is a return to the MS an attempt to satisfy our desiring selves – always 
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looking for our lack of wholeness in the ‘other’? Likewise are we searching for an 
aspect of the lost real in the other? Can interaction with the digital other unite us with 
a lost part of the self and is this part of us lost through language?  
In pursuing this research the digital video image makes it possible to experience the 
digital other as different, and also, as if it were not wholly other to us. As this 
research progresses these investigations may indicate a strong connection to the 
video image experienced as part of the self that is unfamiliar. Perhaps new 
technologies can alter our perception of the fact of otherness in relation to the self 
within the context of the video performance. Though the other is outside of self we 
can embrace our relationship with otherness in a number of ways. For example 
when we interact with objects and artefacts they have an impact on us, where we are 
not unresponsive objects we are reactive. If we react to others and/or things then we 
feel a connection to them. Similarly when there is an emotional dynamic between 
subjects and objects, self and other, sensations and emotions are not experienced 
with detachment or indifference. These connections are likely to contribute to a 
composite self made up of many components outside of the self. If we apply this 
reasoning to our interactions with the digital other there is all the more likelihood that 
through digital performance we may be able to experience a seamless connection  
with the digital other to overcome the boundaries between them. 
In learning new ways of interacting with our own image and that of others we can 
come to take on board these unfamiliar behaviours and perhaps experience them as 
part of self. If the human body is a creature of habit where it learns skills through 
example then eventually it becomes part of one’s corporeality. If the body inhabits 
the world through repetition and structure; when these daily rituals are broken or 
disturbed the body is more aware of its corporeality (Leder 1990).99  
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If we can disturb the bodies rituals through digital performance then we become 
more self aware of the body and our connection with the image. However, it is also 
true to say it is habit forming not to be aware, and exist in space where we believe 
we are separate from ourselves and the world of others. Following this line of 
thinking it is speculated that by scrutinizing our perception of self within our social 
symbolic world, and raising some doubt and scepticism of what constitutes the self, 
can help us to re-examine the way in which it is constructed. To question the 
certainty/uncertainty of the self during digital performance causes us to re-assess 
our prior knowledge and understanding of what self is.  
Lacan’s MS has been explored specifically to explain the way in which the infant 
enters the MS and emerges as a split subject, which has been constituted through 
language. Explaining the self/other positions within Lacan’s MS has enabled this 
research to consider the digital other from different viewpoints during the intersection 
of the actual and the digital within digital performance. This entwinement has been 
articulated as the virtual image reflecting back and impacting on ones perception of 
the self. Indeed, so too has Lacan’s impossible real been linked with Freud’s 
uncanny to explain the uncanny experience as a potential remnant of the real.  
The theoretical positions of Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Leder and Willerslev have all 
maintained an alternative view to the self/other duality where the body can 
experience itself as both a subject and an object. We have seen in Lacan’s MS the 
way in which the infant experiences the paradox of the self/other dichotomy. In 
accordance to Merleau-Ponty and Willerslev we can observe and experience 
through self-reflexive means the viewpoint from both self/other positions. For 
Willerslev we can perform the other through mimesis by hunting rituals. As for 
Merleau-Ponty we can see and be seen through the other. According to Leder we 
62 
 
can experience the body as both a subject and an object through being immersed in 
purposeful activities and through the body in pain where we become aware of the 
body part as an object. These positions demonstrate the way the self and other 
interrelate and interconnect particularly through Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm where self 
and world is enmeshed in each other.    
The self has been articulated through Cooley’s looking glass theory where he views 
the self being constructed by the way we feel others see us. As for Mead, his 
interpretation of the self can only be developed if we can get outside ourselves in the 
form of self-awareness. It is most certainly the cognitive and emotional elements 
which are important contributions to how one views the self. But it is through the 
proprioception of the body that may enable the body to perceptually shift from its 
place of standing and reflect on itself. 
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Chapter Two 
Performing a Phenomenology: A Qualitative practice-led study    
This chapter is concerned with implementing a qualitative practice-led study in the 
form of four Inter-Reactive Video Explorations I-REs. The study encompasses a 
crossover between the theory and the practice by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s work   
the chiasm discussed in chapter one. The crossing over of the theory and the 
practice is located at the intersection of the moebius strip – a metaphor to illustrate 
the encapsulation of the practice as the method to challenge the self/other binary 
divisions.  Likewise this symbol ∞ will provide a framework through which one can 
interpret the I-REs through the subjective experiences of me and the informants. The 
collection and gathering of all information are articulated as ‘responsive field notes’. 
The term connotes the gathering of information under an umbrella of subjective 
shared experiences and reactions which have not been designed under controlled 
conditions, but deliberate ad hoc responses and instant reactions. All the findings 
from these I-REs are to be discussed in chapter three.  
The study uses a mixed-method framework originating from phenomenology and 
auto-ethnography. The intersections of these methods I have coined ‘auto-
ethnophenomenology’.100 The chapter describes this method through an introduction 
into both auto-ethnography and phenomenological principles which have been drawn 
on in order to answer the main research question. The art practice is introduced in 
the form of the four I-REs aligned with four key questions. 
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The Method 
2:1 Auto-ethnophenomenology 
The term ‘Auto-ethnophenomenology’ is a mixed-method approach using 
ethnography and phenomenology to undertake this qualitative practice-led study. 
The framework for this method has arisen out of the importance of subjective lived 
experiences and the ability to shift from the position of the ‘I’ to the other – from first 
person to third person observations and reflections. Together these components 
have enabled the study to validate the ‘subjective’ as both a self-reflexive and ‘self-
objective’ experience. In wanting to know more of my ‘self’ through a video 
representation the first I-RE incorporated an account of my lived experiences as  
autobiographical texts articulating my experiences from both self/other perspectives. 
Though the problem of self-reflection may be hermetic it has been through 
describing my interactions from a third person viewpoint which has enabled me to 
turn away from myself in order to then turn inward on myself from a first person 
position.  
I-RE ii-iv focuses on informants lived experiences as a way to understand their 
phenomenological interactions between their actual body and the digital other. The 
first heading ‘Positioning the ‘I’ through Auto-ethnographic digital performance’ 
articulates what auto-ethnography is and how it contributes to this study. The second 
heading ‘A phenomenology of digital performance’ explains why and how 
phenomenology is pertinent to this research. Together these methods are what have 
contributed to the ‘auto-ethnophenomenological’ framework.  
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2:2 Positioning the ‘I’ through Auto-ethnographic digital Performance 
 Approaching this study as both a researcher and an informant enabled me to be 
aware of the impact these IR-Es may have on my own perception of self. 
Furthermore I was able to focus my attentions within a self-reflexive framework 
reflecting from the inside as an emotive subject and looking outside as a researcher. 
This view is shared by Ellis when she questions the role of the ‘I’ within ethnographic 
research.  
Is the ‘I’ only about the eye of the researcher, the researcher standing apart and 
looking? What about the ‘I’ of the researcher, the part that not only looks but is 
looked back at, that not only acts but is acted back upon by those in her focus. Is 
ethnography only about the other? Isn’t ethnography also relational, about the other 
and the ‘I’ of the researcher in interaction? Might the researcher also be a subject? 
Might the ‘I’ refer to the researcher who looks inward as well as outward? What can 
be gained from making the ‘I’ a part, or even a focus, of ethnographic research? (Ellis 
2004, p.XIX).101
In positioning myself within this practice-led study I formulated a series of personal 
video diaries which captured my experience. Ellis defines autobiographical 
introspections as “…research, writing, story, and method that connect the autobiographical 
and personal to the cultural, social, and political. Autoethnographic forms feature concrete 
action, emotion, embodiment, self-consciousness, and introspection portrayed in dialogue, 
scenes, characterization, and plot. Thus, autoethnography claims the conventions of literary 
writing…”  (Ellis, 2004, p.xix).
   
102
By modelling the first part of this research on an auto-ethnographic framework I 
addressed some of my interactions in I-RE(i) from a first person perspective 
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documenting and tracking my sensations and perceptions. Later I re-visited these 
texts to formulate and analyse a collection of experiences.  
Through introspection auto-ethnography is a way to relay the sensory nature of my 
lived experience, from both first and third person perspectives.  It is also for this 
reason that auto-ethnography has become a most appropriate approach to this 
research where my personal experience is both reflexive and participatory. It is 
through the autobiographical that the first I-RE can interconnect the personal, and 
social introspection portrayed in the video diaries and texts. This method reflects on 
my interactions between me in the art practice, and standing outside it as other. To 
be consciously aware of these shifting movements within the I-RE is understood as a 
way of bridging any divisions between them. During and after the studio 
performances in I-RE(i) I participated in different kinds of writing which deepened my 
experiential, interpretive and theoretical relationship with the performances. The first 
were studio diaries tracking my sensations, perceptions and stream of 
consciousness. Secondly I wrote lived reflections of the performances from 
embodied memory and thirdly I re-visited my documentations of the I-RE and my 
video recorded reflections for theoretical analysis. It was through these methods that 
I could evaluate my personal responses to the interactions and the impact my 
cultural background had on my social interaction with the video image and the 
impact this had on my perception of self.  
Garance Marechal, a researcher of ethnography at Liverpool University wrote that 
autoethnography has been criticised by analytic proponents for being ‘too personal’ 
… ‘biased’ … ‘naval gazing’ and ‘self-absorbed’. (Marechal, 2010, pp. 43-45).103 This 
criticism is assuming that if one gets close to the object of the research or is in fact 
the object of the research that there is no relational commitment to the project 
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creating new encounters between the interaction of the material body and the digital 
other as a valid form of social criticism. Self-participation incorporated into this 
research method is specific to the self as autonomous subject where myself as the 
researcher is the object of my enquiry and also other as autonomous self.   
For Carolyn Ellis ethnography focuses on the relational aspect between the 
ethnographer and her/his subjects locating the researcher between the ‘I’ and the 
‘other’. Knowledge production through the interplay of inter-subjectivities observed 
by, or participated in, has been well documented through the writings of 
ethnographer Sarah Pink, in her book Doing Visual Ethnography (2007). Pink 
defines ethnography in the following way:  
 …ethnography is a process of creating and representing knowledge (about society, 
culture and individuals) that is based on ethnographers’ own experiences. It does not 
claim to produce an objective or truthful account of reality, but should aim to offer 
versions of ethnographers’ experiences of reality that are as loyal as possible to the 
context, negotiations and intersubjectivities through which the knowledge was 
produced (Pink 2007, p.22).104
Pink’s emphasis on the mutual exchange of experiences between subjects is an 
important reflexive subjective approach within ethnography and she challenges 
some of the assumptions associated with reflexivity such as: 
  
 …the assumption that a reflexive approach will aid ethnographers to produce 
objective data represents only a token and cosmetic engagement with reflexivity that 
wrongly supposes subjectivity could (or should) be avoided or eradicated. Instead, 
subjectivity should be engaged with as a central aspect of ethnographic knowledge, 
interpretation and representation (2007, p.23). 105   
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2:3 A phenomenology of digital performance  
The lived experience was the driving force of this practice-led research. This is due 
to the phenomenological study of a subjects’ lived conscious experience and the 
philosophical phenomenon of perception, which led the work in the direction of self-
reflexive research. Although phenomenology can never truly capture the experience 
of others it is through introspection and self-reflection that one can come to 
understand the lived experience of others, and one’s perception of self through a 
shared exchange of knowledge within digital video performance.  
In attempting to understand the experience of others this research tried to connect 
with the digital other, and to provide new frameworks of experiences which could not  
be articulated through language; it is through our ability to empathize with others that  
we can come to recognize their feelings and make sense of them as our own. This is 
most clearly demonstrated by the philosopher Thomas Nagel in his paper ‘What is it 
Like to Be a Bat’ (1974). 106
…to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or 
understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance… Reflection on what it is like 
to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do 
not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be 
compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or 
comprehend them… Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a 
  Nagel took into account the importance of subjective 
experience and the valid results that can be achieved in reflecting on experience. He 
accepted the existence of something that cannot be expressed in language and 
proposed that we can come to understand the experiences of others only by having 
similar experiences ourselves and:   
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human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a 
particular point of view (Nagel 1974).107
Understanding and interpreting the experience of others comes from Nagel’s ‘point 
of view’ with empathy from the perspective of the other, along with Susan Kozel’s 
interpretation of heterophenomenology which has informed this practice-led 
research. Though hetero relates to difference and phenomenology ‘preserves 
subjective experience’ (Kozel 2007, p.56)
 
108 the heterophenomenologist for Kozel 
relies upon shared experience, or some degree of empathy.109   The sharing of 
experience becomes possible between the researcher and the researched where 
they meet on familiar ground where the intention of the researcher is not that of a 
neutral observer. Heterophenomenology is dependant on the way the researcher is 
inserted into the network of social interaction and alongside the content they reveal. 
It is through digital performance that informants can share similar experiences as co-
subjects and self-objects. An understanding of the way the intersubjectivities of 
subjects has contributed to a morphing of experience is important to this research. It 
is this reversibility which can help form a point of view from the other person’s 
perspective. Phenomenology is articulated by Merleau-Ponty as a way of reflecting 
on lived experience, that is the invisibility of human experience. His goal is not to 
make the invisible visible because he supposes that if ‘being’ is hidden then it is a 
fundamental characteristic of being. In other words phenomenology’s invisibility is 
only visible through its absence. It is this imperceptibility of human experience that is 
at the core of this research where things pass into us and we pass into things 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, p.133). 110 The permeability between the digital image and the 
corporeal body can be understood by reworking the relationship between bodies and 
media technology and revoke the suggestion that the digital image ‘is merely a visual 
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representation of the world’ (Kozel, 2007, p.36).111
The act of doing a phenomenology of another person’s experience is both disturbing 
and intriguing…it is further disturbing because we wonder of the agency or the voice 
of the others: are they silenced? Are they well represented? How can we know? It is 
intriguing because it amounts to a slice of shared knowledge, a morph of the lived 
experience of two people because the originator of the experience is trans–
substantiated through the one who produces the phenomenological document, the 
experience thus becomes filtered through two bodies (Kozel, 2007, p.58-59).
  If technology can enable us to go 
beyond a mere representation of the world then in attempting to do a 
phenomenology of another person’s experience Kozel proposes how a 
phenomenological philosophy provides the conceptual framework for interpreting the 
experiences of others.  
112
In an attempt to perform the phenomenology of another, this qualitative research 
sought ways to understand the impact the digital other has on one’s perception of 
self within digital performance. Both phenomenology and auto-ethnography are 
fitting approaches to explore the impact the digital other has on the perception of self 
through the lived experience. The culmination of these methods enabled auto-
ethnophenomenology to reverse both positions of the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ through self-
reflection and self-objectification. As the researcher being engaged in both self-
participation and observation enabled the experiential to make sense of the lived 
experience of others. This in turn enabled me and informants to share experience 
through writing, observing and interacting. Equally through the mutual exchange of 
experience we can have an empathy and understanding of the interactions between 
the corporeal body and its digital counterpart.   
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2:4 The Art Practice 
This section introduces four sets of inter-reactive live experiments I-REs which were 
conducted from (2010-2011) and each one informed the next one over a one year 
period. The explorations were entitled ‘inter-reactive’ as a way to explore the impact 
these explorations had on the lived experience of informants. This research looked 
to the reactions these explorations had on informants as a means of capturing 
experience in the moment and as real as possible.  Each I-RE consisted of a key 
question as way to unpack the overall research question outlined below.  
Main Research Question  
How might the lived experience of digital performance enable the subject to 
step into the digital ‘other’ to understand more about the self through the 
phenomenology of the digital other?  
2:4.1 Key Questions   
I-RE (i) Using video projection technologies can we unite with the digital video 
image as other and become one?  
The rationale for this question explored whether we have the potential to experience 
stepping outside our physical body and of stepping into a digital counterpart when 
engaged in digital performance. This involved the following concerns:  
• Does one-to-one intimate interaction bring us closer to the digital other? 
• Can interacting with our video projection enable us to become immersed 
within the video image?  
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Key Question 
I-RE (ii) Does the digital other have an emotional impact on the self?  Can we 
challenge the impact emotional responses may have on the alienation 
between self and digital other? 
This question explored the potential that human emotion has on the notion of the 
image as digital other. This was approached in the following way: 
• Through observation and recording of emotional responses of participant’s 
interaction with their image in order to identify a connection rather than a 
division, between participant and image.  
• There was a development in the technology to real-time video (Isadora) which 
enabled informants to step into their image in a public venue. 
 
         Key Question 
I-RE (iii) Do we alternate between the physical self and the digital non-self to 
get to know more of the self; and is this oscillation an uncanny experience?  
This question explored the paradox of perceptually shifting from the actual into the 
digital through video technology and the impact this may have on lived experience. 
This was explored in the following way: 
• By developing the real-time capabilities of the technology informants could 
encounter their real-time video image and a pre-recorded video image at the 
same time. 
• By creating a composite image in real-time it may happen that the informant 
could feel an oscillation between moving in and out of the image as a uncanny 
experience.   
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Key Question 
I-RE (iv) Can new technological affordances now allow us to embody the self 
of another? 
This question explored the potential to immerse ourselves in the body of another and 
merge selves. This was approached in the following way: 
• Creating a one-to-one performance between two subjects. 
• Through the development of a new technology using head Mounted Display 
Systems and the real-time video programme Isadora; could we suspend a 
division between subjects where they felt they were immersed in each other? 
• What impact would this have on our perception of self? 
The following key elements are what shaped the framework for each I-RE. This 
included strategies to understand the why of human behaviour and to make rational 
reasons why informants responded to the I-REs in the manner in which they did. 
This included the gathering of a variety of responsive field notes to be interpreted 
and analyzed. Those that took part in these I-REs included myself and members of 
the public at The Mander Shopping Centre in Wolverhampton who were also invited   
to another venue at Eagleworks studios in Wolverhampton and at The Public in West 
Bromwich. These elements have been placed under the umbrella of research, which 
includes the experiential through sensations and perceptions in the moment, lived 
reflections from embodied memories of self-reflection and reflection on reflection. 
These components are outlined as follows:    
• Research: involved gathering knowledge by ‘doing’ and incorporated active 
involvement in the I-REs. Both myself and the informants were involved in the 
research by interacting/performing with their own digital ‘other’. Informal 
discussions were encouraged to discuss informants’ experiences in a non- 
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formal setting. These methods assisted the researcher and informants to 
share experiences to enable the narrative to evolve through collaboration as a 
form of knowledge production.    
• Self-participation and Self-Reflection: this is based on writing and recording 
my experiences within the I-REs. This involved different kinds of writing and 
recording to expand on the experiential interpretive and theoretical 
relationship with these interactions. The studio diaries tracked my feelings and 
perceptions in the moment in the form of text and video dialogue. Later my 
writing and recordings of lived reflections of those interactions were from 
embodied memory and then re-visiting the text and video to interpret and 
analyse these interactions.  Self-reflection does not just rely on the memory of 
an experience but it is seen as a form of experience.  
•  Informants’ experiences in the moment and self-reflection.: A variety of 
techniques were used to gather informants’ experiences. This involved   
recording their immediate reactions on video.  Secondly feedback forms were 
also implemented as a form of reflection. Thirdly informants were invited back 
to the venue to discuss their experience.  
• Reflection of Reflection: this form of self-reflection was established through re-
visiting my own responses on audio and video and re-evaluating and 
documenting my experience. In one particular I-RE informants were re-called 
back for interview to review their first initial experiences. These reflexive 
interviews were a means to compare their first initial experience with a 
preconceived encounter of the same interaction.  
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Each of these I-REs encompasses fieldnotes which documents the latter. The 
following evaluative techniques will be used to analyse the practice through the 
fieldnotes. These are taken from Laurel Richardson Evaluating ethnography: 
Qualitative Inquiry (Richardson 2000, p.15-16)113
2:5 The Inter-Reactive Explorations I-REs 
 . These include considering the 
substantive contribution – how does the research contribute to our understanding of 
life?  Also the aesthetic merit – is it artistically shaped? The reflexivity of how the 
researcher has been both a producer and a product of this research? Subsequently 
what impact does this have on emotion and/or intellect and does it generate new 
questions? Lastly does it express a reality – a fleshed out sense of lived experience? 
These questions will be informing the fieldnotes and analysis discussed in chapter 
three.  
Each I-RE was implemented to challenge each of the key questions (i, ii, iii, iv) where 
each I-RE informed and shaped the next one. This sequence was maintained 
throughout this study with the outcomes of one I-RE impacting on the preceding one. 
All four I-REs are divided into the following categories: 
• I-RE I explores the relationship between me and my digital other (6 studio 
projects) 
• I-RE II explores the relationship between informants and their digital other 
• I-RE III explores the relationship between my pre-recorded digital other and 
informants 
• I-RE IV explores the relationship between two actual subjects/informants and 
their digital counterparts   
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2.5.1:  Inter-Reactive Exploration  I 
 
Fig.1. L Moore: Studio project (iii) 2010 (DVD Appendix 4: I-RE-I)  
 
Title: Me & My Digital other  
Location: University of Wolverhampton, 6 Studio works 
Key Question     
Using video projection technologies can we unite with the digital video image as 
other and become one?  
Statement 
I-RE I was divided into six small studio projects i-vi were I performed with my digital 
counterpart in the form of a self projected video representation. This I-RE had largely 
been informed by the writings of Jacques Lacan and his work on the Mirror Stage.114
 
 
The aim was to challenge Lacan’s self/other dichotomy by attempting to find a 
‘oneness’ between the ‘actual’ body and its digital counterpart. Rather than viewing 
the specula image as a split entity, as other, the focus was to unite ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
so there would no division between them.    
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Description   
In I-RE(i) I engaged in several different kinds of writing which deepened my 
experiential and interpretive relationship with the work. 
a) First I write during my studio sessions engaging in auto-ethnophenomenology. 
This involved experiential writing sensing motion and tracking my sensations, 
perceptions and consciousness. 
b) Secondly I did both audio and visual recordings of my lived reflections of the 
performances from embodied memory and experience. 
c) Thirdly I wrote a critique of these reflections and observations in the 
fieldnotes.  
These methods enabled me to shift from ‘I’ to ‘other’ as a means of turning away 
from myself in order to look inward. I did a series of six consecutive studio projects 
that incorporated a video recording of my full body image where I performed with my 
projected video representation. These are described as projects (i-vi). For each one I 
had a pre-recorded video image of me projected onto the studio wall. My projected 
image was at the same height and width of my actual body where I recorded my 
interactions with my digital counterpart using a video camera. These performative 
experiences were recorded on video, and compiled into written texts as part of my 
field notes. Both the audio-visual and written documentation became both personal 
and reflexive accounts of my experiences. These self-reflections took place 
immediately after each studio project, while both the audio and visual lived 
reflections from embodied memory were recorded some time later which can be 
accessed in appendix 1 (pp.158-175) & appendix 4 DVD. From hereon I describe the 
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corporeal body as the ‘actual’ body and the digital other as ‘digital counterpart’ to 
avoid confusion and to maintain continuity when describing these explorations. 
Immediate Responses to the projects  
The field notes revealed I did not unite with my digital counterpart as I had imagined. 
I was neither at ‘one’ with my image or ‘divided’ from it. The following quotes are of 
my own notes. They are extracts taken from my field notes in the form of video audio 
and written documentaries that have reflected on my experience.  A full account of 
all six of these autobiographical experiences can be found in the appendix of this 
thesis. All of the text in the appendix is based on a sequence of events taken in 
chronological order from (i to vi).  
My reflections articulate moments when I felt a closer connection to my digital 
counterpart when I felt the shadow of the video image cross over my ‘actual’ body in 
studio project (i).It is during this exploration that I compare it to similar experiences of 
that when one feels the presence of another person’s shadow crossing over your 
body in the sunlight.  
Project i 
There are flickers of moments when you believe it’s ‘real’ these two people are 
interacting and talking. When the digital body crossed my body I really could feel it. 
This is paradoxical because I felt a stronger feeling of embodiment when watching 
the video of the 2 Lorna’s but experiencing it I really felt the shadow of the digital 
Lorna cross my body and that was amazing- I also felt embodied then too.(Moore 
2010, p.158 Appendix 1).115
Even though there were flickering moments of embodiment during these 
experiments my field notes describe a heightened sense of the ‘me-not-me’ 
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phenomena which induced an amplified perception of experiencing more of me. This 
was explained as neither a oneness or a division but a slight perceptual shift in 
displacing the ‘actual’ body beyond its normal parameters. My field notes from 
project (i) do not describe any moments where I felt estranged from my digital 
counterpart. Contrary to the latter, I describe the interaction with my digital other as a 
comfortable and almost a natural experience.  
Trying to remember the script distracted me interacting with my other. I felt ‘home’ in 
the experience but I think I felt more ‘home’ watching the video. Watching the video 
was stranger than performing it. Because I had a secondary source to look at (the 
laptop) I could focus more on the experience. The actuality of the experience felt 
‘home’ but also I think I felt more embodied watching the video. Watching the video 
there are moments of union and an interactive relationship with each other where 
one is affected by the other (Moore 2010, p.158 Appendix1).116
The more studio projects I did the stronger the connection became with my digital 
counterpart. This becomes more apparent when I automatically synchronized with 
my digital image. This is most notable during my reflections in projects (ii) and (iii) 
where I explored experimental movement. The following quotes are taken from my 
field notes to describe my experiences in project (ii) and (iii). 
 
Project ii 
  We began mimicking each other, copying each other and at times mirroring each 
other. The video image looks different from me, it looks solid and thinner. When the 
bodies collide or overlap you can see the transparency of the digital ‘other’ over the 
corporeal body ... I felt comfortable with her in my own little world perhaps of a 
‘oneness’ where my body extension is part and a[part] at one and the same time. I 
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could materialise part of myself that was once just a passing action, a history gone 
forever (Moore 2010, p.159 Appendix 1).117
   project iii  
   
There are definitely moments of fluidity where both bodies are moving together like a 
swan. This doubling in unison feels connected more, where arms and legs are 
floating in space almost identical … The impact it had on my physical body was it 
worked in terms of me feeling embodied with her when we were doing synchronised 
movements together …  When I am looking at the video documentation when I see 
the two Lorna’s moving synchronously I feel it’s natural not weird, relaxed and even 
maybe a feeling of sameness or oneness. Is sameness the same as oneness? I am 
not sure … There is a struggle between a striving for sameness and difference. This 
in itself is an oxymoron (Moore 2010, p.160 Appendix 1).118
The field notes suggest that I felt simultaneously ‘self’ and ‘other’ and ‘not divided’ 
from my digital counterpart and ‘not whole’. Equally it was becoming more apparent 
to me that if I was to seek oneness in my image then I must be searching for 
‘something’ lost in myself. This line of thinking correlated with the Lacanian idea of 
seeking wholeness in the other. It had not occurred to me at this stage in the 
research how much the Mirror Stage was pertinent to this work.  Although I did not 
feel I had connected with something ‘lost’ it can be understood from the field notes 
that I had gained a heightened awareness of ‘something more of me’ within these six 
studio projects. The following are extracts from my field notes from project iv and v. 
  
Project iv 
When both Lornas are crossing each other carrying a chair you can’t really work out 
which one is the projection and which one is the flesh. However looking at the video 
they are both a projection. We have a projection of a projection and a projection of 
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the flesh body. Watching the part of the video where both Lorna’s place their legs on 
top of each other it’s like looking at co-joined twins-one whole but two bodies. The 
relationship between the three bodies (the two digital Lornas and the shadow of one 
Lorna) is interesting because you still focus on the projected Lorna and the shadow.  
I think the shadow is more alien as there is no identity, but it is still comfortable 
(Moore 2010, Appendix 1, p.161).119
Project v 
 
There was something beautiful about this experience. It’s like tracing paper and 
trying to trace my own presence. When the digital image moved I moved. I was 
following her. Watching it gives me a real sense of immersion…looking at it you can’t 
work out the real image or the virtual … I really like that. I am scrolling across the wall 
… if this was a pencil I would be drawing around myself. I am following her and the 
unity of both images is slightly off key…there are times when the two bodies are 
identical. It’s almost synchronized…I do like the synchronicity of it …when the virtual 
image turns around so I can see myself from the front and the back  at the same 
time…that’s quite interesting it’s like seeing yourself from a 360 degree angle I like 
that. When I was doing this I remember feeling the presence of the shadow so I was 
aware of the ‘other’ even though I could not see her … I could feel her and also feel 
her behind me, probably through the change in the light. Mimicry again is happening. 
The digital image is controlling the real image. I really like the fact you can’t tell which 
one is which the virtual and the actual   (Moore 2010 Appendix 1, p. 161).120
In addition what came out of these explorations was a stronger emphasis on the ‘me-
not-me’ phenomena where I alternated between self and other. It was this oscillation 
that became the starting point for I-RE (ii).   
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2.5.2: Inter-Reactive Exploration II 
 
Fig. 2. Mander Shopping Centre 2010 (See DVD Appendix 4) 
Title: Windows A & B 
Location: Mander Shopping Centre Wolverhampton 
Informants: Members of the public   
Key question   
Does the digital other have an emotional impact on the self? Can we challenge the 
impact emotional responses may have on the alienation between self and digital 
other? 
Statement 
My aim was to present the same conditions to invited informants to perform with 
themselves as I had done in my studio projects in I-REI. Having asked a number of 
participants to take part in an identical framework they declined. It was proving to be 
too difficult to expect participants to imagine they were performing with themselves 
and being videoed at the same time. Therefore it was decided a shopping centre 
may be a more natural environment for members of the public to come across their 
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projected video image in an empty shop window. By using real-time video projection 
I could observe participants interactions and responses in the Mander Shopping 
Centre in Wolverhampton. It was important to use key words in my questionnaires to 
determine if any emotional dynamic was occurring between the performativity of 
actual self and digital other.  
Taking this I-RE out into the public realm was a way to understand how a variety of 
participants would interact with their digital other. I observed how people responded 
to their image, and I also asked for ‘knee jerk’ reactions to capture firsthand 
experiences. Alongside this the key words used in the questionnaires to represent 
their experiences ranged from positive, negative and ‘in-between’. These were words 
that could be understood as either positive or negative depending on their body 
language and dialogue. These methods where used to determine if participants felt 
their image was alienated from them, as other. This was based on looking for the 
impact the image may have on the informants’ emotional response, or an 
indifference to their image.  In confronting their digital other it was important to 
observe whether it caused an emotional response in the participants to determine if 
their emotional responses were met with detachment or indifference to their image.  
Description   
I-RE II consisted of two shop window projections at the Mander shopping centre in 
Wolverhampton. The windows are referred to as window A and window B. Both 
windows used real-time video projection were members of the public could interact 
with their real-time video image in the windows. Alongside   I-REII, I was also 
pursuing my last studio project at the University of Wolverhampton. This consisted of 
me working in my studio space where I was experimenting with projecting my pre-
recorded video image over my actual face.     
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The activity in windows A and B had been constructed to enable members of the 
public to come across their image. Those that took part in the interactions where 
asked immediately for feedback on the experience. It is important to point out that 
the decision to make responses as quick and as robust as possible was to limit the 
impact I would have on the results. In the same way I aimed to make feedback as 
open as possible through initial first hand responses. Likewise, the questionnaires 
with only key words to select seemed appropriate and less time consuming. 
However, although I was aware that this method of collecting responses may be 
difficult to analyze due to the lack of in depth probing; these instant ‘knee jerk’ results 
were designed to record the instinctual reality of lived experience, rather than 
rehearsed or contemplated. In doing so it serves as a way to prevent informants to 
respond in a way which they thought I wanted.   
The windows A & B were set up using the real-time video programme Isadora121 . 
Isadora was initially designed for the live dance performance company Troika 
Ranch.122It was created by Mark Coniglio, a media artist, composer and programmer 
who is recognized as a pioneer in the integration of live performance and interactive 
digital technologies. Each window had one live video camera placed inside the 
empty shop at the Mander centre pointing outwards towards shoppers. As they 
walked past the window they could see their real-time video image projected in the 
window on a time delay of two seconds. The camera was placed carefully so it was 
not intrusive. Both a real-time live video feed and a two second delayed live video 
feed were superimposed to enable participants to interact with their digital doubles. 
Window A projected a full body image of shoppers. Window B, however, projected a 
smaller portrait image of their head and shoulders. Alongside this I observed peoples 
responses to their image in the shopping centre. This video documentation can be 
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referred to in appendix 4 (see DVD). Window B was also presented as part of a 
conference at Wolverhampton University in the Bessant Gallery for one evening, and 
one evening at the opening of the university’s MA show.    
The differences between window A and B were primarily based on scale. Both 
windows used a delayed live video feed of two seconds. The scale of the full body 
image, in window A was to encourage more than one individual to interact with their 
image. In this way both the live video feed and the delayed live video feed could 
interact with each other. The scale was large enough for many shoppers to interact 
with each other at the same time. Window B however was organized in a similar way 
with the same video delay but the projection was focusing more on a one-to-one 
individual interaction between the shopper and their portrait image. This was to 
encourage informants to move closer to their image to interact with it.   
The informants completed questionnaires during the I-RE which consisted of 45 key 
words. The words represented a variety of emotions to determine if their interactions 
caused an emotional impact on them. Informants were asked to select words which 
most reflected their experience. The words consisted of 15 positive words, 15 
negative words and 15 words which could be understood as either positive or 
negative depending on the context. The rational for having a balanced number of 
positive, negative and ambiguous words was to allow informants to express a wide 
range of emotional responses as far as possible to avoid being coerced into a 
particular response.  The words were laid out in a randomized manner so there was 
no pattern to their responses. The more ambiguous words such as ‘freaky’, ‘wicked’, 
‘disjointed’ etc were interpreted as positive or negative responses depending on their 
body language, facial expressions and overall responses. (see graph 1 Appendix 
1.p.166) The graph illustrates the frequency of words associated with their 
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experience from window B. Out of the 47 informants from window B the three most 
occurring words were ‘playful’, ‘fun’ and ‘weird’.  All 47 informants involved in window 
B were a combination of informants from the Mander Shopping Centre, the Bessant 
Gallery as part of the University of Wolverhampton’s student conference and the 
opening evening of the MA show. The graph indicates there was a very low number 
of  informants who felt ‘estrangement’ ‘alienated’, ‘frightened’ , and/or ‘disturbed’ by 
the experience. In window A only 11 informants took part in the questionnaires. The 
three most common words used to relay their experience was ‘weird’ ‘freaky’, and 
‘fun.’ However due to the limited numbers of informants the statistical significance of 
window A may be questionable. This does not however affect the responses relayed 
in window B which demonstrates that a high number did not feel alienated from their 
video image.   
Furthermore in both accounts the terms ‘freaky’ and ‘weird’ have suggested a more 
positive response to the work rather than a negative one. This has been understood 
by their positive responses when articulating these terms. All informants who 
articulated these terms responded in good spirits and where they enjoyed the 
experience as odd and strange.       
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Studio project (vi) From I-RE I    
       
 Fig.3. L.Moore: Studio project vi 2010 (See DVD Appendix 4)     
Alongside I-REII, I was also exploring my last studio project from I-RE I (project vi) 
where I interacted with my digital other at the University of Wolverhampton in my 
studio. It is important to understand that this particular exploration had a significant 
impact on this research. More importantly it was this particular experience that began 
to shape the parameters for the next I-RE.   
In this last project I had projected a pre-recorded video image of my face fully 
covering my ‘actual’ face to see if I could be immersed within the image and have a 
deeper connection with it. The recorded video image of my head moved and ‘spoke’ 
words while my ‘actual’ real face was quiet and still. The impact this had on me was 
very powerful and it was recorded in the field notes how strange the experience was. 
As the video image was projected over my actual face I began to synchronize myself 
with the eyes, mouth and lips and the more I did this the more I felt embodied to my 
image. This was seen as a turning point in the research that led to the formation of 
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 I-RE III. I felt that the experience was most weird and uncanny which drew me into a 
part of myself I felt I had not explored. The familiar image of ‘me’ became unknown 
and alien yet I was drawn into it and mesmerized by my image. Overall it was this 
strange embodiment which focused the research towards the uncanny experience. 
In my notes I refer to the uncanny and the embodiment with the image as a form of 
‘self-touching’.  It was these thoughts that led me to question the impact the uncanny 
had with the relationship between the actual self and the digital counterpart and the 
Lacanian real. As this interaction was so difficult to articulate it occurred to me that 
there may be a possible link with the Lacanian ‘real’. I began to investigate the 
overlapping of the actual and the digital using real-time video to understand the 
experience. Below are extracts from my field notes. 
… it looks a bit demonic…for some reason it’s the weird and the uncanny. Are we 
closer to ourselves when it’s weird or uncanny? I am totally fascinated by this one…is 
the image me? Yes and no…would I feel the same if it was someone else’s face over 
mine…I don’t know really. There is something strange about this. I know for Lacan 
the image would be the veil of the real ... it’s like the dark side… again synchronicity 
seems to be cropping up. It really does have an impact on me...it’s weird. I could 
spend a long time immersed in myself ... I did feel more embodied in this. The more 
synchronous the more embodied. Did it feel weird? Yeah I suppose it did. Do I see 
myself as different? Yeah it is different but there is something quite satisfying, 
exciting and strange about the whole experience really. To look at it you would 
imagine it would feel more disembodied but in fact it felt more embodied”. “The inside 
is outside the outside is inside. I want to navigate myself so I fit perfectly. There does 
not seem to be a power difference with these two images we have doubling, cloning, 
replication, balance, slotting together, and fitting in, synchronicity. So did I learn 
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anything? Speaking through an ‘other’ is also interesting. I did like the strangeness of 
this and the weirdness. 
Is this all about the trauma of the lost unity with ‘self’ seeking what has been left 
behind through a dislocation? Perhaps through the alignment of ‘actual self’ and 
digital other’ we can strip away the veil of the real. As we exist between the real and 
the imaginary ie the symbolic (Lacan) we imagine the real. Maybe rather than 
imagine the real (a deeper embodiment with oneself and others) perhaps 
embodiment is where we self-touch (Moore 2010 Appendix 1, p.162-3).123
Immediate Responses to I-RE II (Windows A & B) 
 
Meanwhile returning back to window A & B at the Mander Centre, my own 
experiences within these I-REs was one of fun and weirdness. The virtual portrait 
was fun to be able to get closer to a more 3D image of me and the full virtual body 
image was weird and exciting as I could experiment a lot with my body and that of 
others who shared the experience with me. There was a feeling of dislocation from 
my physical body and also an attachment which was disorientating. Overall I did not 
feel indifferent to my image as a separate entity nor was I unified to my image. 
Informants that came across their image at the Mander Centre responded in a 
number of ways. Some deliberately avoided the projection whilst others played 
happily with their image and others were horrified to see themselves.  It can be 
suggested from their instant reactions that the key words they selected (weird, 
playful, freaky and fun) reflected their emotional responses to the work in a positive 
way. Responding without thinking appeared to give the agency of the informants a 
heightened awareness of their experiences. Through a deliberation of quick 
responses informants could not rehearse their answers and predict perhaps what I 
was looking for. Their responses were charged with real emotion which would have 
90 
 
been difficult to fake in such a short period of time.  There was no evidence of 
indifference and/or detachment to their image once informants had participated in 
the interaction.  
However, observing the informant’s interactions in such short interactive bursts of 
engagement was difficult to assess if they experienced the image as other to the 
self. Though informant’s emotional responses did contribute to an understanding that 
they were attached to the image in an emotional manner. This may suggest that the 
image is not understood as alien, estranged or other as their responses did not 
indicate an indifference or detachment from the image.  Equally there was not 
enough depth to the I-RE to determine if the image was a part of self.  The field 
notes describe this exploration as not having enough parameters to determine 
whether there was a synthesis between the informants’ actual self and digital other. 
This was based on the time informants spent with their video image. Those who took 
part did not spend more than 3 minutes interacting with their image. I suspect this 
was due to the public exposure of informants perhaps feeling a spectacle amongst 
shoppers. Though the short time span was adequate to capture an unrehearsed 
response I felt informants needed to spend more time with their image in private. 
Overall the comparison between my own ‘knee jerk’ responses and those of the 
informants were not that dissimilar.    
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2.5.3:Inter-Reactive Exploration III 
 
Fig. 4. Eagleworks: Touching the other 2010 (See DVD Appendix 4: I-RE III) 
Title: Touching the other 
Location: Eagleworks Studios & Mander shopping centre Wolverhampton 
 Informants: Art Audience/members of the public  
Key Question  
Do we alternate between the physical self and the digital non-self to get to know 
more   of the self; and is this oscillation an uncanny experience? 
Statement 
In I-REs I and II, I did not experience oneness or a unity with the digital other.  What 
came out of my explorations when I performed with my video image was a body 
experience that simultaneously felt and experienced itself as both self and other, 
92 
 
thus a return to Lacan’s Mirror Stage. Hence I found myself alternating between self 
and other.  
However, what was most significant to this research was the experience I 
encountered in the last studio project (vi) from I-RE I. This is where I superimposed 
my virtual projected face over my actual face; I described my response as a most 
powerful embodied uncanny encounter with my image. It was this experience that 
prompted me to look for a connection between the uncanny and a deeper connection 
to self.  Subsequently it was these ideas which informed this exploration – I-RE III. 
Here informants were invited to superimpose their real-time video image over my 
pre-recorded image in a private one-to-one interaction. As a result this I-RE may 
begin to question how we might be shaped by the experience of the ‘other’ as 
uncanny. Hence we may be able to perceptually step outside ourselves to feel a 
deeper connection to the image as part of ‘self’. It may be that the video technology 
might be able to help us transcend a part of self through the digital counterpart to 
experience a deeper connection to self.   
Description 
The way in which informants experience was documented from this I-RE was 
modelled on immediate video reactions caught on video camera and informal 
interviews. All informants were asked the same question about their first-hand 
experience. The video camera was also used as a tool to record the ambiance of the 
event acting like a microphone so it was not too intrusive to capture their responses.  
So when I was asking for responses I held the camera in my hand like a microphone 
and not directed in their faces. At a later stage some informants were invited back to 
the video performance to experience the event again so they could reflect on their 
first and second experience. These were conducted as informal interviews within the 
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same space. This way it was possible to compare any notable changes they may 
have experienced from their first time. The rationale behind recalling informants’ 
responses a second time was to determine if their pre-knowledge of the event had a 
greater or lesser impact on the uncanny experience. There were two locations for 
this I-RE; one was at Eagleworks studios and the other in the Mander Shopping 
centre in Wolverhampton. This was an opportunity to have a mixed audience and 
higher numbers of informants. The combination of instant responses and interviews 
enabled me to probe deeper into their experiences whilst at the same time gather 
automatic rather than pre-meditated reactions. 
This I-RE consisted of a video projection of my face similar to that of a portrait 
projected onto a gallery wall. Participants were invited to sit in a gallery space 
wearing headphones. In front of them on a wall was their real-time video portrait 
projected. In an attempt to create ‘liveness’ to the digital counterpart the headphones 
captured my breath and ambiance during the video recording. Meanwhile my pre-
recorded video portrait was superimposed over their real-time video portrait. (See 
DVD Appendix 4:I-REIII)  
Immediate Responses to the I-RE:  
My interactions with these I-REs were described as ‘weird’ in the sense I could 
experience myself oscillating between past and present where the presence of my 
actual body and my digital counterpart interlinked where I felt ‘more’ of me in the 
interaction. The culmination of experience between the actual ‘me’ and, the live 
video of me and the pre-recorded image of me all contributed to the ‘me-not-me’ 
experience. It was not frightening, and it was not other but rather more familiar and 
strange – uncanny.   
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What came out of these two explorations for the informants at Eagleworks studios 
and the Mander Shopping Centre was a high numbers of responses maintaining they 
felt it was ‘weird, strange and playful’. There were some informants who did find the 
experience uncomfortable and uneasy and even fewer who found it a frightening 
experience. The evidence is suggesting that those who experienced the work twice 
had a much stronger uncanny experience than the first time.  
Interviewee 1 Question: You mentioned it was uncanny last time what did you 
mean? Answer: It was unsettling because I could believe it was a real 
person…another person even though I knew it was not another person (during 
alignment)…this is when the faces were aligned… (2010 Appendix 2, p.176)124
Subsequently in comparing my own experiences to that of the informants I would 
propose at this stage in the enquiry that experiences were not too dissimilar except 
perhaps for the fact I was more familiar with the I-RE than those who took part in it. I 
was less playful in the experience as I was aware of exactly what would happen. The 
weirdness I felt soon dissipated through repeated familiarity with the interactions. 
(See DVD Appendix 4) The informants and I did feel we oscillated between the ‘me-
not-me’ experiences and there were brief moments of feeling suspended in the 
image. This is evidenced in the following extract from the interviews. 
 
Interviewee 4…I felt you were behind me…I felt we melted and we were one 
thing…suddenly I got back to me when I could see me… I lost myself in you. I was 
expecting to feel really uneasy and felt like you were over taking my body. That did 
not happen. I felt like I was one. ..it was one we were one with the image…it was not 
you and it was not me ...it was your hair and the shivers run down my spine…I knew 
you were touching your face but I was getting the sensation (2010 Appendix 2, p. 
179)125. 
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These interviews which can be accessed in appendix 2 have been demonstrating 
moments of the uncanny experience when the actual body and the digital body were 
aligned to create a composite image. However it is also apparent in these interviews 
that the video technology could not sustain the experience of being suspended in the 
image through the oscillation between the actual body and the digital image. 
Therefore it was also important to pursue further research into other technologies to 
move the research forward and prolong the embodied experience.   
As a result of this research the following I-RE was able to demonstrate the way new 
digital technology could be used with Isadora as a tool to augment the corporeal 
body and the digital body and extend the embodied experience.  
 2.5.4: Inter-Reactive Exploration  IV 
 
Fig.5: In[bodi]mental at The Public west Bromwich 2011 (See DVD Appendix 4)  
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Title: In[bodi]mental  
Location: The Public, West Bromwich  
Group: Members of the public 
Key Question  
To what extent can new digital technological affordances now allow us to embody 
the self of another?  
Statement 
What was now beginning to shape this research was the possibility that real-time 
video, displayed through the head mounted display systems HMDs may be the 
missing link in suspending the notion of a division between the corporeal self and the 
digital other. In doing so could the technology enable us to embody the other and 
thus become a part of self? Furthermore is the technology revealing elements of 
‘one’ self within other selves in new ways?   Subsequently the uncanny experience 
may be a disruption in our pre-conceived ideas of self experienced through the eyes 
of the other. It may be we are united as a whole divided by the technology only to 
return to a more fulfilling unity with the self?  Can the practice enable me to 
experience more of me through the eyes of the other where we unite-divide-unite 
with another?  
Description   
Participants were invited to interact with another persons’ digital counterpart in the 
form of a body swapping experiment. Here informants were asked to work in pairs 
were each participant wore a head mounted display system. The live web camera 
attached to the HMD showed the live video feed. As each person’s live video feed 
was swapped over each participant could see through the eyes of the other person. 
Under my instructions informants were asked to perform a number of small activities 
such as massaging their legs and knees, stretching out their legs and rotating their 
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feet. Each person took it in turns to lead the other in the performance. As instructions 
were given spectators watching the event could see the viewpoint of each of the 
performers swapped around within the large TV monitors placed behind them. 
Informants where asked to complete a questionnaire to capture their experiences. 
The rationale behind the questionnaires was to explore any links between 
embodiment and the uncanny experience. The questionnaires encouraged 
informants to respond to a number of statements either agreeing, disagreeing, or to 
neither agree nor disagree. These statements were put in place to determine how 
they felt during the experience and whether they felt embodied to the live image and 
how much self-awareness they had during this interaction.  Due to the high numbers 
of the public visiting the venue video interviews would have been too time consuming 
and problematic to do so.  In order to offset this I placed much more emphasis on 
observing the informants through video capture during the experience to give as 
much understanding of their responses as possible. The combination of observing 
informants and asking for initial responses along with the questionnaires served as a 
more convenient method of recording informant’s responses and reactions. This I-
RE was implemented at The Public located at West Bromwich West Midlands in 
June 2011.  
There were 30 informants who were involved in In[bodi]mental consisting of a 
number of age ranges. The questionnaire consisted of statements placed into three 
categories: the first category explored how they felt in the experience, and the 
second questioned whether there was an embodiment to the digital counterpart, 
while the third was based on their awareness of the here and now in the present.  
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Immediate Responses to I-RE: 
My interactions in this exploration were, at times, the belief that the other person’s 
body was my own. This was stronger during synchronized movements. Though I felt 
the other body was my own I did not feel transported into their body and disown my 
own body.  What came out of this I-RE for the informants was a strong connection to 
the digital counterpart through synchronous movements. The informants were very 
quick to intuitively copy each other under instructions. The following are some 
statements from informants’ experiences. 
(Male) Child “It was a weird good experience….very interesting…really clever…it was 
quite convincing….” 
(Teenager) “Whenever I moved she copied…I felt like I was her…” 
(Teenager) “It was unrealistic and I felt her body was mine...it was also real…” 
(Male) Adult “I felt it was most effective when we were standing up…its quite 
strange…after a while you try to synchronize yourself…” 
(Male adult) “The more it’s synchronized the more you doubt your feelings…”  
(2011 Appendix 1, pp. 173-4)126
The feedback from the questionnaires is suggesting that about 50 per cent of 
informants felt the other person’s body was theirs. (see appendix 1 tables 1-3 
pp.171-3). The findings from In[bodi]mental are discussed in chapter three as a  
contribution to new knowledge.  As a result it has been through the practice that we 
are coming to see connections between them were the digital other has felt part of 
self.  This has been evidenced through various responses, such as… ‘I believe your 
hands are mine’… ‘I felt like I was her’… ‘Very interesting…really clever…it was 
quite convincing…’ … ‘It was unrealistic and I felt her body was mine…it was also 
real…’ (2011, Appendix 1. pp.173-4).
 
127    
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Each I-RE has had a particular focus on; a synthesis between actual self and digital 
other; exploring the oscillation between the ‘me-not-me’ phenomena and its 
relationship with the uncanny, and embodying the other as a part of self. These key 
questions have raised some doubt on the notion that the digital other is a separate 
entity to the subject. 
In critiquing the field notes from these I-REs has shed some light on the relationships 
between the self and digital counterpart – self and world. We can see the way the 
technology has stretched the material body and raised more questions regarding the 
self as one single unit of corporeality. The aesthetic merit of the I-REs has been 
varied throughout. The one-to-one performances of I-RE (i) were visually graceful, 
but the I-REs (ii- and iv) were much more transparent in the way they worked. 
Engaging informants between the making and the product was an attempt to 
holistically involve the informant in the research. This undertaking contributed to their 
responses in the knowledge of knowing how the ‘illusion’ worked. This was most 
appropriate to I-RE (iii and iv) so both the emotional and intellectual responses could 
be recorded. As the researcher being both the producer and product of the research 
I was able to shift from ‘I’ to ‘other’ through a variety of writing and recording 
methods as a means to turn away from the work in order to move closer and look 
inward. In this way both my own emotional and intellectual components of my self 
could be analysed. All responses in these I-REs are a result of perceptions creating 
a reality through the lived experiences.    
The appeal of using Isadora in I-RE (ii-iv) was its user-friendly interface and the 
simplicity of the technology to do remarkable things outside my own realm of 
technical expertise. It enabled me to work across the disciplines of art and 
technology and place myself in a multiplicity of roles. I was in total control of both the 
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creative process and the making of the I-REs. Working in this way made it possible 
for me to phenomenologically continue to assess the experience of both the process 
of making and the actual making which has contributed to this research. As a video 
performance artist, using Isadora, has become a tool that encompasses both the 
process and the making of work which has extended the parameters of the bodies 
capabilities. The real-time capacity of the technology enabled me to capture the 
agency of my body in the moment and also capture historical traces of my body 
through video delay techniques. It was through Isadora that the liminal space 
between the self and the other was suspended where we could be immersed in the 
other.    
As a result we have seen the way in which auto-ethnophenomenology has a coming 
together of the ‘I’ and other. Whilst ‘auto’ refers to ‘I’ and ‘ethno’ refers to a 
combination of many we have seen how this method has focused on the significance 
of the ‘I’ of the researcher. In doing so the relational aspect between the ‘I’ and the 
other is equally represented. Furthermore we have come to understand how through 
the I-REs these positions can shift between the observers and the observed 
transposed through the digital technologies.  It is through these mutual experiences 
that we can come to arrive at a more ‘negotiated version of reality’ (Pink 2007, p.24) 
Likewise for Varela, Thompson & Rosch ‘Reflection is not just on experience, 
reflection is a form of experience’. It is where thought impacts experience and 
experience impacts thought. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, ,1993, p.27)128
Visual technologies as tools for creating visual records have received considerable 
criticism. This of course relates back to the problematic assumption that reality is 
visible, observable and recordable in video or photography.  This study challenges 
the assumption that the real exists only in the form of the material, which can be 
   
101 
 
accessed through the visible “just as reality is not solely visible or observable; 
images have no fixed or single meanings and are not capable of capturing an 
objective reality” (Pink 2007, p.32).129
However it is through the capturing qualities of informants’ experiences that these 
visual technologies are intended to be understood as tools to refer to versions of 
reality as referents of visible and observable phenomena that are embedded in the 
experience and everyday practices of the lived experience. We see in chapter three 
how these experiences have been interpreted through those occurrences that took 
place between subjects as a contribution of new knowledge to the field.    
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Chapter Three  
In[bodi]mental: The In[body] of another  
This chapter outlines the findings from I-REs I-III but primarily focuses on the 
conclusions drawn from I-RE IV In[bodi]mental and the contribution to knowledge. It 
discusses what is original regarding this research and makes a distinction between 
the experience of embodiment and In[bodi]ment and the way the self is perceived. 
As a result of this study the chapter proceeds with an introduction to the augmented 
self experienced through other selves via digital technology. The implications of 
these findings are discussed from the perspective of neurology, psychology and 
phenomenology, to challenge our perception of the material body within the field of 
video performance and digital media art practice.        
3:1 Findings from I-REs I-III   
The following are the main findings from three of the I-REs taken from the 
experience of the informants and myself compiled from the responsive field notes, 
questionnaires, interviews and instant reactions.  
Findings and correlations between the corporeal self and the digital other:  
• There was a correlation between embodiment and unity with the image 
when watching the digital images synchronize with each other on the 
video documentation. An increased awareness of self in the moment 
during emotional responses 
• Nothing to support a loss of self in the digital other 
• No substantiation of an estrangement and/or alienation from the digital 
counterpart 
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• An apparent relationship between the uncertainty of distinguishing 
which image was theirs’ and which one was a representation and the 
feeling of weirdness 
• An oscillation between sameness and difference, the ‘me-not-me’ 
experience 
• A relationship between sameness and synchronicity in the actual 
experience 
• A doubling of seeing-oneself see-oneself had links with strangeness, 
attachment and familiarity with the digital image 
• There was a parallel between vision and  feeling touch 
• Highly emotive responses such as ‘weird’, ‘freaky’, ‘strange’ and ‘fun’ 
• A correlation between oscillation and the uncanny experience 
• A connection in the belief the digital image was real and the uncanny  
• A correlation between synchronicity, alignment and immersion of the 
image 
• An association between embodiment and empathy 
What has become apparent in these findings however is an increased awareness of 
the self ‘in the moment’ during these lived experiences. This has been compounded 
through a strong emphasis on an oscillation between the corporeal self and the 
digital other, where they are the same and different ‘me-not-me’ experiences.  
These experiences resonate with Lacan’s Mirror Stage130 during the pre-language 
stage of the infant where the infant has an uneasy relationship with its specular 
image. This is the Imaginary stage for the infant who imagines what it is through 
images and reflections. For Lacan the image is not real and the infant imagines a 
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promise of completeness within the image as other; hence it is through the lack of 
motor co-ordination the infant’s body feels fragmented from its specular image. The 
findings from these I-REs revealed a striking reference to Lacan’s MS where the 
informants and I alternated between the corporeal self and our digital other as a ‘me-
not-me’ experience.  The hypothesis outlined at the beginning of chapter two was 
informed by the MS as a means of finding a promise of completeness in meeting my 
own digital counterpart.  
Subsequently, though I see similarities between the MS and the I-REs, my own 
experiences were not felt fragmentations from my digital video image but rather from 
my place of standing in the world as I know it. There were moments when I felt 
dislocated from my grounding in the world. Together, the heightened awareness of a 
disruption in my proprioception, culminated in me feeling a closer connection to my 
digital counterpart. My perceived split was not between me and my image but 
between me and my place of standing in the actual world. This is substantiated 
through the knowledge my body is grounded in the actual world; but felt transposed 
through the technology into my image. This is a place where I can revolve between 
forgetting the body and returning to the body. Using a video delay within the real-
time technology assisted the actual body in its ability to perceptually shift from one 
location to another. Consequently I propose that the actual body can break learnt 
habits of behaviour and experience new ones.   
Drew Leder in his book The Absent Body (1990)131 proposes that the human body is 
a creature of habit where we learn skills through example which eventually becomes 
part of one’s corporeality. When these rituals are broken or disturbed the body 
returns to its corporeality and becomes more self-aware. During those moments in I-
REI when I felt a similitude between my body and the digital image I had forgotten 
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the physical body. It was only when my body felt displaced through the video 
projection that I felt more aware of it. When we are immersed in a purposeful activity 
we don’t leave the body behind we forget the body, so when the body is in pain, for 
example, we become more aware of our corporeality. 
I am suggesting it is through using appropriate video technology that we can come to 
experience a shift in our psyche which is difficult to define. The significance of IREs 
I-III is how the technology used enabled us to shift between the conscious and the 
subconscious to experience these transitions. Moreover it was the replacement of 
basic video technology to real-time video (Isadora) that facilitated these encounters.  
Ultimately, though these experiences are difficult to articulate in words they may 
have some relationship to Freud’s The Uncanny (1919). A concept that is rooted in 
the psyche, understood as a condition between the conscious and the subconscious, 
where something that was once familiar is now estranged through repression. These 
are the key elements which are informing this research; where I specifically compare   
the familiar self and the unfamiliar digital other to the ‘me’ ‘not-me’ experiences 
encountered in Lacan’s MS and informants’ experiences in I-RE IV In[bodi]mental. 
When I relate to the ‘me-not-me’ encounters I am explaining the strange relationship 
between these binary oppositions where there are moments of recognition of the 
actual self in the digital counterpart. This is most apparent when the images are 
synchronized and aligned as one composite image.  
Oscillating between the ‘me-not-me’ experiences has contributed to the uncanny 
encountered within these I-REs. It is this flux which has created a tension between 
the known and the unknown together with the actual body and its digital counterpart. 
I suspect, these findings are also revealing a correlation between the unexplained 
experiences of the uncanny and Lacan’s impossible real which I will discuss later on 
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in this chapter. However though Freud’s uncanny has roots in the frightening; I am 
suggesting that the uncanny experiences informants and myself articulated were 
‘oddly’ positive strange experiences and not within the realm of the frightening 
arising from some repressed childhood complexities. These experiences were most 
powerful during the alignment and intersection of the actual body and the digital 
counterpart in I-RE III and IV. What seems to have contributed to an uncanny 
experience was the informants’ uncertainty of which image was of them and which 
was of the other participant. Therefore what induced an uncanny experience was the 
ambiguity of a perceived shift in the body’s proprioception where the individual 
momentarily stepped into its digital counterpart and back to the corporeality of the 
body. This I would describe as a ‘lived’ moment between the conscious and the 
subconscious as an uncanny encounter.  
The common use of emotive words such as ‘weird’, ‘fun’, ‘strange’, ‘playful’ and 
‘freaky’ were emotional responses which suggested a strong connection to the 
image. These expressions represented experiences which were difficult to articulate 
in language, in particular the uncanny experience. The real-time digital technologies 
enabled the actual body to feel suspended in the image.  This may account for the 
feeling of being in the moment between past and present, self and other.  In the 
same way as the time delay on the video enabled informants to move into their 
image where they could see-oneself seeing-oneself. The latter terms were 
emphasized in an excitable positive manner suggesting their interactions were not 
met with indifference or estrangement; on the contrary there appeared to be an 
exhilarating tension in the experience.  
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The following are some informants’ reflections on their initial responses along with 
others who had been invited back to I-RE III to reflect on their experience for a 
second time a few days later.   
Interviewee 6…The first time I felt possessed and then I got used to it…”  (Appendix 
2. 2010:182)132 Interviewee 1“…the first time produced a genuine feeling of the 
uncanny when you have never done it before” (Appendix 2. 2010, p.176) 133 
Interviewee 5… First time I was more shocked and this time I knew what to 
expect.… (Appendix 2. 2010, p.181)134 Interviewee 10… I knew what I wanted to do 
this time. I did not feel lost like the first time (Appendix 2. 2010, p.189).135
For those who were interviewed they were given the opportunity to reflect on their 
firsthand experiences. They could articulate in more detail any references or 
synonyms related to the uncanny and any movement of oscillation between self and 
other as a form of embodiment. The findings have indicated that those who were 
invited back for a second time to experience I-RE III responded with less urgency 
and passion as their first experiences had indicated. Thus suggesting that the impact 
the I-RE had on informants was much more powerful during their first experience 
which I believe captured the essence of ‘in the moment’ which was then passed and 
could not be repeated.    
   
These first hand experiences revealed stronger uncanny responses and a 
heightened sense of self-awareness. During their second experience informants   
focused much more on synchronizing themselves with the digital image. In addition 
getting quick responses was much more telling by their spontaneity indicating an 
unconscious reaction to the I-REs of being in the moment. It also follows that their 
first reactions had more urgency about them when describing the experience using 
words and phrases such as ‘wow’, ‘weird’,’ ‘strange’, ‘spooky’, ‘freaky’. I am 
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suggesting that these reactions are symptoms of the uncanny which were not 
prescribed, but automatic involuntary reactions which may have links to a primordial 
part of the subconscious experience understood as uncanny. 
The findings have been indicating that in order to maintain the feeling of embodiment 
further technological research needed to be undertaken. Therefore, it was more 
likely that emerging technologies could determine whether there was a relationship 
between the feeling of embodiment to the image and an uncanny experience to 
sustain this experience through prolonged encounters. The video technology used 
was not able to suspend the informants’ embodied experience within the image. 
Though there were moments of an uncanny embodiment during the intersection 
between the corporeal body and the digital other this ‘moment’ had yet to be further 
explained and investigated. It was becoming more apparent that these alternated 
states were causing an uncanny reaction at the moment of their intersection. It was 
these occurrences which led to further probing of these experiences in accordance 
to make sense of the impact these experiences had on the self. The findings were 
encouraging in that they inferred that one may be able to embody another subject 
and literally stand in somebody else’s shoes through a meeting place between 
bodies enabled by the technology. The correlation between the alignment of images, 
synchronicity and mimicry corresponded with the feeling of embodiment. The 
informants felt a desire to be in unison with the digital image understood as other.  
Interviewee 4 …you were in my head…I tried to match up with your face… I wanted 
my face to fit with yours...it felt right…it was not weird or uncomfortable I forgot you 
and forgot me. (Appendix 2. 2010, p.179)136 
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Interviewee 5 …This time I was trying to match myself up and at one point I merged 
it was spot on it was brilliant.  I thought I got it right...I wanted to get it exactly right…I 
could imagine what your skull was like… (Appendix 2. 2010, p.181)137
Interviewee 10 …I wanted to line up with your alignment…its interesting when faces 
match up its different to distinguish who is who even though we have totally different 
faces…(Appendix 2. 2010, p.189)
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These moments of embodiment can be described as ‘hovering’ in the image where 
one feels a similitude with the image. During these instances informants did feel 
embodied to the digital counterpart. This was even more compounded when both the 
actual and the digital image worked together in unison copying each others’ 
movements. This was most encountered when the two images created a composite 
image during an exact alignment of facial features and expressions.  One 
explanation of this similitude may be a link between the discovery of Mirror Neurons 
and the embodiment of the digital other. In his book Mirroring People: The science of 
Empathy and how we connect with others (2009) neurologist Marco Iacoboni 
explains how these neurons fire in the brain when we watch another person perform 
a similar action to our own where it is thought the observer may feel what it feels like 
to move in the observed way. 
 
Insofar as when informants are in unison they have more of an empathy with the 
image thus contributing to the embodied feeling. These are exciting explorations 
which could have a profound impact on the way in which we perceive the self in 
relationship with the digital other.  To explore these findings further in In[bodi]mental  
I-RE IV I introduced head mounted display systems (HMDs) to challenge these 
observations using direct instructions for informants to copy each other’s 
movements. The live video feed for each HMD was swapped over so each informant 
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could see the viewpoint of the other through the HMD. It was also looking for a way 
to suspend informants in the image at the intersection between the actual body and 
the digital other.   
I-REs I-III had been the stepping-stone in leading the research in the direction of 
discovering more about selfhood. This has led to an exploration in new digital 
technologies where we are seeing the emergence of an augmented self. I-RE I 
incorporated basic video projection to challenge these ideas which was then 
replaced with real-time video technologies in I-RE II and III. Though the real-time 
video technologies could momentarily immerse the informants in the digital image it 
could not sustain it. It was not until the introduction of the HMDs in conjunction with 
real-time video in I-RE IV entitled In[bodi]mental that the research moved on. I-RE IV 
proved to be crucial to this investigation as this is where the technology had the 
potential to suspend the corporeal body within the digital counterpart.  
3:2 In[bodi]mental I-RE IV   
The following is a summary of those findings taken from the experiences of the 
informants and myself.  
• A relationship between exhilarating and weird 
• Correlation between embodiment and synchronicity 
• Informants felt the other body as part of their own 
• Self was momentarily immersed within the other 
• A link between self-objectification and unity with the image 
• Correlation between the uncanny and a belief in the other body as their 
own 
• A feeling of being suspended in the other  
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• A correlation between synchronicity, alignment and immersion of the 
image 
• There was a relationship between embodiment and empathy 
• A connection in the belief the digital image was real and the uncanny  
• A correlation between oscillation and the uncanny experience 
• A strong connection between touch and vision 
• High emotive responses such as ‘weird’, ‘freaky’, ‘strange’ and ‘fun’ 
• A strong disruption in proprioception 
• A hyper-real experience 
• Experiencing more of the self 
• A link between an excess of self and the Lacanian real 
• A link between the uncanny and the Lacanian real 
• A link between the uncanny and experiencing more of self 
In In[bodi]mental informants and myself were caught between doubt and certainty 
during the  intersection and alignment of this body swapping exploration. There were 
expressions of disbelief and belief in ‘whose body was who’s’. The notable difference 
with this I-RE compared to I-REs I-III was the hyper-real experiences informants 
expressed.  The following are some quotes taken from those experiences.  
I felt I was my mum and my mum was me…it was most effective when we had the 
little hand ball” “I believe your hands are mine …” “Whenever I moved she copied…I 
felt like I was her …” “It was a weird good experience …  it was quite convincing that 
it was my body (my dad’s that is). It was more convincing my dad’s body was on me 
when we stood up and rubbed stomachs…it was very weird”  “…after a while you try 
to synchronise yourself and match the action intuitively…I feel the more immersive 
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the experience I think the body can be tricked into believing the other body is yours 
(2011, Appendix 1, p.173).139
These findings indicate that the self was momentarily immersed in the other. There 
are no indications that self was lost to the other, on the contrary, through immersion 
the self experienced more of self in the other. For brief moments informants believed 
they had ownership of the other body.  Though some of these findings relate to I-
REs I-III it has been through the HMDs that the real-time video technology has been 
able to suspend the self in the digital counterpart. During my own experiences of 
In[bodi]mental I believed the other person’s body was my own. In the early 
experimental stages of this I-RE the following is an account of my first response.  
  
I really did feel that her hand and legs where mine especially when our movements 
where synchronized. Danielle started drawing with a pen on her hand and I believed 
she was drawing on my hand and that was weird for me.  I poured hand cream into 
my hands and rubbed it in.  I asked Danielle to copy my actions and she said she 
really felt the cream on her hands even though the cream was in fact on my hands 
(2011 Appendix 1, p.174).140
We might say that these experiences correlate to being in a state between 
substance and non-substance. This corresponds neatly to the Siberian Yukaghirs 
discussed in chapter one, when they go hunting for their Elk. Here Rane Willerslev 
describes the way in which these hunters occupy a ‘betwixt’ place between a state of 
substance and non-substance, between animal and hunter that assists in the 
similitude of sameness and difference (Willerslev 2007, p.30).
 
141  As an imitator, the 
self can enter into relations with its other without being transformed into something 
else or losing itself within the other. Without the mediation of the self through the 
other there would be no conception of self as such. The imitator can be in contact 
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with the world of other bodies, things and people and also separate himself from 
them by forcing himself to reflexively turn in on himself (2007, p.26).142
In In[bodi]mental informants reported a suspended belief in the other body image as 
their own, which was reinforced through imitating the digital counterpart. This is 
where the physical body was performing the other while maintaining its sameness 
and difference. This awareness of imitating the other prevents us from fusing with 
the object of difference. This is something Jungian psychoanalyst Mark Saban 
describes as the psychology of mimesis which is a state that is neither cut off in 
difference nor fused with sameness.  Saban refers to the concept of mimesis as a 
similarity which always depends for meaning on its opposite ‘difference’. ‘It is this 
awareness of difference that enables the imitator’s direction of attention … to turn 
back into self- awareness as imitating subject’ (Saban: 2010). 
  
143
In refraining from speaking whilst experiencing In[bodi]mental we can come to 
suspend our separation between our corporeal self and digital other. Insofar as we 
abstain from using the symbolic order of language whose principle function is to 
differentiate and divide. Through withholding language and mimetically incorporating 
the digital other into the self we come to experience a duality of doubling 
perspectives where each is reflected in the other, emphasizing the similitude 
between self and other. In this instance it is the technology that has augmented this 
emphasis. Throughout our day-to-day interactions with each other we are unaware 
of our inherent desire to mimic others in the actual world. In the process if mimicking 
the other through the real-time HMDs the digital image folds back into and changes 
 The conception 
between the physical body and its digital counterpart in In[bodi]mental assists the 
body to perceptually transpose itself from physical self to other self mediated through 
the process of imitation and the digital technology.  
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the actual perception of the corporeality of the self. We are so caught up in the 
others’ image and actions they become mutually related.  
3:3 In[bodied] selves  ∞ :the ‘live chiasm’ of the actual body and the digital 
other  
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm discussed in chapter one has been exampled 
through In[bodi]mental where the actual body and its digital counterpart intersect. I 
refer to this as a ‘live chiasm’ which we experience in the moment of In[bodi]mental. 
It is through the alignment of body matter and digital media that we experience the 
relationship between the visible and the tangible. The chiasm has become a lived 
experience beyond the parameters of philosophical discourse channelled through 
the HMDs.  In[bodi]mental is an experience which conveys Merleau-Ponty’s claim 
that there are no limits between the body and the world, self and other as the world 
is flesh. Indeed we are both subject and object simultaneously where our ‘flesh’ 
merges with the flesh that is the world (Merleau-Ponty1968, p.138).144
I propose that any claim of the binary self/other division between the lived body and 
the digital other, has become a learnt perception from our fixed optical viewpoint of 
the world. In other words, as we see the visual image outside our corporeality we 
assume we have no connection with it. Furthermore because we do not see the 
chiasm we assume it is not there. This unassuming quality of the chiasm indicates 
we are unaware of our entwinement with other subjects and the world. Conversely it 
is the real-time technologies that has magnified this process where we experience 
these crossovers and learn new ways of seeing and experiencing the world. In 
seeing-ourselves see-ourselves through the eyes of the other our pre-conditioned 
relationship with self and the world is challenged. While we are able to shift our 
perspective through the digital technology, we have the potential to step into the 
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digital counterpart and become a part of our other as a part of self. The crossover of 
the live video feed within the HMDs has been the stepping-stone in assisting in these 
shared realities. In[bodi]mental enables us to feel we are in the [body] of another.  I 
have coined the term In[body] to express these forms of experience  where one 
perceives that they are situated inside another’s body. The term is defined as being 
inside another body through these interactions where you choose to step into it. 
Whereas, the term embodiment uses the pre-fix en/m meaning into which is more 
about becoming embodied where you bring something into the body. Here the 
subject and object are different where the subject acts upon the object. The 
difference between in[body] and embody is significant in that being in the body is 
different from becoming the body of another. If we actually become another body 
what would happen to the self? We don’t lose the self in these interactions. On the 
contrary, it is by simulating the digital counterpart that this In[bodi]ment has been 
realised as an excess of self. This is where we have gained something more of the 
self in the other – an augmentation of the self via technology through the other.  This 
experience may potentially be more real than the self we know. This hyperreality is 
something Merleau-Ponty might have taken to mean in the following quote:       
…as upon two mirrors facing one another where two indefinite series of images set in 
one another arise which belong really to neither of the two surfaces, since each is 
only the rejoinder of the other, and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real 
than either of them  (Merleau-Ponty1968, p.138).145
In In[bodi]mental we experience the tangibility of the ‘live chiasm’ as a form of 
In[bodi]ment in the other. It re [presents] the chiasmus as a mobius strip ∞ where this 
figure of eight subverts our normal way of representing space. It does this by aligning 
the digital and the actual through synchronicity. The in[bodi]ment of two selves 
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appear as ‘one’ when in reality there are two individual subjects.  The HMDs 
facilitated a perceived traversal of each participant’s corporeality where the 
technology enabled us to experience one continuum where it is impossible to locate 
the cross over between the inside and outside, self and other. This type of digital 
technology extended our vision and touch acting as the interface between the actual 
body and its digital counterpart where vision dominates proprioception.  
3:4 The In[bodied] Mirror Stage     
Whilst we are suspended in In[bodi]mental we return to a new Lacanian MS were we 
have entered the stage as non-speaking subjects. As non-speaking subjects we 
abstain from speaking in language, and are mimetically engrossed being captive in 
the digital image of the other. It is during this In[bodi]ment that the experience is 
uncanny. This is the place where we have forgotten our own body and shifted into 
that of another, where we are suspended in a ‘betwixt’ place between substance and 
non-substance, between the conscious and the subconscious. In The Uncanny 
(1919)146
In the experience of In[bodi]mental we actually gain something more of self in the 
digital image. Therefore it is significant to return back to the Lacanian MS where the 
child passes from the MS to the symbolic world of language as an individual subject. 
In[bodi]mental reverses Lacan’s MS where we enter as subjects and maintain a 
suspension in his imaginary. It is while we are immersed and captivated in the image 
that any gap between subjects is overcome. In doing so a disruption in the 
 Freud often refers to an unintentional return to something that was once 
familiar and now estranged and repressed. Experiencing In[bodi]mental suggests 
that we may have returned to ‘something’ familiar within the digital counterpart 
understood as unfamiliar ‘as other’, which has now become a part of self through the 
synchronized movement. 
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proprioception of the body had caused a heightened awareness of the body in the 
moment creating a stronger unity with the image. While the real is lost during 
Lacan’s MS In[bodi]mental enables us to experience something of the lost real 
phenomenologically. As a form of experience which cannot be articulated in 
language I regard the uncanny experience in In[bodi]mental as a re-connection with 
the lost real.   
3:5 The Uncanny as the remainder of the lost real  
We know the uncanny is an experience which we cannot articulate in words. This is 
also true of Lacan’s real as it cannot be named. Freud also points out that we tend to 
relate to the uncanny when our boundaries between reality and fantasy are blurred. 
These boundaries are not so much blurred in In[bodi]mental but sustained in the 
‘betwixt’ space between substance and non-substance. While we are suspended in 
the imaginary In[bodi]mental enables us to prolong our experience in the reality of 
the digital counterpart. It is at this moment the digital counterpart is experienced as 
part of self. This real experience advanced the research.    
It became apparent that Lacan’s real was experienced during this exploration but 
was caught up via the uncanny. Though an ‘uncannyness’ was induced when the 
digital counterpart was experienced as part of their self, I claim that the uncanny 
experiences in In[bodi]mental did not arise out of some repressed childhood 
complexities revived within the performance. Nor was it a revival of a primitive belief 
system. I argue that it is from a much deeper primordial connection that enables us 
to go beyond the symbolic world of language with a shared empathy of experience 
mediated through the technology. We are reconnecting with something that was 
familiar and lost and nothing to do with being hidden or repressed. This is not a 
return to something repressed but to something lost or long forgotten – Lacan’s real. 
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I state that we can experience the real phenomenologically through an uncannyness 
which cannot be expressed in words. This uncannyness is understood as an exciting 
strangeness rather than a frightening encounter where we are connecting with 
something lost but found in the other.     
This can be explained through a shared reality between informants. Those who took 
part in In[bodi]mental felt an intuitive urge to continue copying each others’ 
movements once instructions had been given. Some led the other without 
instructions. In all of the I-REs there was an instinctive urge to mimic and/or 
synchronize oneself with the digital counterpart. As discussed in chapter one this 
process of repetition is tantamount with the uncanny and the real. We know 
repetition for Freud is an unintentional return, whereas for Lacan it is a missed 
encounter with the real. I am claiming that our desire to mimic in In[bodi]mental is a 
direct instinctual response in an attempt to access the real in the other. In doing, so 
we return to the lost real encountered through the uncanny experience. I therefore 
argue that the uncanny experience may be a remainder of the lost real, accessed 
through other, as self in the digital counterpart. What we have lost in the subject in 
Lacan’s MS is rediscovered in the other augmented through the new technologies as 
a form of direct experience. In this way we experience a reality of the self ‘more real’ 
together in In[bodi]mental than we could ever experience on our own. The impact 
this has on subjects has been equated with a disturbance in the human psyche 
rather than a traumatic experience.  
3:6 The Augmented Self: Performing the real through the other self using real-
time video technologies  
According to Lacan the real is impossible to think or to verbalize. However what I am 
arguing is that we can we take another approach to experiencing it. This is not to 
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suggest a division between language and experience but to consider them both 
occurring simultaneously where we can find new frameworks to experience them. 
The In[bodi]mental exploration has been formulating new ways with technology to 
experience the real phenomenologically through digital performance. In doing so, it 
can explore the gaps within the symbolic between language and experience. It does 
this through the augmented self which has come about through the In[bodi]ment of 
two corporeal selves reversed through the HMDs. The augmented self in this case 
provides a platform for the crossover between the symbolic world of language and 
the experience of the real, which can only be accessed through the imaginary in 
In[bodi]mental. This ’live chiasm’ at the intersection between the symbolic and the 
real has developed a growth in lived experience which has had a profound impact on 
ones perception of self. Just like the (gametes) of a human cell where we divide-
unite-divide, In[bodi]mental mirrors those behaviours through its potential to 
perceptually shift the subject from its place of standing in the world to unite with the 
digital counterpart and back again. On its return the subject has gained more of itself 
through the other. The crossing over of the live video feed through the HMDs has 
disturbed the reality we have been familiar with, which has now been undermined to 
the point where we may be experiencing a reality that is more real than the self we 
have come to know. Furthermore this may be compounded through the instinctual 
desire to synchronize and mimic the digital counterpart, to where we are performing 
this other. Not only do we come to empathize with the image as our own we have 
come to observe how it feels to move like the digital counterpart and identify with it 
as part of our self  
It makes sense that the correlation between self-objectification and In[bodi]ment is 
focused on the ability to  observe oneself reflexively.  Willerslev observes how our 
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bodies invite objectification to gain a sense of the other as part of self. By 
incorporating the performative mimetic image of another, the body can occupy both 
states of the self/other experience where we can perform the other. In essence this 
takes us back to the Yukaghirs when they go hunting for Elk were they take on the 
qualities of the Elk to catch their prey. However while we take on the mimetic 
qualities of the digital counterpart in In[bodi]mental we have the ability to amplify the 
body as an external object where one observes oneself reflexively from the viewpoint 
of another; which I am suggesting creates  a stronger empathy with the other subject 
as part of self. Here the materiality of the body has been stretched through a 
deliberate disturbance in the proprioception of the body.  
3:7 Technology as the Looking Glass Self 
As we interact with emerging technology the more they are becoming the interface of 
the looking glass self. They are enabling us to reflect on ourselves from many 
viewpoints and the way others see us. This has been exampled through the software 
Isadora which has the ability to project and manipulate real-time video images. Using 
Isadora has enabled the boundaries between the corporeal self and the digital other 
to become blurred. In[bodi]mental for example has enabled us to empathize with 
others and experience the digital other as a component of self.  These emerging 
technologies are breaking down the illusion of the digital other as a separate entity. 
Artists, scientists and theorists are witnessing the augmentation of the self mediated 
through digital technologies. Digital media art practices are having an impact on our 
perception of reality especially our assumed assumptions that self and digital other, 
subject and objects are somehow separate alien entities. In essence we cannot get 
outside technology; we are a part of the technology.  
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The artistic process of practitioners has been challenged when using new 
technologies within an art and performance emphasis. Just like any other medium 
within the field of Fine Art and/or Art and Design the tools have challenged the 
making process. The methods and approaches that result from those challenges 
have been evidenced within In[bodi]mental where the technology is the device which 
has caused the body to feel In[bodied] to another. Though the technology has 
inevitably been a part of the making process of the art practice it has been during 
this research that the concepts and ideas came first which required the HMDs to 
make the work happen. Nonetheless the technology has also pushed the concepts 
within this research and expanded the art practice as the method and the method as 
the practice. In[bodi]mental has been transparent in bridging the gap between the 
making and the process where these fields have come together to make artwork.  
Moreover the technology had also become the looking glass to communicate the 
personal journey this research has undertaken through the work phenomenologically 
and reflexively. The journey has not been pure philosophy but not pure technically, 
but an engagement of them both to enable the conceptual processes to emerge 
through the artists multiplicity of roles viewpoints and vocabularies to work across 
disciplines such as art and technology. These personal experiences have become a 
part of the making process, in such a way that, using the technology is as important 
as the outcome which has contributed to new knowledge. If we understand that we 
cannot get outside technology as we are so much a part of it, then we also 
understand we cannot take the self out of the making processes attached to practice 
led research. Rather than just focusing on methodological frameworks the working 
process point of view can also helps artists become researchers and still maintain 
artistic integrity.    
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Using the tools of emerging technologies to re-examine the self as a form of self 
reflection blurs the boundaries between the artist and the artefact. The capability of 
real-time technology within the field of video performance demonstrates the way the 
self bleeds into the technology. Inevitably this will impact upon the way artists 
approach self-portraits, and the way observers interact with an image. An original 
aspect of this research is the way we can In[body] the image. Using Isadora has 
enabled one to feel they have inhabited the body of another as a new experience 
which we did not have a phrase for, until now.  The alignment between the digital 
and the corporeal has created a digital circuit to enable a crossover between the 
actual and the digital. Therefore body matter and digital media are part of the 
materiality of the body. Without the affordances of the digital technology the 
in[bodied] experience would not be possible to stretch the body beyond it’s normal 
parameters. The notion of in[body]ing oneself or another subject through technology 
is a way forward to experience the real through digital performance.  
3:8 In[bodi]mental: The intersection between neurology and phenomenology  
It has been through the technology that the subject’s lived experience has been 
heightened through our visual perceptions which creates our reality in In[bodi]mental. 
In the 1990s neurologist Vilayanur Ramachandran devised mirror therapy for 
phantom limb pain sufferers. During an online interview Ramachandran claims that if 
a mirror is placed to reflect the existing limb in a position that makes it look like the 
missing one, the brain’s distorted image of the phantom can be changed.  “When the 
amputee moves the existing limb into a comfortable position, the reflection in the 
mirror — the phantom limb — “moves” with it, and pain in that missing limb often 
disappears, sometimes forever”. Time Health & Family, ‘Unlearning’ Pain (Maia 
Szalavitz 2011).147   
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In a related study, a team of Swedish neuroscientists demonstrated that human 
subjects can be made to experience virtual bodies as their own in the form of body 
swapping experiments. Volunteers at Stockholm’s Karolinska Institute wore VR 
goggles to experience the illusion of swapping bodies with a mannequin and a real 
person.  
Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated 
multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that 
another person’s body or an artificial body was one’s own. This effect was so strong 
that people could experience being in another person’s body when facing their own 
body and shaking hands with it (Henrik Ehrsson & Valerie Petkova 2008).148
These experiments consisted of subjects being subjected to synchronized visual and 
tactile stimulation. To create the illusion scientists fitted two CCTV cameras onto the 
head of a male mannequin and sent the output from the camera to two small screens 
in front of the subjects’ eyes. When the mannequin and the subject’s head where 
looking down towards their own torso, the subject saw the mannequin’s body where 
they would have normally seen their own. Ehrsson’s work has built on previous 
experiments known as the “rubber hand illusion” in which participants were 
manipulated to experience a rubber hand as their own. Ehrsson comments that:  
  
…this shows how easy it is to change the brain’s perception of the physical self… By 
manipulating sensory impressions, it’s possible to fool the self not only out of its body 
but into other bodies, too 149
According to these neuroscientists we can fool the brain into believing that we can 
experience another limb or another person’s body as our own. The ramifications of 
these findings resonate with the debate surrounding Mirror Neurons in the field of 
neuroscience. For Ramachandran there is a direct correlation between mirror 
(Ehrsson cited in Helen Thompson, NewScientist 2008).  
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neurons and pain-relief. He claims that if a phantom limb patient watches another 
patient being scratched or touched they feel the touch in their own phantom limb. In 
his paper Self Awareness: The Last Frontier (2009, p.3)150   he identifies with ‘touch 
mirror neurons’ (2009:4)151
It’s as if the neuron …was using the visual input to do a sort of ‘virtual reality 
simulation’ of the other persons actions – allowing you to empathize with her and 
view the world from her point of view (Ramachandran 2009, p.4).
 that fire not only when your own skin is touched but also 
when you watch someone else being touched. He speculates that we can 
experience the touch of the other just by observing it, like a simulation.   
152
Though mirror neurons have been described as the most hyped concept of 
neuroscience Ramachandran goes one step further and sees mirror neurons as the 
driving force behind what makes us human. (Jarrett 2012). 
 
153
Though Ramachandran may be regarded as sensationalist in their paper Reflections 
on the Mirror Neuron System: Their Evolutionary Functions Beyond Motor 
Representation (2009) by Lindsay M. Oberman and Ramachandran they “Suggest 
that mirror neurons fundamentally mediate the mapping of one dimension or 
representation in a brain map onto a completely different dimension” (2009, p.41).
  
154
These are interesting propositions that have been experienced in In[bodi]mental 
through the crossover of live video feeds in the HMDs. Furthermore the findings 
have indicated that subjects did experience the digital counterpart as part of their 
own corporeality and the mapping of one body had been transposed through the 
technology to another. Though there is no empirical evidence I am speculating there 
may be a direct correlation between mirror neurons and the technology which could 
account for the experience of the In[bodi]ment of the other were we come close to 
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performing the phenomenology of the other. Through synchronised movement and 
the ability of the technology to enable one to see through the eyes of the other there 
is a heightened reciprocity of self-awareness and other awareness.  
In their paper From Embodied representations to Co-regulation (2009) Gun R. Semin 
and John, T. Cacioppo explore social cognition between subjects. They recognise 
that social cognition does not consist of passive experiences of observing another 
perform an action; and nor is it equivalent to ‘becoming another self’ it is a process 
that unfolds between two or more agents. They define synchronization as “jointly and 
simultaneously recruited sensory motor processes that are evident in a 
neurophysiological mirroring of the producer by the perceiver”. (G.R. Semin and J,T. 
Cacioppo 2009, p.113). 155
Synchronized processes link two or more human agents putting them on a similar 
footing… it is jointly recruited processes with overlapping ‘identities’ that facilitates 
understanding (co-cogitaion)  and adaptive co-action (co-regulation) between two or 
more individuals… what counts for the one member may not have initially counted  
for the other but through interaction these two become synchronized to approach 
being on the same page – that is, for what counts for one individual also counting for 
the other (G.R. Semin and J, T. Cacioppo 2009, p.114).
 Furthermore they claim that these:  
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They also ask the question, does one become the self? They claim that 
synchronization ‘alone’ does not to lead to complete equivalence between self and 
other. Instead synchronization promotes partial and not full correspondence between 
subjects.        
 
In the 1960s when Merleau-Ponty was writing his work on the chiasm the 
Neuroscientists had not come across the existence of the mirror neurons. However 
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what is remarkable is the way neuroscience has made the connection that appears 
to make a stronger claim that when we simulate the other there may be evidence of 
a neural crossover between subjects. In other words we may be able to come to a 
point where we can see the connection between two subjects by their neural brain 
patterns which may have the same patterns of neural activity and potentially mirror 
each others’ experiences in In[bodi]mental.  
When we consider the stretching of the material body within this practice-led 
research we can draw on the Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical relationship between the 
visible and the tangible belonging to the same world. He understood there were no 
boundaries between the self and the world – the world is flesh were we touch and 
feel with our eyes. Though my findings are based on phenomenological experiences 
where informants have felt the digital counterpart as part of self; the research needs 
to look towards science to seek evidence of In[body]ing another subject. According 
to Ehrsson & Petkova we can fool the self out of it’s own body and into another. For 
Ramachandran just by observing we can experience the touch of the other through 
touch mirror neurons and as for Semin and Cacioppo we can through synchronized 
interaction experience ‘being on the same page’. The impact mirror neurons have on 
the constitution of self is also shared by Oberman and Ramachandran when they 
submit ‘that ‘mirror neurons’ play a large role in our social evolution including the 
development of culture and the development of self’ (2009, p.41).157
To undertake further empirical research to evidence if there is in fact a sharing of the 
same experience between subjects and the impact this has on the self there needs 
to be more collaborations between neurology, psychiatry, social science and video 
  Though this is 
a big claim there may be some grounding in mirror neurons and our understanding of 
what constitutes the self. 
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performance practice. A step forward could be through neural brain maps that may 
draw correlations between subjects and their experiences.  
The sharing of emotive and cognitive experiences is currently being explored by 
filmmaker and researcher Pia Tikka’s project. NeuroCine (2009-2014) 158
Exploring shared experiences between subjects is an exciting prospect to develop a 
deeper understanding of the self. According to Ramachandran the fine line between 
subjects is “…a sobering thought that the only barrier between you and others is your skin 
receptors’ … ‘despite all the pride that your self takes in its individuality and privacy, the only 
 . This 
research is being conducted in the framework of a neuroscience project aivoAALTO 
at Aalto University Finland.  The research looks for new insights to the 
intersubjectively shared functions of the human brain. It is a multi-disciplinary 
team combining methods and approaches of cinema and cognitive 
neurosciences. The aim of the project is to unravel the neural basis of filmmakers 
creative imagination and to examine to what extent subjects share emotive-cognitive 
experiences while viewing films. Also using advanced data-analysis methods allows 
quantifying similarities between brain signals of subjects perceiving narrative stimuli 
of cinema-scale durations. In addition the project Neurofiction developed by Finnish 
author of science fiction and fantasy, Hannu Rajaniemi and mathematician and 
engineer, Samuel Halliday explore the two way process of the reading brain and the 
text. The electrical activity of neurons is captured using an electroencephalography 
headset. Using algorithm that learns what themes and elements engage each 
reader, the neurofiction engine turns this data into a unique path through the story. 
The reader alters the story by being guided to one of the multiple possible endings or 
to explore a new region of the story space.        
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thing that separates you from me is a small subset of neural circuits in your frontal lobes 
interacting with mirror neurons” (Ramachandran 2009, p.4).159
Rather than approaching the self as a unitary self the findings from I-RE IV reveal it 
is through the experience of In[bodi]mental that we can focus on components of the 
self of the other, to find ways to perform the other self and experience these 
elements as part of our own corporeality. If self can be defined as a composite of   
individual components then a component of my self is reflected in the digital other 
and vice versa. If the neurons enable us to adopt an empathy with another, and 
enable us to simulate their experience, then self and the world as we know it are 
indeed entwined much more than we think.   
   
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at all 
things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the ‘other side’ of its 
power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and 
sensitive for itself. It is not a self through transparence like thought which only thinks 
its object by assimilating it…by transforming it into thought. It is a self through 
confusion… -a self, therefore, that is caught up in things, that has a front and a back, 
a past and a future … (Merleau-Ponty 1964, pp.162-3).160
If we can simulate experiences by observing, then what happens when we immerse 
ourselves within that simulation through live video interaction? What happens when 
the sensory input of the performance, through, technology, image, light, shadow, 
touch, and sound etc feeds back into and changes the motor output of the physical 
body? These considerations can only be measured through empirical enquiry which 
may lead these investigations in the direction of post doctoral research. If we evolve 
through knowledge production then our compulsion to reproduce ourselves by 
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simulating the behaviours of others may be an unconscious attempt to inhabit a part 
of the self in another.  
Understanding what happens between subjects resonates with Roy Ascott, a pioneer 
in telematic art and a seminal theorist in the field of new media art. In Syncretic 
Reality; art, process, and potentiality (2005) Ascott discusses the impact new media 
art has on our reality and the way ‘syncretic reality’ is both construed and 
constructed by new media art practice. The syncretic is articulated as distinct to 
binary oppositions described by Ascott as “a process between different elements, the 
in-between condition of ‘being both”… “In the syncretic context, extreme differences 
are upheld but aligned’ in such a way ‘that likeness is found amongst unlike things’ 
were ‘the power of each element’ enriches ‘the power of all others within the array of 
their differences”. (Ascott 2005, p.1)161 Ascott’s syncretic has been evidenced in 
In[bodi]mental were we find ourselves immersed within the digital counterpart and 
experience the other as part of self . We did not meld into a homogenous whole 
losing our individuality we experienced more of us in the other while retaining our 
own sense of self – a composite self, augmented and mediated through the HMDs. 
Not only does the self distribute itself through telematic networks according to Ascott 
it is an evolutionary development towards the multiple self – a ‘multiplicity not just of 
(virtual/cyborg) bodies but of attitudes, values, intentions and purposes’ (2005, 
p.9).162
The notion of the self moving from person to person is articulated by writers and 
architects Robert Sumrell and Kazys Varnelis in their book Blue Mondays: Stories of 
Absurd Realities and Natural Philosophies (2007). “In order to function within 
contemporary cities we have all become human chameleons without a sense of home.  
 Viewing the self from this perspective we may be able to understand how 
aspects of the self can move from person to person.  
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Beyond merely moving from place to place, we move from self to self according to the social 
conditions we find ourselves in” (Sumrell & Varnelis 2007, p. 144).163
The binary divisions between self/other, subject and object have been temporarily 
suspended in In[bodi]mental were each is implicated  in the other. In the future the 
‘mixing together’ of the actual self and the digital will inevitably contribute to our 
understanding of the composite self through mixed-reality technology where the 
awareness of a syncretic self (the in-between condition of being both self and other) 
may become the norm of our experience.  
 Rather than moving 
from place to place it is through social networking that we can move from self to self 
depending on the construction of self we choose to simulate. We can change our 
identity within these parameters. However in In[bodi]mental  we inhabit something of 
the self of the other in both mind and body where we share our intersubjectivities. 
Perhaps when we do feel the experience of the uncanny between each other it may 
be the moment when we are experiencing an inbodied shift from one self to another 
– the Unheimliche (the unhomely).  According to Ascott it is habit forming which is 
the enemy of art which impedes the search for new ways of being, while conversely, 
the syncretic process is an assault on habit. Using new video technology has 
enabled us to break learnt habits of our own selfhood and assist in our ability to 
experience more of self. In In[bodi]mental I can perform a part of the other self which 
is also part of me. We experience this as a ‘live chiasm’ – a tangibility of the other-
self channelled through the HMD which satisfies our infinite process to reproduce 
ourselves through the other. 
3:9 Reflecting on In[bodi]mental 
The findings in this chapter have been revealing the way in which the actual body 
phenomenologically experiences an In[bodi]ment of its digital counterpart through 
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the I-RE In[bodi]mental. These experiences can be articulated as three phases 
which contributes to the body’s ability to shift from its place of standing into the digital 
image and return back to the body:  
• Phase one is a process of ‘opening one’s body’ up to focus on touch 
and vision through the HMD. By abstaining from using language and 
acting as a ‘non-speaking’ subject the focus of concentration on these 
senses induces the experience of immersion. By removing the 
peripheral vision of each informant through the HMD the notion of a 
separation between informants is reduced. Through the crossover of 
the live video feed within the HMDs informants have been experiencing 
a suspension within the digital counterpart of the other. This has been 
articulated as a ‘live chiasmic’ processes were vision supersedes 
proprioception and we enter a new Lacanian MS where we are trapped 
in the imaginary world of images, reflections and doubles.  
• In phase two, one performs the other through mimetically incorporating 
the movements of the other as part of your own. In doing so the other 
becomes a part of self.  During those moments of synchronization 
between the digital counterparts we are suspended in the imaginary 
world of the image. During this alignment there is crossover between 
the conscious and the subconscious where we forget this body and 
experience another. This real-time composite image is experienced as 
an excess of self which induces the experience of the uncanny. This is 
a return to something of the self rediscovered in the other, ie the lost 
real. The uncanny is the trigger that accesses the remainder of the lost 
real encountered in In[bodi]mental. These two phases enable the body 
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to perform the real phenomenologically. The inter-corporeality of one 
self is caught up in another self which cannot be accessed without the 
mediation of the real-time video through the HMDs.  
• Phase three sees the return of the body back to its assumed 
corporeality.  The awareness of this return has disrupted our learnt 
habits of behaviour and perception to experience new aspects of the 
self in the digital other. The transformation in the cycle from the ‘me’ 
‘me-not-me’ to ‘me+’ is complete. A fragment of the other self is 
transposed through the HMD and becomes a part of the subject and 
her/his selfhood.   
These three phases alter our preconceived perception of self as one whole enclosed 
unit of a subject’s corporeality which is perceived as divided from the self of others. 
What In[bodi]mental does is to enable us to shift into the other which becomes a 
component of self. The ‘live chiasm’ is evidencing an inter-corporeality of both 
subjects where the tangible and the visible interrelate and allowing us to experience 
Willerslev’s ‘betwixt’ state between substance and non-substance. These In[bodied] 
selves ∞ are experienced as a form of concrete experience.  This is a In[bodied] 
network that is a return to the MS where both informants are trapped within the 
imaginary suspending any notion of a division between them. 
If our inner compulsion to repeat and the desire to reproduce ourselves as image is a 
missed encounter with the real then perhaps by simulating the behaviour of others it 
may be an unconscious desire to inhabit a part of our self in the other to access the 
real. Perhaps through more simulation we may be able to encounter more of the 
Lacanian lost real. A connection to a primordial part of self which has come about 
through the In[bodiment] of the other .   
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Conclusion  
This thesis has been structured into three main chapters. Chapter one explored the 
theoretical binary self/other divisions in the work of Jacques Lacan, Drew Leder, 
Maurice-Merleau-Ponty, and Rane Willerslev. Chapter two explained the mixed-
method approach applied auto-ethnophenomenology. This method was significant in 
capturing informants’ lived experiences from the viewpoint of both the ‘I’ and the 
‘other’ through four Inter-Reactive Explorations I-REs. Thereafter chapters one and 
two drew together the theory and the practice in a contribution to new knowledge 
discussed in chapter three. 
In the field of video performance the main research question focused on the impact 
digital performance has on the subject’s perception of reality through the 
phenomenology of the digital other, questioning what this interaction may suggest 
about the other and our perception of self. The research began with a simplistic 
notion of the self as a whole bounded unit of one single self. As a result of this study 
the main findings have revealed a shift in understanding of the self as one single 
unit. Instead we have witnessed many components of self which include the digital 
counterpart where we become composite selves. Digital performance has enabled 
us to understand how we can perform the other through mimesis to consider the way 
our desire to mimic the other enables the subject to take on board elements of the 
digital other as part of self. 
New knowledge 
The new knowledge contributed from this research has been that of experiencing the 
digital other as a part of self augmented through real-time video technology – the 
augmented self. What has made this research original is the way we can stretch the 
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materiality of the body and in[body] the real-time video image as a component of 
self. What has contributed to this phenomenon is a deliberate shift in the 
proprioception of the body. In building on this claim this thesis has demonstrated that 
one can [step into] the digital counterpart through digital performance and In[body] 
the other subject. Moreover the experience of this In[bodi]ment has induced an 
uncanny experience were one has compared it to the Lacanian real. In other words it 
is through the uncanny we can experience the real where we access more of the self 
in the other. These findings are summarized in the following points.   
• In the first instance the research uncovered that the digital counterpart is not 
other to the self but a component of self augmented through the real-time 
technology.  
This has come about through a disturbance in the experience between the subject 
and its reality through a disruption of the proprioception of the body. The real-time 
video technologies enabled an expansion of an individual’s perception of reality to 
include previously undetected components of self through the digital counterpart 
• Secondly that the uncanny experience is a reminder of the lost real re-
discovered through the embodiment of the digital counterpart. It is a 
primordial part of our self that we re-experience in the other.  
The outcome of this research process has revealed that one can encounter more of 
the self in the other digital counterpart understood as an excess of self mediated 
through new video technologies. The following four key questions implemented in 
chapter two provided a framework to unravel the main thesis question as a 
contribution to new knowledge through video-performance practice: 
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1. Using video projection technologies can we unite with the digital video image 
as other and become one? 
The rational for I-RE (i) explored whether we have the potential to perceptually step 
out of the physical body and step into the digital other through one to one video 
performance.  
2. Does the digital other have an emotional impact on the self? Can we 
challenge the impact emotional responses may have on the alienation 
between self and other  
I-RE (ii) was looking for an emotional connection between the subject and the digital 
video image to determine if subjects did indeed feel alienated from their self image. 
This was reinforced through using a real-time video programme Isadora to enable 
subjects to step into their image. 
3. Do we alternate between the physical self and the digital non-self to get to 
know more of the self; and is this oscillation an uncanny experience? 
 I-RE (iii) explored the embodiment of the subject to the digital video image using 
both real-time and pre-recorded video. Through oscillating between self and other it 
the I-RE attempted to create an uncanny experience to reinforce the embodied 
experience.  
4. Can new technological affordances now allow us to embody the self of 
another? 
Finally I-RE (iv) In[bodi]mental challenged the material body through real-time video 
and HMDs to determine if we could experience the ‘Inbodiment’ of the other.  
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Despite the success or teething problems associated with each of the key questions 
their implementation through video-performance practice invariably contributed to 
each other and the outcomes of this research.  
The research has established the way real-time video technology has had a 
fundamental impact on the perception of self. The video programme Isadora enabled 
the viewer to transport the actual body into the digital counterpart and back again to 
expand an individual’s perception of reality. For the first time we were able to see 
ourselves from the viewpoint of the other. This was due to the real-time capability of 
the video programme and the HMDs. In I-REs I-III myself and informants immersed 
ourselves in our own digital image (as other) and also the digital image of others. 
The live element of the video technology was pertinent in shifting the perception of 
the body from one place to another causing a disruption in the proprioception of the 
body.  A disturbance in the body’s perceived boundary is what contributed to the 
experience of a hyperreality which could not be achieved using mainstream video 
technology. What’s more, by using the real-time media manipulation programme 
Isadora via the HMDs, it was possible to suspend the body between the subject and 
their digital counterpart.  Informants   interacted with each other in the moment and 
became temporarily trapped within the image.  Being immersed in the image is what 
enabled subjects to sustain the feeling of in[body]ing the other. Isadora assisted in 
the crossover between subjects and their digital image through the live morphing of 
digital bodies and live-video body swapping processes. When informants interacted 
with their image in real-time they became disoriented and disjointed from their actual 
bodies. The shift in perception made it possible to experience the stretching of the 
material body from impossible viewpoints.  
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The research advanced through the innovative way in which the HMDs were applied 
to explore the thesis question. The HMDs had become the looking glass which made 
the absence of self in the other most present when we could focus our direct 
experience through the lens of the technology. These tools had made it possible to 
go beyond signification as a form of experience to where we could experience the 
uncanny as analogous to Lacan’s real.  The findings from I-RE IV In[bodi]mental 
inverted the Lacanian MS where as subjects divided through language we did not 
lose the real but we momentarily accessed a transposition of the real in the other. 
Though we can never return to the Lacanian pre-language stage of development 
Isadora simulated a Mirror Stage through a disruption in the proprioception of the 
body.  The HMDs exaggerated the way the actual body could oscillate and rotate 
between self and image, and then return to the body, creating a heightened self-
awareness – a hyperreal experience of the self which blurred the perceived 
boundaries between self and other. The HMDs removed the peripheral vision to 
which we were accustomed and ‘opened the body up’ to richer experiences as ‘non-
speaking subjects’ where we could focus our attentions on the experience in the 
moment. Though we can never escape the signification of words, we can experience 
the lost real through the uncanny via a digital circuit and share our inter-corporeal 
realities.  Though this research has focused on the lived experience which cannot be 
articulated through language the paradox of this research is that it is only through 
language that we are able to talk about the experience. Insofar as certain 
experiences have been difficult to describe they have been articulated through 
expressions such as ‘wow’, ‘weird’, ‘strange’ ‘uncanny’ etc that have been 
understood as an echo of the real. Language is a way of coming to terms with lack 
and loss which was proposed by Lacan. If we know that entering into language 
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provides security against the dissolution of the self, then we also know that by 
abstaining from speaking can enhance our senses and experiences and narrow the 
gap between self and other. When we overuse and rely on language we come to 
interpret the world mediated through signs and signifiers. If we focus more on direct 
experience where we abstain from speaking through oral dialogue and ‘open up’ the 
body to new experiences then perhaps we can overcome our perceived boundaries. 
In[bodi]mental has enabled us to go beyond the veil of language where we can 
communicate non-verbally and in[body] the other through the digital image. It is 
through these interactions that we have experienced an augmented self.  
The research contributes to the field of video performance within digital media art 
practice. It does this by challenging our perception of the material body within digital 
video performance.  In[bodi]mental  extended the body beyond the parameters of its 
own limits were we have experienced the in[bodi]ment of another. Furthermore we 
have come to believe the other person’s body as our own through touch through 
vision. These findings are advancing art practice by creating new encounters and 
relational experiences between actual bodies and their digital counterparts.  Through 
phenomenology, embodiment and the experiential this research will continue to 
encounter digital art practice in new ways and raise new questions regarding the way 
we perceive the self and its constitution. Video performance within digital media 
practices will continue to challenge the material body and its reality.    
Further Research 
The research has evidenced that the digital counterpart is a component of the self 
mediated through technology. The impact this contribution to new knowledge will 
have on further research is to continue exploring what constitutes the self and the 
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role that real-time digital video technologies have on shaping the perception of self. 
Although a shared reflexive phenomenology between subjects has been an 
adequate approach for this research I envisage new developments between 
phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience. By turning to more scientific 
empirical enquiry to measure the extent subjects can share a phenomenology of one 
another, through emerging technologies, we may then be able to discover even more 
about the self.  
To build on this research we need to develop partnerships between these disciplines 
through practice-led research. In[bodi]mental has proved that when we simulate 
another’s actions we can experience an empathy with the digital image. We have 
discovered that through mimicry and synchronization channelled through the HMDs, 
informants have experienced a shared reality. Yet in sharing something of each 
other’s reality mediated through digital art practice I see this leading us in new 
directions were we can learn more about the self and our relationship with the world.  
The collaborative project NeuroCine (2011-2014) led by Pia Tikka and her research 
on enactive cinema in now coming to an end. Therefore we need to encourage more 
networks and collaborations between a variety of experts in the field of 
neuroscience, cinema, video-performance, psychology and emerging technologies to 
understand connections between subjects. Tikka’s interest in enactive cinema has 
been focusing on the unconscious interaction between the cinema spectator and the 
cinema. While following the cinematic narrative, each spectator’s heart rate, 
breathing and movements are continuously measured by the built in bio - sensors. 
The spectator’s emotional experience is connected to the installation’s real time 
emotional montage dynamics even without conscious attention on interaction. 
NeuroCine has developed these connections with collaborations between filmmakers 
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and neuroscientists to unravel the neural basis of filmmakers creative imagination, 
and to what extent subjects share emotive-cognitive experiences whilst watching 
films, and reading stories encountered in Neurofiction. It is these directions which will 
lead us to experience artworks empathetically.  
I envisage developing this practice-led research through empirical enquiry to seek 
evidence of a shared phenomenology between subjects within digital video 
performance practice. This would involve collaborating with experts in the field of 
neuroscience and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imagining FMRI, psychologists 
and computer engineers. Consequently, FMRI can be used to reveal brain structures 
and processes associated with perception, thought and action. Most FMRI scanners 
allow subjects to be presented with different visual images, sounds and touch stimuli. 
By developing real-time video performances, such as In[bodi]mental, which 
deliberately disrupted the proprioception of the body,  FMRI’s may be able to reveal 
a shared and/or similar neural activity happening in the brain. Using elements of 
synchronization and repetition may induce a shared mirror neuron activity to witness 
the elasticity of the material body. In attempts to Inbody one subject with another the 
culmination of emerging technologies may lead us to a deeper understanding of our 
connection with others and the extensible nature of being in the world. Collaborating 
with phenomenological methods and neuroscience are a means forward to 
understand the experience of others through lived experience and neuroimaging. 
Consequently by deliberately attempting to create uncanny experiences through 
one-to-one video performances we may find more ways to interpret experience 
which cannot be articulated through language.  
If we can gather empirical evidence of the same neural brain patterns this could be 
the way forward to evidence the fact we are actually sharing the same state of mind. 
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Moreover it could lead to the notion that the self and consciousness is not just a 
single unit of experience but also a shared reality. If the sensory inputs of variables 
present within the digital performances disrupt the motor output of the proprioception 
of the body then it could intensify the embodied experience. If we can look towards 
the crossover between phenomenology and neuroscience we may be able to 
discover more about the self and the part technology plays in enabling us to In[body] 
the other. We already know we can experience the touch of the other simply by 
observing, and immersing ourselves in the other through visual simulation.  
Therefore it is so necessary that art practice should continue to address the 
embodiment of the other through interactive video. In this way we can then come to 
formulate a new understanding and empathy with our other as an expansion of self. 
So far this research journey has raised more questions regarding the reality of the 
material body as a single unit of corporeality were we believe we are the sole author 
of our own selfhood. This means we have expanded on our research regarding the 
actual and the digital self which has been understood as the in-between condition of 
being both – the syncretic self.  The alignments between these modalities are 
narrowing through new digital media art practices, especially through digital 
performance which can temporarily overcome the divisions between language and 
experience, self and other. 
Our intrinsic desire to reproduce ourselves through simulating the behaviours of 
others may well be an unconscious attempt to embrace a part of our self in the other. 
Nonetheless it has been through the looking glass of the digital technology, and 
human interaction, in the form of interactive video performance that has enabled this 
shared reality of phenomenological experience to take place. The tangibility of these 
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experiences satisfies our infinite process to reproduce ourselves through the other 
so any boundary between self and other is suspended. 
This research has demonstrated that digital video performance practice can disrupt 
the conventional perceptions between subjects in the actual world as divided entities 
where we can share our realities through the medium of real-time video 
performance.  We can go beyond the signification of words through a more direct 
route – the experience of being in the moment together to encounter the real in the 
other. By focusing on direct experience we have a deeper connection than language, 
which is realized through emerging technologies.  Though Lacan views us as split 
subjects defined by language I argue that it is through digital performance practices 
that we can temporarily overcome those divisions if only for a moment.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Extracts from Field Notes 
Inter-Reactive Exploration I  
   
Studio project I   
  “The script was trying to achieve an understanding of the Lacanian theory between 
self and other. I was trying to control the dynamic between me and my other. Using a 
script I wanted to try and get outside myself to experience the ‘other’. I also wanted 
to put myself in the shoes of the digital other. I did not feel estranged from her. I felt 
like it was me and it wasn’t me.  Trying to remember the script distracted me 
interacting with my other. I felt ‘home’ in the experience but I think I felt more ‘home’ 
watching the video. Watching the video was stranger than performing it. Because I 
had a secondary source to look at (the laptop) I could focus more on the experience. 
The actuality of the experience felt ‘home’ but also I think I felt more embodied 
watching the video. Watching the video there are moments of union and an 
interactive relationship with each other where one is affected by the other. There are 
flickers of moments when you believe it’s ‘real’ these two people are interacting and 
talking. When the digital body crossed my body I really could feel it. This is 
paradoxical because I felt a stronger feeling of embodiment when watching the video 
of the 2 Lorna’s but experiencing it I really felt the shadow of the digital Lorna cross 
my body and that was amazing- I also felt embodied then too. “ 
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Studio project ii  
   
“It was exciting being involved without the script. This was when I did not have to 
think about the next line. I felt an overlaying of the digital body more by watching 
myself on the laptop as I could see the other Lorna crossing my body. BUT also my 
lived experience of doing it I felt more of the presence of the other Lorna when the 
light changed and I could feel the shadow. This is similar to when you’re on the 
beach and someone gets in the way of the sun and creates a shadow on your body-
you feel them” 
“When recording the video of myself without the projection I had to imagine her in my 
mind’s eye-see her. Pre-empt where she may be in the space or where she may go 
or what she may do. Now with her image I don’t have to imagine I just see and feel 
her presence through the light and dark of the projected image passing over me, 
through me, into me. I hear the utterances of sound she has made during the 
recording – the noise of a foot or the sound of a hand clapping against the wall. 
These sounds are real and not imagined they have been captured by the video and 
they add to the ambiance of the presence of my ‘other’ self. Is this a part of me that 
has gone from a primordial time. Though the image is HIStoric now it is ‘Real’ “I 
move she moves. Sometime we moved in the same direction sometimes we moved 
apart but always looking for a point of reference in the ‘other’. We began mimicking 
each other, copying each other and at times mirroring each other. The video image 
looks different from me, it looks solid and thinner. When the bodies collide or overlap 
you can see the transparency of the digital ‘other’ over the corporeal body. I felt 
comfortable with her in my own little world perhaps of a ‘oneness’ where my body 
extension is part and a[part] at one and the same time. I could materialize part of 
myself that was once just a passing action, a history gone forever. There I am my 
‘other’ digital one caught in a moment of time with this time-now; playing together, 
communicating”.  
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Studio Project iii 
                 
“The dancing was trying to get a balance between the other two pieces. The first one 
was scripted and the second one was where there was non verbal dialogue and 
totally improvised. This one is more choreographed and also improvised. The impact 
it had on my physical body was it worked in terms of me feeling embodied with her 
when we were doing synchronized movements together. I felt more embodied 
somehow. What did I understand about this experience? I think maybe it’s the 
texture or surface of the wall where there is a surface to lean against. In this piece 
we come out more from the wall where the video projection and me I felt the dynamic 
distanced me from the digital Lorna. Maybe it’s because the wall support is not there. 
When the scale is the same its more convincing rather than a really large image of 
yourself you don’t feel anything when the large body goes across your body. It may 
be interesting to project on other surfaces”.  
 “When I am looking at the video documentation when I see the two Lorna’s moving 
synchronously I feel its natural not weird, relaxed and even maybe a feeling of 
sameness or oneness. Is sameness the same as oneness? I am not sure. But when 
the bodies become more separate where each has a little personality of their own 
there seems to be a search for individuality and difference. There is a struggle 
between a striving for sameness and difference. This in itself is an oxymoron. Also 
there is a lot of balance going on between the two images. Also I am definitely 
following the movements of the projected image maybe because the projected image 
cannot follow me not unless it was perfectly scripted. I notice that I look more at the 
projected image than my physical body. When watching the synchronous 
movements it’s like looking in a mirror at myself. There are definitely moments of 
fluidity where both bodies are moving together like a swan. This doubling in unison 
feels connected more, where arms and legs are floating in space almost identical.” 
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Studio project iv 
   
“When both Lorna’s are crossing each other carrying a chair you can’t really work out 
which one is the projection and which one is the flesh. However looking at the video 
they are both a projection. We have a projection of a projection and a projection of 
the flesh body. Watching the part of the video where both Lorna’s place their legs on 
top of each other it’s like looking at co-joined twins-one whole but two bodies. The 
relationship between the three bodies (the two digital Lorna’s and the shadow of one 
Lorna) is interesting because you still focus on the projected Lorna and the shadow. 
The more flesh like Lorna you look at last. It would be really interesting to work with 
my shadow and see what happens. Looking at the shadow somehow it becomes of 
an individual, or maybe a separate being than the other flesh like Lorna. I think the 
shadow is more alien as there is no identity, but it is still comfortable. Sameness and 
difference seems to stand out more with the relationship between the shadow and 
the projected projected Lorna”.  
 Studio project v 
                          
“I am looking at my documentation and describing what I see. Basically I am tracing 
myself…I am actually starting to copy the ghostly image of myself… to keep it 
synchronized. There was something beautiful about this experience. It’s like tracing 
paper and trying to trace my own presence. When the digital image moved I moved. 
I was following her. Watching it gives me a real sense of immersion 
because…looking at it you can’t work out the real image or the virtual… I really like 
that. I am scrolling across the wall… if this was a pencil I would be drawing around 
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myself. I am following her and the unity of both images is slightly off key…there are 
times when the two bodies are identical. It’s almost synchronized…I do like the 
synchronicity of it…when the virtual image turns around so I can see myself from the 
front and the back  at the same time…that’s quite interesting it’s like seeing yourself 
from a 360 degree angle I like that. When I was doing this I remember feeling the 
presence of the shadow so I was aware of the ‘other’ even though I could not see 
her…I could feel her and also feel her behind me, probably through the change in 
the light. Mimicry again is happening. The digital image is controlling the real 
image…and also the alter ego of the virtual image is much stronger here…there is 
much more of a personality coming through…she is very feisty. I really like the fact 
you can’t tell which one is which the virtual and the actual”  
Studio project vi 
              
“I am going to describe what I am looking at. …I think out of everything so far this is 
the weirdest experience I have had. I am speaking on the video and the actual body 
is miming…I am attracted to freaky…ok it looks a bit demonic…for some reason it’s 
the weird and the uncanny. Are we closer to ourselves when it’s weird or uncanny? I 
am totally fascinated by this one…is the image me? Yes and no…would I feel the 
same if it was someone else’s face over mine…I don’t know really. There is 
something strange about this. I know for Lacan the image would be the veil of the 
real...its like the dark side…again synchronicity seems to be cropping up. I would like 
to experiment with the pre-recorded voice coming out of the mouth...placing the 
virtual image over the real. It really does have an impact on me...it’s weird. I could 
spend a long time immersed in myself ...  I don’t know. What would Freud or Lacan 
think of this? I did feel more embodied in this. The more synchronous the more 
embodied. Did it feel weird? Yeah I suppose it did. Do I see myself as different? 
Yeah it is different but there is something quite satisfying, exciting and strange about 
the whole experience really. It’s like the tracing one trying to get my face to fit the 
digital face. I think maybe it would be interesting to have the face overlaid without 
movement perfectly to see how that feels. To look at it you would imagine it would 
feel more disembodied but in fact it felt more embodied”. 
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“The inside is outside the outside is inside. I want to navigate myself so I fit perfectly. 
There does not seem to be a power difference with these two images we have 
doubling, cloning, replication, balance, slotting together, and fitting in, synchronicity. 
Because the projection is over my face the bright light is quite strange. So did I learn 
anything? Speaking through an ‘other’ is also interesting. I did like the strangeness of 
this and the weirdness”. 
“Is this all about the trauma of the lost unity with ‘self’ seeking what has been left 
behind through a dislocation? Perhaps through the alignment of ‘actual self’ and 
digital other’ we can strip away the veil of the real. As we exist between the real and 
the imaginary ie the symbolic (Lacan) we imagine the real. Maybe rather than 
imagine the Real (a deeper embodiment with oneself and others) perhaps 
embodiment is where we self-touch”. 
Inter-Reactive Exploration II 
     
 Mander Centre: Window A  
   
Mander Centre window B 
 I decided to place the live video projection in the shop window to see how people 
would respond. This involved putting the ‘live’ footage on a delay with the video 
camera placed in the window pointing towards participants passing by. The camera 
was placed carefully so it was not intrusive. As people passed by they caught their 
‘live’ image of themselves on a delay of 2 seconds so they could interact with 
themselves and/or others in the same space. Interestingly when the doors of the 
shop were closed I got a lot of interest where people came over to see themselves. 
Less people when the shop doors were open”.  
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“I also placed another piece of work in the other window called Window B: this 
consisted of a picture frame, back projection and a live webcam using a delay. Both 
Windows used delays. The delay on Window A was faster than Window B. I have not 
looked at the results yet. I sat in the Orange shop opposite today just observing 
people. Most people went by either unfazed, avoidance, or fun. Some school 
children hurriedly passed Window A once they recognized themselves in the image”. 
Some responses to windows A & B 
Window A  
“I am curious to know how it’s made” … “It’s strange”… “I don’t like watching 
myself”… “yeah its uncanny” 
“It’s different …I can see myself speaking…it’s disorientating…its good I am 
catching myself speaking watching myself…it is uncanny…its interesting it 
tells you more about yourself…its quite good to look at…its present and past 
all in one go.” 
Window B 
“oh that’s neat…I came out three times…there is three of me…your moving I 
am moving and I am not moving…it moves when I am still…it is surprising” 
“…this one is really weird …I can’t describe it…its frightening…it’s so weird…I 
am going to video it” 
“Oh no way man…it’s the new mirror…I want it for my bedroom” 
“There is no artistic expression you have just turned a machine on…your just 
filming stuff…it’s not art…the machine is quite talented”    
Window B was also placed at the Bessant Gallery at Wolverhampton University and 
a one evening event at the Universities MA open evening.  Informants were also 
asked to complete the same questionnaire supplied in the Mander Centre. The 
following is one response from an informant. 
“ I think when it just you there is something quite extraordinary about it…you become 
less self conscious…its interesting when you do match up there is a reward for that 
when it happens…it works nice spatially…its quite intimate…you say damn when 
you just miss yourself” 
   
Window B at the Bessant Gallery 2010 
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I-RE II: Questionnaire: Feedback and Responses from Informants  
This information is part of a practice-led doctoral research which will be kept 
anonymous. Thank you for your support. 
Q1. Can you please describe your emotional response to the work 
 
 Q2. Can you please circle any words that relate to your experience? If you 
cannot see a word that relates to your experience please feel free to add your 
own words in the blank boxes.   
Disturbing  Calming Relaxing Weird Frightening 
Strange                 Playful Alarming Peaceful Stimulating 
Erotic Uncanny Real Funny Invasive 
Violated Comfortable Estranged Warm Silly 
Alienated Cold Shocked Powerless Elated 
Secure  Cosy  Irritating Disjointed Happy 
Unreal  Wicked Safe Angry Embarrassed 
Stupid  Fun Excited Blissful Altered 
Freaky Complete Nothing Uneasy Scared 
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Inter-Reactive Exploration III   
 
Eagleworks Studios I-RE (iii) 
‘Knee jerk’ reactions from informants at Eagleworks Studios 
The following responses are from the opening event where I used my video camera 
as a tool to record the ambiance of the evening and to ask all informants the same 
question about their first-hand experience.  
Informants 
1. (Male) “I Felt I wanted to match you… I was confronted by my own image rather 
than yours… unsettling when images are synchronized… it was uncannily matched-
odd”. 
2. (Male) “I felt a little uneasy …felt like I was being possessed and gradually I 
relaxed. I found it intriguing and then funny…it made me aware of what I was feeling 
too… my sensory experience. I felt my wine slipping down my chest. It is not often 
you feel things so intensely… I was concentrating on myself rather than what I was 
looking at.. I was worried when I felt you in my periphery position… blowing me out 
made me feel insignificant and small…eating me a sort of feeling of possession”.  
3. (Male) “I thought of avatars…the audience narrates and develops the experience 
themselves”. 
4. (Female) “It was a shock to see my picture up there…I found it disconcerting to 
see myself I did not want to be in the way of your image. I was intrigued by what you 
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were trying to establish and a little in ore on how comfortable you were in front of the 
camera…most of us don’t look at ourselves…you have looked at yourself many 
times…we only see a part of ourselves we do not take in the whole e.g. a ladder in a 
stocking- a check and run…the examination of the face in detail I found most 
intriguing…drawing oneself in was disconcerting. Whereas when you have yourself 
as the double it calls on films that have done a similar thing and it feels more 
comfortable territory…this actually felt more disconcerting territory .” 
5. (Female) “it was something different… not what I was expecting…something I did 
not expect…one person at a time made it more interesting… I started mirroring what 
the person was doing on the video” 
6. (Female) “I started to see what I looked like ... I am totally narcissistic. I felt like 
you were looking inside me...looking at me... I was really self conscious” 
7. (Male) “the ownership of yourself has been taken away from you…your not 
yourself anymore…you’re not yourself anymore your image is so large…you the 
subject has become someone else…the self image has become dominated over…is 
not what I expect… you want to engage in the happening” 
8. (Female) “I really enjoyed it...I loved the blowing...I found myself looking at you 
more than myself… I found it really peaceful” 
9. (Male) “I felt lost… it was a very engaging experience… in a funny way you find 
out more about yourself when you put yourself against another self” 
10.(Male) “it was almost like watching myself... how I imagine myself to be if I was 
born female rather than male... I have now become to realize that my features are 
more feminine… I don’t know whether I should be afraid of it… or if it troubles me or 
not… maybe I should milk it in a sense it’s a strange confrontation of one’s own 
representation.... I need to think about this at length” 
11. (Male) “It’s weird…when you touch your face its weird...I was memorized by it… 
it was really intimate… I felt you were actually there in the same place” 
12.13.14 (3 Males together talking) “Err the more I saw my own image in the 
screen overlaid it did not seem right…I realize I was moving with it… I felt both 
images were merging into one image...it was surreal…the blowing was like it was in 
my own ear...it was pretty strange...I felt I was mimicking you and I had to pull myself 
away from it...to break away from the mimicking… and you can’t do it anymore… I 
realized I had been mimicking you the whole time… it was an interesting experience. 
You become one and you can’t tell which is your face and your own face…when you 
yawned I opened my mouth and I did not know if it was you or me yawning...I got 
confused which was me or you…it blurs the line between you and me…I was trying 
to work out which one was me…I moved with you…because of the mirroring you 
move the wrong way because it’s the other way round…it breaks the fluid at it...it’s 
like throwing a pebble in the water and it’s a ripple…I felt you blowing in my 
ear…with the hand on the face you believe your touching your own face…I felt and I 
believed I should feel the hand on my face…you expect to feel something…what 
confused me was it my own hand or your hand touching the face…it was really 
weird…total bizarre…you naturally follow her movements “ 
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15. (Male) “it was strange watching myself watch you. I felt unnerved being so close 
to somebody…it was weird…like an empty presence. Especially when you were 
rubbing your face and your hair, I felt detached from everything. I tried to line up with 
you. When I did it felt weird…I felt like I lost a sense of where I was. I did not feel 
separate from myself like a here and there at the same time. I did feel a closer unity 
with myself. What you were trying to achieve were someone in a sense is losing 
themselves…its engaging”.  
16 “I really like it … very intimate… felt really peaceful…mesmerizing” 
17 (Female) “It’s like you have become a elemental force…I felt it was an unequal 
relationship….shock….spooky….scary….visceral and elemental”  
18 (Male) “It’s a fight for an ownership of the real”    
19(Female) “When you moved out of the frame it brought me back to looking at 
myself which I did not like. But when we merged I felt comfortable. I could slowly 
melt back into this non real reality” 
20 (Male) “It’s aggressive and forceful sitting in there…it’s not passive is it?”  
 
Knee-jerk responses at the Mander Centre 
21 (Female) “It was surprising and you suddenly look at your face. It’s swallowed by 
someone else it’s a very strange feeling…its relaxing and also scary when your 
being swallowed by someone. When the images mix together it’s not weird it’s good 
to look at.  I really liked it…” 
22 (Female) “When it started off with a yawn … it did not get me to yawn I thought it 
was trying to get me to yawn…it’s a strange feeling. I can’t really describe it really… 
parts were erotic as well ... it was just strange. Q Can you elaborate on the word 
strange? I spent a lot of time looking at what I was looking at which was strange… I 
thought at first it was weird and then I got used to it … I would say strange would be 
a good word” 
23 (Female) It was bizarre…looking at me looking at you…it was a bit dizzy…and 
quite funky…looking at her...kind of between two realities, looking at her looking at 
me...seeing me made me focus on me and my face…I felt self conscious…it felt 
naughty being in the dark...it was bizarre and surreal…I felt I was mimicking you and 
its odd capturing yourself doing it...it was good… 
24 (Female) “I thought it was brilliant and really relaxing…I loved it I want to take it 
home…it was totally surreal”. 
25 (Male) “ Yeah it was scary at first …” 
26 (Male) “I was interested …I got more interested in me gurning. Q what is gurning? 
When you move your mouth to the side and twist It”. 
27 (Male) “I found it provocative…it was weird and eerie maybe because of the 
confined space…it was spooky…I am sure I felt something touch my arm…I was 
starting to feel drowsy”. 
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28 (Male) “I felt I was in a porn movie bur felt safe because it was on a delay…the 
delay eroticised it and made me more interested in myself and it coming up seconds 
later...I felt like a voyeur rather than violated due to the delay...the delay enabled me 
to distance myself…I felt protected by the delay”. 
29 (Female) “I spent a lot of time looking at my hair…I felt I was at the side. I felt a 
little bit uncomfortable…I felt I was intruding”. 
30 (Male) “I thought it was scary and spooky…overlapping of the images of the face 
became psychologically affecting me...your face and my face so it was spooky like a 
horror movie like the exorcist…only a little bit scary…when I heard your breath it had 
more of a sexual connotation… without the sound it was more scary...with the mouth 
open it became more sexual…I felt it was psychologically a bit mentally messing with 
you but not a strong reaction.” 
31 (Male) “Ha ha...it was quite good I quite liked it...I am still thinking about it…it was 
uncomfortable. I don’t like somebody breathing in my ear…” 
32 (Female) “Oh my god it was really scary…because of the superimposed 
image...my face was very passive and you were very active”. 
33 (Male) “It was really weird odd…spooky…I couldn’t tell who was who…” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
Inter-Reactive Exploration IV 
           
 In[bodi]mental at The Public West Bromwich June 2011 
Feedback from 30 Informants 
Table 1: Statements of how informants felt  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree/disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Felt weird 13 12 2 3 0 
Beyond 
words 
2 7 13 7 1 
Felt 
uneasy 
0 4 10 13 3 
I felt more 
complete 
0 3 13 11 3 
I felt 
secure 
2 10 9 7 1 
It felt 
uncanny 
2 12 11 3 0 
I felt 
frightened 
0 1 1 13 12 
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Table 2: Embodiment 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Inhabited 
their body 
3 17 4 4 2 
Did not 
feel my 
body was 
my own 
3 15 4 4 3 
Felt their 
body was 
real 
3 15 8 3 1 
It 
connected 
on a 
emotional 
level 
0 7 11 9 1 
I felt part of 
the other 
person 
4 12 4 6 3 
I 
connected 
with a part 
of myself 
unknown 
to me 
1 7 9 9 3 
I felt the 
other  
person 
touching 
my body 
3 8 3 12 3 
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Table 3: Awareness 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
I was in a 
heightened 
reality 
3 14 7 4 0 
I was more 
ware of 
myself 
1 12 7 9 0 
I felt not in 
the real 
world 
1 9 10 7 1 
Felt 
divided 
from the 
other 
person 
1 7 11 8 1 
Felt not in 
this world 
but 
another 
2 8 9 5 3 
 
Some responses from Informants on the day: 4.06.11 
 
(Female) Childs response said “It felt strange…I did not feel my dad’s legs were 
mine”.  
(Male) Child “It was a weird good experience….very interesting…really clever…it 
was quite convincing that it was my body (my dad’s that is). It was more convincing 
my dad’s body was on me when we stood up and rubbed stomachs…it was very 
weird”. 
(Male) Adult “I felt it was most effective when we were standing up…its quite 
strange…after a while you try to synchronize yourself and match the action 
intuitively…I feel the more immersive the experience I think the body can be tricked 
into believing the other body is yours…erm I would say it was initially a strange 
experience” 
(Male adult) “The more it’s synchronized the more you doubt your feelings” 
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(Male child) “ I felt I was my mum and my mum was me….it was most effective 
when we had the little hand ball...I liked that best…I was a little confused and I 
managed to gain control…I did copy my mum  and it was strange and totally weird” 
(Adult) “It was well weird” 
(Adult) “It was weird” 
(Child Male) “It felt really weird…I did not feel that Danielle’s body was mine” 
(Teenager) “Whenever I moved she copied…I felt like I was her” 
(Teenager) “It was unrealistic and I felt her body was mine...it was also real” 
(Adult) “I don’t get much of a crossover as I identify with your body/hands all the 
time. I don’t believe your hands are mine” 
(Adult) “I believe your hands are mine” 
(Adult Female) “when we shook hands and they crossed over…’Oh yes now that is 
strange…that’s more like it” 
(Adult Female) “I still keep my own feelings when we rub stomachs…but if you were 
wearing my clothes it would be weird”  
My own experience 
“I really did feel that her hand and legs where mine especially when our movements 
where synchronized. Danielle started drawing with a pen on her hand and I believed 
she was drawing on my hand and that was weird for me.  I poured hand cream into 
my hands and rubbed it in. I asked Danielle to copy my actions and she said she 
really felt the cream on her hands even though the cream was in fact on my hands” 
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Appendix 2 
10 Interviews 
Inter-Reactive Exploration  III 
Informants interviewed in the actual space 
            
            
1. Male (J) Second Experience 
Q.  Researcher: “Is there anything different from your first experience”? 
A. “felt there was a slight eroticism I had not noticed the first time...it did not 
dominate the experience though”.  
Q. Researcher: “When the two faces where perfectly aligned do you think you 
experienced something more about you generally”?  
A. “I don’t think so no… if I see a photograph of myself I am interested in looking at 
myself but not in this case”. 
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Q Researcher:  “You mentioned it was uncanny last time what did you mean”?  
A. “The first time produced a genuine feeling of the uncanny. It was unsettling 
because I could believe it was a real person…another person even though I knew it 
was not another person (during alignment)…this is when the faces were aligned”.  
Q. Researcher:  “What do you think we mean by uncanny”?  
A. “A   strange unsettling”   
Q Researcher: “Do you think this experience adds more to a heightened reality, 
beyond the symbolic”?  
A. “‘I am not sure I was taken away from what I perceive as reality”.  
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel more embodied to me or yourself or somehow more 
separate during the alignment”’?  
A. “There was a state where I found myself changing between how I relate to the 
image of me the image of you and the coming together of the two faces...it was the 
idea of them coming together…I tried to line up with you and at other times I 
deliberately tried not to line up with you. I was more pro-active trying not to align. If I 
look at a photo of myself I feel separated…I feel a little confused by this though”.  
Q Researcher: “Has it heightened your awareness of yourself’”? 
A. “It allows me to scrutinize my own face…” 
Q Researcher: “Are there any key words you would use”?  
A. “Unsettling… a game being played…I felt you wanted me to do something to fulfill 
your expectation to please your expectation”.’ 
Q Researcher:  “Where there any key moments”? 
A. John: ‘When you yawned it was disturbing because I had aligned myself with you 
and it did not appeal to me’. 
 Q Researcher:  ‘Did you feel we were part of each other’? 
A. “‘I feel I was very aware of what was going on so no”.  
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Q Researcher:  ‘Were you taken beyond yourself during alignment’? 
A. “‘I did feel I was a third part to something”.  
2. Female (J) First Experience  
Q. Researcher. “Can you tell me how you felt in that experience”? 
A. “‘It was weird and surreal…it’s like looking in a mirror where I am half watching me 
and half watching you. It triggered more thoughts when you were blowing”.  
Q Researcher: “Did you align yourself with me’”?  
A.”No…to start with I avoided looking at the camera…the longer I sat the more 
relaxed I became. I did not feel the need to align myself”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel my presence”?  
A. “‘Yeah…especially the close ups of your face it felt like you really knew me...it was 
intimate and persona”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel more aware of yourself”?  
A. “Yeah definitely…I don’t spend a lot of time looking at myself...but like the scale 
and you were not fully on the screen I was forced to confront myself”.  
Q Researcher: “Did you feel more embodied with me or yourself, or did you feel 
more separate”?  
A. “The more the video went on I became more of the background… I did start to feel 
more a part of the video…Err I find when you touched your face I felt I wanted to 
touch my face…I did not realize I was doing it…I did not feel compelled to touch my 
face...I expected to yawn but I did not.  As the video went on I felt more conscious of 
me”.  
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel in two places at once”?  
A. “No I was aware I was sat here”. 
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3. Male (M) Second Experience  
Q Researcher:  “Was the second time around different”? 
A. “It was more intense an intrusive feeling of being inside your head with sensual 
sounds and thoughts…it was not because I was on my own though”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel it was difficult to describe”? 
A. “I felt guilty about being so intimate with you”  
Q Researcher:  “Did you try and align yourself with me”? 
A. “Only the first time, but not the second time… It was a seductive experience and I 
felt I was being a little bit err deceitful as regards to my relationship with my wife and 
I was not invited by you as a person to be that close to you”.  
Q Researcher: “When you aligned yourself the first time did you feel more embodied 
to me or not”? 
A. “The first time was more a humorous mode the second time round as we are on 
our own it helped me be more seduced intimately with you”. 
Q Researcher:  “Due to the synchronicity did you feel your body was transported 
somewhere else... what I mean is where you here and there”? 
A. “I become part of the film and it wasn’t easy to be objective as opposed to 
subjective to the image”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel separated from yourself and/or unified”? 
A. “When I felt I was intruding on the projected image I found it difficult to see it as a 
film and as I know you… I have admired your character” 
Q Researcher: “Did you have a heightened awareness of yourself’”? 
A. “Only as much as it made me err aroused to the image I did not want to be 
intimate with the image”. 
Q Researcher:  “Could you feel my presence”? 
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A. “With earphones on yes as they did remind me of those experiences only the 
individual themselves can feel... like swallowing, lip smacking etc”  
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel I was touching you”? 
A. “No I felt the image was you”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you want to copy my movements”? 
A.”Yes the first time as I was in a good mood. The second time round I disassociated 
myself from the image”. 
Q Researcher: “Can you describe any key moments”? 
A. “I was listening to your breath…and err, was interrupted by music from 
somewhere”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was part of you”? 
A. “Only an extension of the history of our relationship which added to the human 
elements I felt about you”. 
 Q Researcher: “Is there anything you want to say”?  
A. “I can see how this subliminally imposing emotions on the viewer that’s why they 
are banned in films and advertising”.  
4. Female (K) First Experience.  
Q Researcher: “What was your first initial experience”? 
A. “The sound got me more than the visual… opening and closing your mouth... you 
were in my head…I tried to match up with your face…the sound sent shivers down 
my spine especially when you blew...I felt you were behind me…I felt we melted and 
we were one thing…suddenly I got back to me when I could see me… I lost myself in 
you. I was expecting to feel really uneasy and felt like you were over taking my body. 
That did not happen. I felt like I was one. ..it was one we were one with the image…it 
was not you and it was not me ...it was your hair and the shivers run down my 
spine…I knew you were touching your face but I was getting the sensation” . 
Q Researcher: “What words would you use to describe emotions”? 
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A. “It was really calming…when you opened you mouth it became more than real 
and a bit uneasy and consumed by the image...yeah it went from safe and intimate 
to being very very small when you opened your mouth…it was ..it felt safe and not 
between two people…you were not you and I was not me it was something else…I 
felt a body extension…when I saw my face it brought me back to where I am sitting”. 
Q Researcher: “What did you mean by strange”? 
A. “You get lost in it to a degree...you forget you’re being filmed”. 
 Q Researcher: “Do you think you lost yourself”?  
A. “Oh yes you do...I lost myself in the work but I did not lose the sense I was sitting 
here”. 
Q Researcher: “During alignment did you feel more embodied”? 
A “I wanted my face to fit with yours...it felt right…it was not weird or uncomfortable I 
forgot you and forgot me”. 
Q Researcher “Did you feel your body was transported but it was still here”? 
A. “Yeah” 
Q Researcher:  “Did you have a heightened unity with the image”? 
A. “I was expecting to feel like the same relationship we have as friends. I thought it 
would be a bit strange…it was a completely different experience with you”. 
Q Researcher: “Was there a different level of consciousnesses”? 
A “‘definitely yes…there was something I achieved with the technology which I could 
not experience otherwise. It was some other reality”. 
Q Researcher:  “Could you feel my presence”? 
A “‘Yes it felt like your presence was my presence…we were both breathing at the 
same time…it was a new thing…a new other...not me and you…when I was not 
merging with you there was a switch like when you yawned …I was 
fascinated…when it was really close up this other had changed into something else 
when I saw your chin it was less comfortable. I did not feel I was touching you or vice 
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versa…it was interesting…it was strange. You were one but not in a way you would 
experience”.   
5. Female (B) Second Experience.   
Q Researcher: “Was there something different second time around”? 
A “‘Yeah the first time I was concentrating on you… this time round I looked more to 
see what you were doing. First time I was more shocked and this time I knew what to 
expect. First time it was about you and second time about me. This time I was trying 
to match myself up and at one point I merged it was spot on it was brilliant.  I thought 
I got it right...I wanted to get it exactly right…I could imagine what your skull was 
like”. 
Q Researcher: “Were you more embodied during alignment”? 
A “I don’t know…I just felt like I wanted to get it right…I can’t describe the feeling…I 
was determined to get it right”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did something click inside you”? 
A “‘When I was lined up I got it correct...it was a hard thing to explain…I achieved it”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you synchronize with me”? 
A “No not at the beginning…second time I did. The first time was about emotions 
and the second time was about aesthetics. I was not aware of my body… the body is 
just a carrier to move around”. 
Q Researcher: “Were there any moments of a union...like a oneness or not”? 
A “I had no feelings”. 
Q Researcher: “Was there a heightened awareness of you”?  
A “‘Maybe …it might ...I don’t know”. 
Q Researcher: “Any key words for emotions in this experience”? 
A “In the first one I felt you had invaded my privacy…this time it was rawer”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel my presence”? 
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A “Because I know you as a person this is not you…I know you so I view it 
differently”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did experiences change”? 
A “‘When you put your hand out…I started copying you...mirroring you”. 
Q Researcher:  “Does mirroring make you feel comfortable”? 
A “‘Oh yes definitely…I feel comfortable mirroring I am very aware I do it”. 
Q Researcher: ‘”Were we part of each other”? 
A “No because I don’t feel part of myself…I was part of the work but not part of 
you…we were not together at any point…there was nothing scary about it…except 
seeing myself”’. 
Q Researcher: “What is the difference between this and a mirror”’? 
A “In a mirror your checking your ok…it is a point of reference…to check it’s 
ok…you’re not conscious your doing it…you’re not aware of your body unless it’s in 
trouble or your ill etc. In a mirror your checking your in the world...it’s not a vanity 
thing it’s to check your ok. But in the video it goes beyond the surface, it’s deeper. I 
think I have contradicted myself I said first time it was about emotions and the 
second about alignment I think this is emotional. I can check everything in the video 
that I could not check as a reference point in the video...mirrors they’re restricted”.   
6. Male (I) Second Experience  
Q Researcher:  “Was it different from the first time”? 
A “Yeah it was different from the first experience…I have put some weight on 
since...last time I could superimpose my face onto yours…this time because I am 
heavier it felt weird not being able to line up my face onto yours”. 
Q Researcher: “Was this experience focusing on trying to align yourself with me”? 
A “‘Yeah much more this time…at the first time I felt possessed and then I got used 
to it…what the composite face looked like…before it was more aligned exactly and it 
was almost like androgynous but I could not do it today”. 
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Q Researcher: “Did you learn more about yourself”?  
A “I think what’s interesting is the way a different mood can influence it...I have just 
come from spouting political slogans in the street and I am more serious…last time I 
was more in the mood for fun...also this time a I am not as shocked as last time 
being eaten and the blowing”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel more embodied”? 
A “Not so much this time...last time I felt I was taken over. It was quite fun last time it 
made me laugh out of fun and uneasiness”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you want to synchronize”?  
A   “Yeah” 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel separate from yourself’”? 
A “‘Yes…the first time after about eight minutes it got difficult to define what was me 
and what was you. So when you’re more aware of yourself you feel separate”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel a oneness’s at all”? 
A “Sort of…because you’re looking out all the time for what is you you’re always 
looking for you in the other”. 
Q Researcher: “Do you think awareness is associated with a oneness”? 
A “I think so yeah”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel my presence”? 
A “Yeah” 
Q Researcher: “Did you mimic me”? 
A “This time I did more than the last time as I could predict what you were going to 
do”. 
Q Researcher: “Was there any key moments”? 
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A “‘I would scratch myself...not sure if it’s a uncomfortable itchy that was posed on 
me etc”. 
Q Researcher: “What emotions did you feel”? 
A “Err I went through a number of feelings ...especially the first time were of surprise, 
discomfort, sensuous…and awareness and then more uneasiness again”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel we were part of each other at all”? 
A “Sort of…yeah..I think cos I know you I would have felt more uncomfortable if I did 
not know you”. 
Q Researcher:  “Is there a difference between this and a mirror”?  
A “Ha ha... yeah in the sense there is something else being superimposed on 
you...it’s not a spec of dust on the mirror it’s another human form…you react 
differently. If it was an object obscuring the mirror…I think when looking at myself the 
difference is the time delay which you would not get with a mirror when speaking into 
it, it would not have a delay it would be instant”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel your body was transported”? 
A   “At times yeah ... when the image moved in and out”  
Q Researcher: “Is there anything you would like to add”? 
A “I am interested how its different from the first experience and if it’s cos I know 
what’s coming or whether it’s something else I am not quite sure…the first time 
produced a genuine feeling of the uncanny when you have never done it before”. 
 Q Researcher: “Do you think you get used to it second time around”? 
A “Yes sure” 
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7. Female (D) First Experience.  
Q Researcher: “Can you describe your feelings”? 
A “‘I thought it would be scary and intimidating. I felt it was playful and warm…with a 
blonde wig and long hair... it made me interested in how I look...it was very playful, 
warm and friendly. The breath was a intimate warm feeling that embellishes you”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you experience more of yourself’”? 
A “‘It just made me feel really funny…also I know you and playing with your image is 
fun like a female playmate like trying to fit the face…I was really wanting to align 
myself to you…it was frustrating as I wanted to play more”. 
Q Researcher: “How did alignment feel”? 
A “It was engaging … very comforting…not threatening…a sisterly thing….when you 
empathize with people you empathize in a visual way…I did mimic and overlap, 
overlay …it’s like two children playing”  
Q Researcher: “Were you more embodied”?  
A “‘I was too aware of what was going on to be embodied…I did not feel pulled in…I 
did not feel transported”. 
Q Researcher: ‘”Did you feel separate at all”? 
A “I felt I lost something when it finished…I did not want it to stop playing with me” 
Q Researcher: “Was there a oneness”?  
A “The aim of the play was aiming at the oneness and merging with the 
image…that’s the aim…you know your not going to achieve it”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you feel my presence”? 
A “It was not you…it was familiar…it was only your image”. 
Q Researcher: “How would you respond if you did not know me”? 
A “I think I would have felt differently, less comfortable”. 
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Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was touching you”? 
A: “No not at all…only a soft regret you had gone when you were moving to the 
side…I could not join you when you moved to the side”. 
Q Researcher: “Were we part of each other”? 
A “No…once the objective had been achieved ie the alignment, then it was not a 
feeling of being part of you only the objective to be achieved”. 
Q Researcher: “Did it feel uncanny”?  
A “No…it was too familiar to be uncanny …it might be done with someone I don’t 
know”. 
Q Researcher: “What’s the difference between this and a mirror”?  
A “‘When the headphones are on you feel underwater, and I felt more distant…I felt 
removed rather than close to the other” 
8. Male (S) Second Experience.  
Q Researcher: “Can you explain to me how you feel”? 
A “I felt the eyes did not belong to me…I felt this was very interesting…something 
about identity…when I matched my eyes up it felt more like me…it produces a 
different person”. 
Q Researcher: “During alignment did you feel more of a unity etc”? 
A “I would have felt we joined up somehow…but later I felt it was a different 
person…the first time I felt joined in you…this time I felt I was producing a third 
person”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you want to copy me”? 
A “Yeah the first time I did. I think I was just moving”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel you body was transported somewhere else ie in two 
places at once”? 
A “I felt I was there and I forgot I was sitting here. I thought I was looking at me”. 
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Q Researcher: “Did you feel a unity or separateness with the work”? 
A “I felt unnerved by the close up mouth thing...I wanted to get away from that…I 
was quite happy to be with your full face”. 
Q Researcher:  “Did you want to copy me”? 
A   “Yeah I did and I was reacting to you” 
Q Researcher: ‘”Could you feel my presence”? 
A “Sort of…I felt some actions were contrived…unnatural…perhaps if it was a film of 
you doing what you normally do then I think o would of felt more of your presence”. 
Q Researcher: “Was there any key moments”? 
A “Yeah I did not like the mouth…I wanted to move away….the sideways gestures 
were quite at ease and a bit uneasy also”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was part of you or vice versa”?  
A. “At times I felt I was part of your image when we matched up” 
Q Researcher “Did you feel me touching you”? 
A “‘No I did not”. 
Q Researcher: “Is there something more real about the video image rather than a 
mirror”? 
A “‘Oh yeah the video image is more real…your limited with your gaze in a mirror so 
you always see yourself in a certain direction and in this situation I can see 
more…the depth of image is different”. 
9. Female (J) Second Experience  
Q Researcher: “Can you explain to me your second experience”? 
A. “‘I looked more at myself this time…the first time I looked at you more”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you want to line up with my image”? 
A   “No, not at all in both times” 
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Q Researcher: “Did you feel more embodied”? 
A “I felt more apart of you when you were blowing and feeling you were going to 
swallow…I also felt quite separate from myself”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you want to copy me”? 
A   “No not at all” 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel your body was taken into the work and being in two 
places at once”? 
A “I physically knew I was here but the sound of the blowing took me somewhere 
else like on holiday”. 
Q Researcher: “Has the work added anything to you”? 
A “This time I feel more comfortable”. 
Q Researcher: “What key words would you use”? 
A “It was relaxing I think…you would not expect it to b e relaxing so it was rather 
odd”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel my presence”? 
A “Only a little but I knew you were always on the screen”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was touching you”? 
A “‘No but there was times I felt you were walking around me”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was part of you at all”? 
A “No I felt we really knew each other even though we don’t”. 
Q Researcher: “What is different from this and a mirror”? 
A “In a mirror you’re critical of yourself as your looking for a reason to see how you 
look. It’s different from a mirror”. 
Q Researcher: “What is more real the mirror or the video”? 
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A “I would say the video is more real it’s a truer reflection of how others see you. It’s 
more accurate”.   
10. Male (E) Second Experience 
Q Researcher: “Was it different from the first time”? 
A: “Yeah I had more time to consider the impact and I knew what to expect and 
reflect. I knew what I wanted to this time. I did not feel lost like the first time. Then I 
was looking for my other...after thinking about it it’s not my other…it’s your other…it’s 
not my other...no that video image is me and not my other. Through my virtual 
meeting of both of us it’s not. .I wanted to line up with your alignment…its interesting 
when faces match up its different to distinguish who is who even though we have 
totally different faces”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel I was touching you”? 
A “‘No it’s me trying to catch up with you…it’s not about your actions affecting me 
…it’s about you being a role model where you are leading me”. 
Q Researcher: “During alignment do you think it creates another being”? 
A “I don’t know…it creates an impression of another being”. 
Q Researcher: “Were you more embodied to me”? 
A “Yeah I felt closer to your image and not mine…while I was experiencing it I was 
trying to get close to you”. 
Q Researcher: ‘”Were you in two places at once”?  
A “Yeah but in the context of a virtual mirror…you never have a mirror that plays 
back an image…that’s while it’s interesting”.  
Q Researcher: “What is the difference between this and a mirror”? 
A   “This goes beyond a mirror…there is a background to it”. 
Q Researcher: “Is the video more real than a mirror”? 
190 
 
A “‘No I can’t distinguish between them…in both cases it’s a reflection of me…it’s the 
reflection that matters….I followed you around and wanted to align up to you.  Once 
you participate you stop questioning it and it pulls you in”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel separate”? 
A “No” 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel a unity with yourself”? 
A “Yeah I felt more conscious of myself…this tracing of the movements gives me a 
heightened awareness or I am more aware of myself’”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you feel my presence”? 
A “No I received it but I did not feel it”. 
Q Researcher: “Did you mimic me”? 
A “Yeah” 
Q Researcher: ‘”Was there any key moments”? 
A “The first time it was alignment and the second time it was the sound. With sound 
there is no intellectual divide its closer to you. With the sound there is no escape but 
with alignment you can move out the way…I felt that both of us were part of 
something we created something other…something new…I was not you and you 
were not me…me being here is about us creating something other…that digital 
image of me is not my other…its two others coming together. It’s a step beyond…I 
did not feel a part of you or you part of me...this is new to me.  
Me being here is not about the other or my other… the other is the social 
expectations of ourselves … the only way that could be my other is by me imposing 
my image of myself over my pre-recorded image over me. The only way that could 
be my other is if it was me…you see the other is a concept on how we see 
ourselves”. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Technical specification: Inter-Reactive Explorations I-REs I-IV 
 
I-RE I :Studio projects i-vi 
1 Digital video camera 
1 Laptop 
1 Video Projector 
1 extra long firewire 
1 tripod 
Computer software: windows movie maker   
 
I-RE I I: Mander Shopping Centre 
Window A:1 Digital Video Camera 
                     1 PC 
                     1Video Projector 
                     2 USB leads 
                     1 Tripod  
Computer software: Isadora 
Window B: 1 Webcam 
                       1 Laptop 
                       1 Video Projector 
                       A Picture Frame 
Computer Software: Isadora 
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I-RE III: Eagleworks Studios 
1 Digital Video Camera 
1 Laptop 
1 Video Projector 
1 Tripod 
2 USB extenders 
1 Headphone 
Computer Software: Isadora 
 
I-RE IV: The Public 
2 LCD TV Monitors 
2 Laptops 
2 Vusix Head Mounted Display Systems HMD 
1 Video Splitter 
Computer Software: Isadora 
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